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 Chapter 1 Introduction 
Carolus Grütters & Elspeth Guild  
1.1 Background 
In Pope Francis’ first address to the European Parliament in Strasbourg in 
November 2014, he deplored the EU’s treatment of migrants. “We cannot allow 
the Mediterranean to become a vast graveyard”, Pope Francis said, in reference 
to the thousands of migrants who drown as they seek to reach Southern Europe 
from North Africa and the Middle East.  
 The first trip which Pope Francis took (July 2013) was to the island of 
Lampedusa, the landing place of many migrants and refugees arriving in Europe 
after dangerous sea trips from North Africa. He met with refugees and migrants 
there and sought first hand experiences of people who have suffered these 
difficult trips and the ambivalent reception on arrival. The Pope also praised 
(Lutheran) Sweden in particular for its open-door policy for refugees and its 
acceptance of the largest number of Syrian refugees over the period of the civil 
war there juxtaposing the treatment of refugees in that mainly protestant country 
against the less generous reception of refugees of a number of primarily Catholic 
countries in Europe. “Sweden opens its borders, organizes language classes, 
gives economic assistance, and offers paths to join society”, Pope Francis said.1  
 This challenge by the head of the Catholic Church to the legitimacy of the 
EU’s border and immigration management project represents a substantial 
policy move at the top of the Catholic Church regarding the normative obli-
gation of European policy makers, border guards and people to accept and 
respect the human dignity of non-citizens (asylum seekers, refugees, migrant 
workers and other migrants) both in law and practice. It is incumbent on scholars 
to examine this issue from the perspective of the role of churches in assisting 
migrants and refugees and framing the ethical imperatives of our times. 
 All kinds of churches, i.e. religious bodies, have played a very important role 
in the assistance and social insertion of migrants in Europe over the past 
decades. During the years of labour migration from Southern Europe to 
Northern Europe, churches were a central institution in providing a mechanism 
for migrants and refugees to find ways to understand their new environments 
and realise their human potential in their new homes. These churches have been 
central in promoting good interfaith relations, social insertion of newcomers and 
equality.  
                                                      
1  Report of Vatican Radio 15 February 2014. 
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 A number of orders and denominations within the churches have been parti-
cularly active in Europe over the past 20 years in the field of migration. The 
Jesuit Refugee Service is perhaps the best-known example with its Charter 
which stresses that it accompanies refugees and forced migrants serving them 
as companions and advocating their cause. However, it is not the only religious 
body, which is engaged with the support of migrants and refugees. Such actions 
not only often come into tension with state policies and national, regional or 
federal laws but also supra-national legislation and programmes designed to 
manage migration by keeping some people out and allowing only some other 
citizens in. This challenge takes the form of a normative position that all people 
are deserving of dignity and that divisions on the basis of citizenship are suspect. 
The legitimacy of national and supranational or federal migration and border 
policies is questioned through many of these activities – and not just in Europe 
or the United States of America. 
1.2 Problem of priority 
There are three main ways in which churches act which privilege people over 
immigration and border laws.  
 The first is in respect of arrival. In the context of the irregular arrivals of 
people on small boats in the Mediterranean, many of the press releases and 
accounts of the saving of life include details that when the boats got into 
difficulties, someone on board had a mobile phone and the number of a priest 
in Italy to whom the distress call was sent and from there the priest alerted the 
authorities to the need for a search and rescue operation. In the process of 
embarking on a dangerous trip in inadequate conditions, the migrants and 
refugees leave the North African coast with knowledge that there is someone, a 
priest, who will dare to raise the alarm when and if they run into trouble. The 
challenge to EU law here is both direct in bringing international humanitarian 
law into a picture which EU border guards prefer to configure as a border control 
matter and indirect in that by assisting the irregular entry of non-EU citizens, 
the priest puts himself potentially in the category of persons who may be 
facilitating ‘illegal’ entry (as the EU documents describe such action) and thus 
potentially committing a criminal act.2  
 The second way concerns reception. In Europe, churches take an important 
role in providing reception facilities and shelter for destitute non-EU citizens 
arriving in the country. In some cases, this reception provision is supported by 
the state with funding being channelled through religious institutions to assist 
people. In this capacity of providing reception to migrants, churches or muni-
cipalities often find themselves in a position of some friction with certain parts 
of immigration authorities which have a policy of trying to starve foreigners into 
                                                      
2  Council Directive 2002/90/EC of 28 November 2002 defining the facilitation of unauthorised 
entry, transit and residence. 
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leaving the state – a rather unsavoury formulation of policy but one in currency 
today. Some churches have taken a central role in challenging the deprivation 
of new arrivals of reception facilities, food, housing and medical treatment. Not 
only through direct provisions albeit in contrast to state policies but also through 
supporting legal challenges such as the very important case from the European 
Committee on Social Rights interpreting the European Social Charter as 
prohibiting the destitution of people on the basis of their immigration status or 
manner of arrival in the state.3  
 The third way in which churches provide support to irregularly present 
migrants (and often asylum seekers whose applications have been refused) 
engages an even more immediate challenge to state authority: the use of church 
asylum to protect persons at risk of expulsion from state authorities. In many 
instances, a Church becomes the sole or last intervener on behalf of irregularly 
present migrants who are facing coercive action by state authorities.4 In the 
USA, a comparable approach is known as ‘sanctuary city’ in which a city limits 
its cooperation with the federal government to enforce immigration law.  
 The normative framework of migration and border control has been much 
influenced by the application of human rights law. Some commentators have 
even gone so far as to see human rights as a ‘new belief system’. However, 
while access to lawyers willing to argue human rights cases became the norm 
in many states in the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s, the diminution in funding 
of legal aid has resulted in the exclusion of many migrants from legal advice 
(let alone legal advice and assistance of a high quality). The role of human rights 
as a mechanism to reframe the normative issues of non-citizens lives has 
become more limited in the 2010s. This may have created new dynamics for 
churches in respect of the humanity of migrants. The question, then, becomes 
which framework – state or faith – has priority and why. 
1.3 This book 
On 9 and 10 February 2017, experts from various backgrounds joined in a 
seminar Migration and Religion organized by the Centre for Migration Law, 
Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence at Radboud University, Nijmegen the 
Netherlands. During this seminar, the focus was on the intersection of migration, 
law and religion. We hoped to identify which arguments play a role in the 
discussions where state law and religious norms conflict in the context of 
                                                      
3  European Committee of Social Rights, 1 July 2014, Complaint 90/2013, Conference of 
European Churches v. the Netherlands. 
4  For example, the work of the Jesuit Refugee Service together with a change in the judicial 
authority reviewing immigration detention in Germany has resulted in the sharp reduction of 
non-citizens kept in detention with a view to removal from the country and a possible closure 
of several detention facilities for foreigners. 
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migration. In this book, we have included the most important contributions to 
this seminar thematically organised around four topics:  
 
 (1) Religious Social Thought,  
 (2) Application of religious freedom   
 (3) Comparative analysis of religious freedom laws, 
  and  
 (4) Practitioners’ views. 
 
The first theme, Religious Social Thought, is examined first by Graziano Battis-
tella. In chapter 2, he outlines the historical foundations of Catholic Social 
Thought on the issue of migration and the repeated attention to date. He also 
underlines that Churches recognize the tension between love for migrants and 
love thy neighbour. Subsequently, Jorge Castillo Guerra provides a closer look 
(chapter 3) at the current views of the Vatican held by Pope Francis, who offers 
the view that the Church is without borders or boundaries. Migration is not a 
‘mere ethical issue’ but rather a ‘faith issue’. The third contribution on this 
theme (chapter 4) is by Myron Cherry who presents the views of Talmudic law 
on migration and concludes that ‘Talmudic law regards immigration policy as 
circumstantial and transactional’. Thus, illustrating a balance between the rights 
and duties of a stranger, i.e. the migrant, and society. Although these three 
narratives seem to represent equivalent ideas, there are differences as to what is 
given priority. 
 The second theme, Application of religious freedom to migration laws, is 
developed by Rev. Craig Mousin (chapter 5), who demonstrates that courts (in 
the United States of America) still fail to address international law under the 
International Religious Freedom Act. He concludes that the government shows 
a lack of sensitivity to national laws, cultures and practice that silence religious 
belief and practice. Subsequently, Federica Sona (chapter 6) elaborates the 
Italian case. She focuses on the right of Muslim migrants to contract a valid 
marriage in Italy with civil and religious effects. Along with national legislation 
and religious rules, the EU directive on family reunification is dealt with. 
Dolores Morondo Taramundi (chapter 7) goes one step further and investigates 
how to break the law. More in particular, she discusses cases of infringement of 
legislation stemming from the Facilitation Directive.  
 The third theme, religious freedom laws, is first dealt with by Jim Murdoch 
(chapter 8). He shows that jurisprudence of the ECtHR on Article 9 ECHR 
acknowledges the principle that diversity matters and that there may well be a 
need for limits to the freedom of, among others, religious belief. However, he 
proceeds in arguing that Article 9 is not necessary to protect freedom of thought, 
conscience and belief in light of case law developments on Article 14 ECHR. 
He suggests that discounting any element of the exercise of religious belief in 
favour of the application of the principle that cases are better determined by the 
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simple question of which side better advances pluralism, tolerance and broad-
mindedness. The second contribution in this part (chapter 9) comes from 
Roberto Scarciglia who discusses the legal problems related to the exercise of 
freedom of religion and immigration at the level of comparative administrative 
law. Specifically, he focuses on freedom of religion in places of immigration 
detention.  
 The fourth part of the book contains some practical experiences of offering 
help. Almaya Valcarcel (chapter 10) describes the hospitality offered by the 
Jesuit Refugee Service. The JRS has developed a Welcome Network, a pro-
gramme for individuals and families to welcome refugees into their homes. The 
practical problems one runs into by ‘just’ offering help is exposed (chapter 11) 
by Lisbeth Zornig Andersen. She tells the story of how helping others brought 
her in (legal) problems in Denmark. Quite depressing is her conclusion that after 
a Danish District Court punished her for helping refugees, no higher Court came 
to her aid. The Danish Court of Appeal upheld the verdict of the district Court. 
Subsequently the Danish Supreme Court declared her case inadmissible: too 
little importance. Even the European Court of Human Rights did not want to 
touch it: inadmissible. Lastly, Derk Venema (chapter 12) illustrates the proble-
matic character of freedom of religion describing the Church of the Flying 
Spaghetti Monster. Interestingly, the principle characteristic of a religion does 
not seem to be sincerity but seriousness.  
 In the concluding remarks in the postface of this book (chapter 13), Elspeth 
Guild expresses the competing viewpoints that have emerged from several 
papers regarding the propriety of assisting migrants. She does so by reference 
to two biblical passages: Romans 13, which commands submission to governing 
(worldly) authority, and Matthew 25, which commands people to help strangers 
or migrants. 
 We hope this book will clear up the arguments used in the discussions on the 
important issue on migration and religion. 
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 Chapter 2 Do Likewise 
Obligations toward migrants in Catholic Social Thought 
Graziano Battistella  
2.1 Introduction 
It is probably a platitude, but I would still like to begin by remembering the 
pictures of those two boys found dead, one on the shore of the Mediterranean 
Sea and the other on the banks of a river between Bangladesh and Myanmar. 
The first, Aylan Kurdi, was a three-year-old Syrian boy who drowned on 2 
September 2015 near Bodrum, Turkey, while his family was attempting to reach 
the island of Kos in Greece, after their application for asylum in Canada was 
rejected. The second, Mohammed Shohayet, was a 16-month-old Rohingya boy 
who drowned while the family was trying to cross the river Naf on the Ban-
gladesh-Myanmar border on 4 January 2017. Two similar pictures, one year 
apart, miles apart, but pointing to the same reality: there are people in the world 
trying to escape violence, persecution or poverty, but there is sufficient willing-
ness to welcome them in countries where there is security and prosperity. 
Should anyone feel obliged to respond to the plight of people seeking asylum 
and if yes, who should? The countries closer to problematic areas are the ones 
providing immediate solutions. But should the moral responsibility to intervene 
only fall on them? Is geography the main determinant for moral responsibility 
toward migrants and asylum seekers? 
 Two additional images need to be presented in this introduction. On the one 
hand, the image of thousands of migrants from Syria in a European country, 
Germany, and the image of the border of another European country, Hungary, 
closed with barbed wire to avoid the entry of refugees. Of course, things cannot 
be oversimplified and other images could be shown which lead to a different 
conclusion. The purpose, however, is to raise some questions. Why is there such 
a difference among countries with the same cultural background (insofar as 
being European spells cultural similarities)? And closer to our topic, why are 
there such differences in countries with the same Christian background? To put 
it differently, is it possible to share the same faith and have a different attitude 
toward migrants? Is such difference coherent with Catholic Social Thought 
(CST)? 
 The question hides many other concerns: among them, the relevance of CST 
in general, for public policies in particular and, ultimately, the possibility that 
people listening to CST may reach different policy conclusions. It is not our 
 CHAPTER 2 DO LIKEWISE 24 
intention to resurrect the old debate about the autonomy of political mediation 
in governing social realities. The purpose of this chapter is much more modest. 
It attempts to illustrate CST in regard to migration and examine whether and 
what obligations toward migrants arise from that teaching. In addition, it must 
be specified that reference to CST is mostly limited to documents of the Holy 
See and it cannot be exhaustive, as documents, messages and speeches already 
comprise hundreds of pages.1 
 This chapter will begin with a brief illustration of the biblical foundations of 
the teaching on migration; it will then examine the main obligations deriving 
from CST; it will discuss the normative nature of CST and its convergence with 
or divergence from international norms on migration. It will conclude with the 
call for an ethic of inclusion and proximity. 
2.2 Biblical foundations 
Extensive writing has been devoted, particularly in recent years, to the biblical 
perspective on migration. This increased attention follows the attempt to 
propose a theology of migration, a development emerging from the growing 
trend of doing contextual theology.2 Relying on migration as a locus theologicus 
and a “sign of the time”, the theology of migration attempts to shed new light 
on the mystery of salvation using migration as a metaphor for the journey of 
God with his people and the aspiration of people to return to God. In this context, 
the many circumstances of displacement, escape, expulsion, exile, diaspora, 
welcoming and hospitality found in Scripture are utilized as metaphors for the 
unravelling of the mystery of salvation. 
 If careful exegesis and hermeneutics is necessary in the reading of Scripture 
in relation to a theology of migration, much more attention is required when 
using the Scriptures for ethical reflection. After centuries in which Scripture in 
Catholic moral theology was used mostly as proof-texts,3 magisterial and 
theological contributions after Vatican II make a much more extensive reference 
to the Bible, also following the recommendation of Optatam Totius (16) which 
asked that moral theology “should draw more fully on the teaching of Holy 
Scripture”. At the same time, there was no agreement among moral theologians 
on the method for using the Scriptures. Spohn contends that Catholics use an 
analogical approach between the situations in Scripture and the contemporary 
                                                      
1 See: Tassello G. & L. Favero (eds.) (1985), Chiesa e mobilità umana. Documenti della Santa 
Sede dal 1883 al 1983, Roma: Centro Studi Emigrazione; Fondazione Migrantes (2001), 
Enchiridion della Chiesa per le Migrazioni. Documenti magisteriali ed ecumenici sulla 
pastorale della mobilità umana (1887-2000), Bologna, EDB; Baggio Fabio & Maurizio 
Pettenà (eds.) (2009), Caring for Migrants. A Collection of church Documents on the 
Pastoral Care of Migrants, Strathfield, NSW: St Pauls Publications. See for most documents 
of the Holy See: <www.vatican.va>.  
2  Campese 2012. 
3  Bowe and Nairn, 2002. 
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context, while Protestants prefer a dialectical approach.4 Behind these metho-
dological differences, however, there is agreement that more than providing 
specific moral rules, the narration of salvation testified in Scripture is the source 
for the living of discipleship. 
 This brief digression on the use of Scripture is necessary because a funda-
mentalist misuse of the Bible remains common, even in regard to migrants. Sen. 
Jeff Sessions of Alabama, Attorney General of the USA, claims to find support 
in Scripture for his political choices and indicated the decision of Nehemiah to 
rebuild the wall of Jerusalem as the equivalent of the wall between the US and 
Mexico. In ridiculing this position, Rev. Craig B. Mousin of the Chicago 
Theological Seminary pointed out that the whole history of salvation would 
have been different if a fundamentalist interpretation had been applied.5 
 The commandment: “The foreigner residing among you must be treated as 
your native-born. Love them as yourself, for you were foreigners in Egypt. I am 
the Lord your God” (Lv 19:34) is the most direct reference to normative 
behaviour toward migrants that we can find in Hebrew Scripture. It was 
observed that it is repeated more than 30 times (more than any other command-
ment except for the injunction to recognize the supremacy of God).6 Exegetes 
rush to specify that not all foreigners were included in that commandment, but 
only what we would call the permanent residents (gēr). The visitor or temporary 
residents (zar or nochri) were considered strangers and were not given such 
attention. Perhaps what is most significant in the commandment toward the 
foreigner, who could be of any nationality or ethnicity, are the reasons for the 
protection.7 First is the condition of legal weakness, similar to that of the orphan 
and the widow. The reason for the lack of protection comes from the fact that 
these persons do not possess the sources of protection: property or people who 
could provide a guarantee for them. “The Israelites should not take advantage 
of their condition, but should favour their survival by allowing them to glean 
wheat and grapes after the harvest” (Dt 24:19-21). Second is the fact that Israel 
was a foreigner in Egypt. Having experienced oppression in a foreign land, 
Israel should remember the suffering connected with it and not impose it on 
others. The same logic that sustains the golden (or silver) rule also informs the 
commandment not to oppress the foreigner, and is sanctioned by the will of God: 
“I am the Lord your God.” 
 Rushing from the commandment to love foreigners to conclusions on public 
policy is an inappropriate shortcut. Immigration restrictionists have spared no 
effort to utilize Scripture in their favour8 and it is worthwhile remembering, as 
pointed out by the Lutherans, that “Scriptural teaching on immigrants (…) 
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cannot be directly translated into current immigration laws or policies”.9 At the 
same time, Scripture provides us with “an interpretive framework” and the 
commandment to love the foreigner cannot be ignored. It is the first obligation 
we have toward migrants, regardless of the form of migration in which they are 
involved as it would be anachronistic to utilize the biblical distinctions between 
foreigners and strangers and apply it to contemporary migrants. 
 Naturally, such a commandment must be considered an instance of the more 
general commandment to love one another. It is the original responsibility, 
considered in its semantic value as responding to the other. It is a response 
required from the very beginning of the history of salvation. “Then the Lord 
said to Cain, ‘Where is your brother Abel?’” (Gen. 4:9). Levinas has provided 
the philosophical foundation for the understanding of the other as someone who 
cannot be assimilated to the self and who requires instead recognition in his 
“otherness,” from which moral duties derive. It is the foundation of an ethics of 
alterity which becomes the ethics of responsibility as the other requires that I 
respond to his existence.  
 In the New Testament, alterity is redefined as proximity. The indigence of 
the other reveals my own indigence and requires that I reach out to him, become 
a neighbour, and love him like myself, because he is myself.10 The reference to 
the parable of the Samaritan (Lk 10:25-37) becomes natural. It defines the 
ethical consequences of discipleship as an ethics of proximity. As Christ, the 
estranged among his own people, reaches out to wounded humanity, so the 
disciple is invited to become a neighbour to those in need. It is a parable that 
has been utilized often in regard to the concern for migrants, but which invites 
reinterpretation. Traditionally migrants have been identified with the man 
beaten up and left half dead on the side of the road and the recommendation is 
for Christians to act as good Samaritans, rescuing them from the abuses suffered 
on the migration trail. But an ethic of proximity also has a reciprocal side. It is 
in the encounter with the other that I discover who I am. Accepting the logic of 
proximity is accepting to be welcomed in the act of welcoming. Today more 
than ever the migrants are the ones who desire to become our neighbours, they 
are the Samaritans trying to approach us.11 Legal barriers erected by migration 
policies and structural walls built at the borders are keeping them out. We feel 
secure because of those barriers and do not realize that our secure societies are 
in need of rescue. 
 With this perspective, it is easier to understand the New Testament normative 
injunction in reference to migrants: “I was a stranger and you invited me in” 
(Mt 25:35). An ethics of responsibility and proximity requires hospitality, but 
hospitality implies identification and recognition. Through hospitality the other 
is no longer a stranger but a neighbour. Differences cannot be eliminated, but 
can be appreciated in a relationship of mutual recognition. Hospitality is offered 
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gratuitously, but Jesus’ identification with the stranger gives to hospitality an 
ethical and eschatological dimension, because “Jesus Christ is the paradigm for 
Christian moral life”, as he said: “follow me”.12 Again, from the command of 
hospitality we cannot derive specific policies, but we have an interpretative 
framework within which to discern when policies turn against the spirit of the 
Gospel. 
2.3 Obligations to migrants in the Church’s Social Thought 
In the Gospel, Jesus identifies with the foreigner without distinction as to the 
type of foreigner. The same universalistic approach is maintained in the early 
Christian community as powerfully expressed in the short writing To Diognetus. 
Diognetus has various questions about Christians and one such question is 
“what is the affection which they cherish among themselves?” The author 
answers: “They love all men, and are persecuted by all.” As Burin observes, 
they do not just love one another, they love all, as required by the Lord (Mt 
5:43-46).13 Certainly, the early Christian tradition also contains an adversarial 
tone, particularly in the apologetic literature as found in the Hebrew Scripture.14 
It is also possible that the apologetic purpose leads to embellishing things, but 
it is still worthwhile quoting Aristides of Athens, who wrote in the Apologia 
(15:7): “And when they see a stranger, they take him in to their homes and 
rejoice over him as a very brother”. 
 The universalistic framework is never lost but the progressive experience of 
concern for foreigners from the same Christian faith has led to directives and 
institutions that can be qualified more as pastoral care. When contemporary 
forms of migration generated by the Industrial Revolution took place, the 
Church developed specific teachings and action for the care of migrants. These 
teachings reflect the evolution of origin, direction and types of migration. From 
the specific concern for Italian migrants to the Americas at the time of Leo XIII 
the teachings re-acquired a universalistic approach after Vatican II and more 
specifically with the latest instruction Erga Migrantes Caritas Christi and have 
been written to address migration as a globalized phenomenon. Throughout this 
development, some essential obligations toward migrants can be identified. 
These are duties which correspond to migrants’ rights. 
2.3.1 Obligation to ensure that migration is not a necessity 
It has been frequently stated that a comprehensive approach to migration 
requires addressing its root causes. While this is not the place to discuss the 
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determinants of migration,15 it can be said in general terms that migration is 
remotely caused by economic, political, social and cultural disparities which 
force people to decide to seek a more dignified life in another country. What is 
considered problematic are the constraints, which are manifested in different 
degrees in the various forms of migration (higher for refugees, less compelling 
for economic migrants) but which bear consequences on the decision to migrate.  
 Leo XIII expressed the idea that migration is the result of compelling factors 
when he said in Rerum Novarum (47): “No one would exchange his country for 
a foreign land if his own afforded him the means of living a decent and happy 
life”. Pacem in Terris (25), Gaudium et Spes (66) and Erga Migrantes Caritas 
Christi (29) reiterated and made more explicit the need to ensure that people are 
not constrained into migration: “Also the right of the individual not to emigrate 
is affirmed, that is, the right to be able to achieve his rights and satisfy his 
legitimate demands in his own country”. 
2.3.2 Obligation to admit migrants 
The obligation to receive migrants derives from the fact that the Church 
recognizes the right to migrate as a natural right. The initial formulation of such 
a right is attributed to Pius XII. He looked at migration mostly as an issue of 
overpopulation. Migration was a way of redistributing population for the benefit 
of both the country of origin and the country of destination. Behind this practical 
reasoning was a theological argumentation, the fact that land was a resource that 
“God created for and prepared for the use of all”.16 In the Apostolic Constitution 
Exsul Familia he argued that the right to migrate was founded on natural law 
and duties toward humanity.17 The right was expressed in clear terms in the 
radio message Levate capita vestra pronounced on Christmas Eve 1952, where 
he said that numerous families found obstacles to migration because of the 
measures imposed by migration policies and therefore “the natural right of the 
person not to be hindered from emigrating or immigrating is not recognized or 
is practically nullified under the pretext of a common good falsely understood 
or falsely applied, but nevertheless sanctioned and validated by legislative or 
administrative dispositions”.18 In those words, Pius XII affirmed the right to 
migrate as a natural right, but also the right of the state to regulate migration in 
the name of the common good of the country. However, limitations deriving 
from the common good cannot be falsely understood or falsely applied. In 
addition, even if the common good of the country would lead to restrictions, 
“Christian charity and the sense of human solidarity existing between all men, 
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children of the One Eternal God and Father, will not be forgotten.”19 Consi-
derations deriving from membership in the common human family should 
temper the restrictions which the state can determine in the name of the common 
good of the country and invite human solidarity. 
 The articulation provided by Pius XII was then reiterated by his successors, 
mostly in the same terms, although international migration had changed. John 
XXIII listed the right to migrate in art. 25 of Pacem in Terris. Paul VI in 
Octogesima Adveniens (17) advocated an international charter for migrants 
“which will assure them of the right to emigrate, favor their integration, 
facilitate their professional advancement and give them access to decent housing 
where, if such is the case, their families can join them.”  The Instruction Nemo 
Est (1969), which replaced Exsul Familia as the guiding Church document on 
the care of migrants, reformulated the right to migrate in its essential elements 
in art. 7 as a right of the persons but also of the families and which should not 
be denied “except for grave requirements of the common good, considered 
objectively.” John Paul II provided the clearest formulation of the right to 
migrate in the 2001 World Migration Day Message (WMDM), specifying “its 
dual aspect of the possibility to leave one’s country and the possibility to enter 
another country to look for better conditions of life.” 
 This brief excursus shows consistent teachings by the Church on the right to 
migrate, which should not be considered an absolute right since the country can 
regulate it, but which should be affirmed as taking precedence over regulation, 
since for the Church it is the state that should explain the reasons for limiting 
such right and the reasons can only be for the common good of the country, but 
a common good considered objectively. In Church teachings countries should 
ensure general openness to migrants and refugees. The reasons why migrants 
and refugees should be accepted is because they are escaping conditions which 
are against their human dignity (Nemo Est 7) and because, before belonging to 
specific nations, everyone belongs to the common human family. 
2.3.3 Obligation to protect the migrants’ families 
The Church affirms the right to migrate not simply as a right of the individual 
but as a right of the family (Mater et Magistra 45; Familiaris Consortio 46). 
The right of migrants to live together as a family should be safeguarded (Apos-
tolicam Actuositatem 11; Charter of the Rights of the Family 12,b) and the same 
should apply to refugees, as recommended by Benedict XVI in his 2007 
WMDM. Obligations toward the migrants’ family concern all aspects with 
which every family has to contend (housing, education of children, working 
conditions, social benefits). John Paul II reminded states that protecting the 
family, in particular the migrant family, was a priority duty.20 Often, the right to 
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live as a family is not expressly opposed, but it is frustrated by the lack of 
conditions to live as a family. This applies in particular to workers in temporary 
migration, confined in barracks or labour camps. Attention to the family left 
behind is recommended in documents of episcopal conferences such as the 2003 
joint document of the US and Mexican bishops: Strangers No Longer. Together 
On the Journey of Hope (46). Specific obligation is required in regard to the 
children of migrants, the object of the 2017 WMDM of Pope Francis, who 
recommends protection, integration and long-term solutions to issues related to 
migrant children. 
2.3.4 Obligation to ensure integration and cultural dialogue 
The admission of migrants is only the first step in the migration process. 
Insertion into the community, with all its related aspects, constitutes the largest 
part of migrants’ rights and, conversely, of society’s duties and obligations. The 
Church has recommended social integration countless times, warning against 
the temptation to assimilate the migrant both into the society and the Church.21 
Integration begins with avoiding discrimination in all its forms. 
 The Church is aware that the presence of migrants increases the cultural 
differences within societies. John Paul II, addressing this issue in his message 
for the World Day of Peace (1 January 2001), observed that migration often 
enriched the cultural environment of the countries of destination. At other times, 
cultural differences remain sharp and fan ongoing tensions. The Pope was aware 
that there were no “magic formulas” to address differences but invited inter-
cultural dialogue, the need to address both the needs of the local population as 
well as of the migrants, and the obligation to respect the cultural traditions of 
the migrants “as long as they do not contravene either the universal ethical 
values inherent in the natural law or fundamental human rights.” 
2.3.5 Obligation to respect the human rights of irregular migrants 
Irregular migration is ubiquitous. There is practically no country which can 
claim to be without irregular migrants, and the harshest measures against them, 
including structural barriers, often make the process more dangerous but do not 
eliminate it. Irregular migration is a function of the conflict between the number 
of migrants intending to go abroad and migration policies limiting such 
possibility. Differences in the number of irregular migrants in countries depend 
on the geographical proximity between origin and destination, the imbalance in 
their living and working conditions and ultimately the usefulness of irregular 
migrants for the destination economy. 
 The Church does not advocate irregular migration. However, John Paul II 
warned that “His irregular legal status cannot allow the migrant to lose his 
dignity, since he is endowed with inalienable rights, which can neither be 
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violated nor ignored”.22 Together with the respect of human rights, which are 
not lost because of the irregular status, the Church recommends preventive 
action and legislative harmonization.23  
2.3.6 Obligation to assist victims of smuggling and trafficking 
Increasingly, smuggling and trafficking of persons have received the attention 
of the international community, which has addressed the issues through two 
widely ratified protocols of the 2000 United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime (CTOC). Although this phenomenon is not 
limited to persons involved in migration, as trafficking in particular can also 
happen within the national borders, it is migrants who are mostly caught in it. 
The Church has raised its voice several times on the subject. The EMCC defined 
trafficking as “a new chapter in the history of slavery” (5) and recommends 
speaking about it in catechetical instruction (41). Pope Francis has spoken often 
on the subject with the intention of raising awareness on this “modern form of 
slavery, which violates the God-given dignity of so many of our brothers and 
sisters, and constitutes a true crime against humanity.”24 He called the victims 
of trafficking the most vulnerable people in society and encouraged action 
within the Church, where several groups have already been established on the 
issue of trafficking, such as the Santa Marta Group (senior law enforcement 
chiefs and members of the Catholic Church), RENATE (Religious in Europe 
Networking Against Trafficking and Exploitation) and Talitha Kum (a coalition 
of religious congregations).  
2.3.7 Obligation to avoid forced migration and to welcome refugees and 
asylum seekers 
Forced migration is increasing, driven by conflicts and natural disasters, and 
comprising internally displaced persons, asylum seekers, refugees and persons 
of humanitarian concern. The Church has dedicated two major documents to 
refugees: Refugees, A Challenge to Solidarity (1992) and Welcoming Christ in 
Refugees and Forcibly Displaced Persons: Pastoral Guidelines (2013). The 
purpose of this second document is clearly stated: “Through this Document, we 
hope to make all Christians, pastors and faithful alike, aware of their duties as 
regards refugees and other forcibly displaced persons” (7). In this regard, the 
main direction was set by John Paul II:  
every situation in which human persons or groups are 
obliged to flee their own land to seek refuge elsewhere 
stands out as a serious offence to God. (...) The dramatic 
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plight of refugees demands that the international community 
do everything possible not only to treat the symptoms, but 
first of all to go to the root of the problem: in other words, 
to prevent conflicts and promote justice and solidarity in 
every context of the human family” (32).  
Detailed recommendations for addressing the issues of and providing pastoral 
care to refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced persons, stateless persons, 
trafficked persons, and people subject to sexual exploitation are offered. 
2.3.8 Obligation to provide pastoral care 
The Christian community is directly charged with the obligation to welcome 
migrants within the Church, to provide them with specific pastoral care and the 
possibility to participate actively within the community. The welcoming derives 
from the fundamental principle expressed by John Paul II “In the Church no one 
is a stranger, and the Church is not foreign to anyone, anywhere”.25 Migrants, 
however, must be assured not just of welcome, but of full pastoral care (EMCC 
32). This duty is weighed upon the bishops, first (CD 18), and therefore upon 
the local Churches. Specific pastoral care requires the possibility to serve the 
migrants in their language and culture but with a view to building communion. 
The presence of migrants within the local Church serves as a sacrament for the 
experience of the dimension of catholicity which characterizes the Church, but 
also as a measure of it (EMCC 103). Migrants should be assured of the possi-
bility to express their baptismal vocation as full participants within the commu-
nity, overcoming a perspective which considers them outsiders and only in need 
of social assistance. “They offer the Church the opportunity to realize more 
concretely its identity as communion and its missionary vocation” (EMCC 103). 
2.4 The nature and cogency of obligations toward migrants 
After highlighting, necessarily in general terms, the obligations toward migrants 
contained in CST, it is necessary to examine what is the nature of such 
obligations. The dispositions provided in early documents were absorbed and 
codified in the Canon Law and are normative for those involved in the care of 
migrants. Erga Migrantes Caritas Christi also contains Juridical Pastoral 
Regulations, intended to update the guidance of the Church on the pastoral care 
of migrants. In reality, the innovations over the previous Instruction are few. 
Among them, is the organization of the text, beginning, like Lumen Gentium, 
with the tasks of the lay faithful and ending with the duties of Episcopal 
Conferences and the now abolished Pontifical Council for the Care of Migrants 
and Itinerant People. The Instruction directs itself also to migrants of Catholic 
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Oriental Churches as well as to non-Catholic and non-Christian migrants. This 
positive openness reflects the need of the Church to reach out to the millions of 
non-Catholic and non-Christian migrants of the current era. At the same time, 
from a canonical perspective, it creates the necessity to coordinate with other 
dicasteries within the Roman Curia who have direct competence over those 
faithful. Likewise, Art. 22 confers upon the Pontifical Council the authority to 
issue instructions, which traditionally was reserved only to the Congregations 
within the Roman Curia.26  
 Outside of the juridical norms, the obligations toward migrants carry the 
same cogency as the entire CST. This is not the place to revisit the discussion 
about the various expressions utilized to refer to CST. Leo XIII spoke of 
“Christian philosophy” (RN 14); Pius XI used the expression “social philo-
sophy” (QA 4). It was Pius XII who introduced the term “social doctrine,”27 
which was continued by John XXIII, but abandoned in the documents of 
Vatican II and by Paul VI, who emphasized the need for the Church not only to 
teach, but also to learn. “Social doctrine” reacquired currency with John Paul II 
and it is in the title of the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church. 
Within theological schools, the most common term is “social thought,” an 
expression which downplays the normative character of CST. Beyond the 
terminological dispute, what is essential is to capture the characteristics of CST, 
which should not be considered an ideology or the search for a third way 
between capitalism and socialism (SRS 41). It is instead a thinking which is 
evangelical, prophetic, critical, dialogical and pluralist.28 
 The normative nature of CST was addressed by Paul VI in Octogesiam 
Adveniens (4). The Pope acknowledged that it was not possible to provide a 
unified solution to all the different situations and affirmed that that was not his 
ambition or mission; he deferred the duty to provide practical solutions to local 
Christian communities. This should be done in dialogue between all stake-
holders, including all persons of goodwill. Nevertheless “the forcefulness and 
special character of the demands made by the Gospel” should not be lost. This 
forcefulness consisted of the inspiration that the Gospel and Church tradition 
provided to advance life in society. However, no specific option should claim 
to exhaust the Gospel’s inspiration.  
 From the words of Paul VI it is possible to conclude that obligations toward 
migrants can be articulated in a different way in different situations but also that 
the different articulations cannot escape the demands generated by the Gospel, 
enriched by the experience of Church tradition. When examining the normative 
character of CST obligations toward migrants we discover that it is absolute 
when the human dignity of the person is offended and when the human rights 
of migrants are violated, it is progressive when addressing the causes and 
consequences of migration, it is inspirational when envisioning a community 
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and society that incarnate the dynamics of the kingdom of God, which remains 
within the constant tension between the “already but not yet.” CST has a 
universal dimension, it is offered to all peoples as all are responsible for the 
common good, but it demands much closer consideration and adherence from 
the disciples of Christ, as it is derived ultimately from the teaching and example 
of Christ. 
2.5 Convergence and divergence of obligations toward 
migrants between CST and international norms 
Although migration remains governed by national migration policies, there are 
many international instruments applicable to migrants and obliging the states 
that have ratified those instruments.29 The covenants and conventions that 
constitute international humanitarian law are applicable to migrants, except 
when such application is specifically excluded, usually because of citizenship 
requirements. The same can be said of the ILO conventions. Instruments 
directly adopted for the protection of migrants include the International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families, and ILO Conventions 97 and 143.  
 Specific categories of migrants find additional protection in specific 
instruments, such as the ILO Convention 189 on Domestic Workers. Also, many 
regional instruments exist for the protection of migrants within the regional 
borders. CST, which is not tasked with providing specific measures for the 
protection of migrants, does not diverge from such a vast corpus of international 
law. At the same time, instruments in favour of migrants are notorious for their 
very limited level of ratification. Although countries might provide the same 
measures in their national legal system, they tend to not ratify international 
conventions to avoid being tied by international obligations in the regulation of 
migration. Furthermore, even when international norms are adopted, the 
national implementation often remains unsatisfactory.  
 Because of this complex and fragmented scenario, for the analysis of 
convergence and divergence it is not possible to examine the actual 
implementation of norms. The following considerations simply provide a 
general appreciation of Church teachings in relation to the accepted approach to 
migration within the international community. 
2.5.1 Obligation to avoid migration as a necessity 
While the Church affirms explicitly the right not to emigrate, there is no such 
terminology in international law. This, however, does not mean that the 
international community is not conscious of the issue. Perhaps the closest 
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international statement is the 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development, 
reaffirmed in the 1993 Vienna Declaration, although one could argue that the 
right to development does not imply that such development should take place 
within the country and exclude migration. Countries of origin have been 
challenged to increase the level of development to avoid a flow of migrants 
which critics see as a specific strategy toward development. Some countries, 
like the Philippines, have established in the law30 that migration should not be 
used as a strategy for national development, but legal statements might not 
converge with actual policies. 
 The closest convergence is in the first principle of action of the final report 
of the Global Commission on International Migration, which says: “Women, 
men and children should be able to realize their potential, meet their needs, 
exercise their human rights and fulfil their aspirations in their country of origin, 
and hence migrate out of choice, rather than necessity”.31 Since then, it has 
become common to repeat this principle as the guidance for migration policies, 
but coherence with other development policies is another story. 
2.5.2 Obligation to admit migrants 
While the Church explicitly affirms the right to migrate as a natural right and in 
its dual dimension (right to leave and right to enter another country) inter-
national law does not contain such a right. It simply speaks of the right to leave 
a country and to return to one’s country.32 One could argue that the divergence 
on this essential point between the Church and the international community is 
irrelevant, because in all instances in which the Church affirms the right to 
migrate, it contextually affirms also the right of the state to regulate migration. 
It might appear a complex and futile exercise of balance on the part of the 
Church, but in reality, it carries importance for the obligation toward migrants. 
On the one hand, the Church’s recognition of the right of the state to regulate 
migration is always residual. Secondly, the recognition of the right of the state 
to regulate migration is qualified; it must be motivated by the common good of 
the country and the common good must be properly understood. The US and 
Mexican bishops have concluded that the control is not admissible “when it is 
exerted merely for the purpose of acquiring additional wealth”.33 In general, this 
divergence allows for the ethical scrutiny of migration policies in the name of 
duties toward the common human family and in solidarity with those most in 
need. 
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2.5.3 Obligation to protect the migrants’ families 
The migrant’s family is inherently included in the protection afforded to 
migrants. The fact that it is included in the title of the Migrant Workers Conven-
tion speaks loudly about it. In addition, the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, the widest ratified UN Convention, considers specifically the situation of 
the children of migrants and recommends that states facilitate family reuni-
fication (art. 10). However, it is on family reunification that some divergence 
can be observed. While the Church affirms the right of family reunification,34 
international instruments only recommend that states facilitate it or not hinder 
it, but never acknowledge it as a right of the migrant.35 Perhaps the above-
mentioned art. 10 of the CRC comes closer to it. It is possible that, particularly 
in the case of migrant workers, the conditions for family life are not available 
and family reunification is not a recommended solution. It is also true that 
family reunification is sometimes abused, with migrants resorting to fake 
marriages to obtain admission or stay in the foreign country. But it is also true 
that even traditional countries of immigration have reduced admission for 
family reunification in favour of admissions which bring economic benefits to 
the country. The Church’s stance reminds legislators of the duty to not deprive 
migrants of family life. 
2.5.4 Obligation to ensure integration and cultural dialogue 
Integration is differently addressed in the various migration systems. Some 
countries, like the US, have adopted a laissez-faire approach and leave it to the 
migrants to decide how to integrate. Other countries, like Canada and Australia, 
have adopted a specific multicultural approach. European countries have played 
with multiculturalism but declared it a failure. Instead, the European Union has 
adopted a common agenda to favour the integration of migrants.36 Countries of 
temporary migration, like the Gulf Countries, do not foresee the integration of 
migrants, who are not allowed to acquire long-term residence rights. 
 The Church’s recommendation to ensure the integration of migrants speaks 
in general terms and it is not possible to go beyond that precisely because of the 
variety of situations in which integration can take place.37 As for the contentious 
aspect of cultural differences introduced or exacerbated by the migrants, the 
Church’s invitation to encourage intercultural dialogue goes beyond the 
increasing isolationism among countries, as well as the reaction to terrorism 
manifested even by some bishops in Eastern Europe, and finds echoes in 
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UNESCO’s (2009) invitation to start intercultural dialogue. Although ignored, 
both the Church and UNESCO’s recommendations maintain their validity and 
require proper education to see a change in attitudes and perceptions. 
2.5.5 Obligation to ensure the protection of the rights of irregular migrants 
In this regard, there is wide convergence between the Church and international 
law. In fact, it was the ILO Convention 143 first, and the MWC later that 
codified the protection of the rights of irregular migrants and the Church has 
supported this effort. It is well known that the reference is basically to their 
human rights, the rights that irregular migrants have because they are human 
beings. Nevertheless, many countries did not ratify the MWC with the 
motivation that it went too far in protecting irregular migrants.38 In addition, 
many countries have proceeded to declare irregular migration a crime, and 
therefore irregular migrants can be detained and expelled, and those who 
provide them with assistance are also committing a crime. This is where some 
divergence exists between the teachings of the Church and migration policies. 
When law and the duty of solidarity conflict, the Church maintains that it is 
necessary to go beyond the law. In the words of John Paul II: “Solidarity means 
taking responsibility for those in trouble. For Christians, the migrant is not 
merely an individual to be respected in accordance with the norms established 
by law, but a person whose presence challenges them and whose needs become 
an obligation for their responsibility. ‘What have you done to your brother?’ (cf. 
Gn 4:9). The answer should not be limited to what is imposed by law, but should 
be made in the manner of solidarity”.39 
2.5.6 Obligation to assist victims of smuggling and trafficking 
There is wide convergence on this aspect, as the Church utilizes the Protocols 
of the CTOC as the general framework as well as the assistance provided by 
countries and international organizations to support preventive and protective 
initiatives toward the victims of trafficking, while leaving prosecution to the 
state. Partnerships established among the various stakeholders are aimed at 
increasing attention to this modern scourge. 
2.5.7 Obligation to avoid forced migration and to welcome refugees and 
asylum seekers 
The Church cooperates widely with the UNHCR in the protection and assistance 
given to refugees, particularly through its presence in refugee camps (for 
instance with the Jesuit Refugee Services), and through the activities of the 
International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC). The Church does not 
                                                      
38  Pécoud & de Gutcheneire 2006. 
39  Pope John Paul II 1996, 5. 
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agree with the confinement of children in refugee camps and criticizes extra-
territorial asylum processing, recommending instead shared responsibilities 
among countries according to national capabilities. To prevent forced migration, 
Hollenbach has maintained that countries have negative duties, duties not to 
engage in actions which will lead to the displacement of many people to escape 
situations of conflict and violence, while they have positive duties to provide 
assistance to refugees.40 
 Pope Francis has shown practical concern in providing resettlement to some 
refugees after his visit to the island of Lesbos, but also in recommending that 
refugees should not just be admitted but also integrated. In the in-flight press 
conference while returning from Sweden, in 2017, he said that countries “must 
be very open to receiving refugees, but they also have to calculate how best to 
settle them, because refugees must not only be accepted, but also integrated.” 
This should not be interpreted as avoiding the obligation to admit refugees, but 
as distributing responsibilities among countries according to their different 
capabilities. 
2.6 Conclusion 
The teachings of the Church on migration were developed over a long period of 
time, during which migration changed origins, destinations and dynamics. From 
the time of the great migration from Europe, particularly Italy, to the Americas, 
to the permanent and labour migration after World War II, to current global 
migration, the Church always saw migration as an opportunity and a challenge, 
but also as a “necessary evil” (LE 23). The current international scenario has 
become much more complex, as migration flows are increasingly mixed, forced 
migration is generated by international instability, traffickers and smugglers are 
exploiting the need of people for dignity and safety, and destination countries 
tend to view migration mostly as a security issue. 
 From the biblical framework and the constant reminder for hospitality 
commanded by its Founder and repeated throughout its tradition, the Church 
has articulated obligations first of all for the disciples of Christ but also for 
society in general. Obligations are founded on the fundamental commandment 
of love for all and on Jesus’ identification with the stranger. As stated by 
Benedict XVI, “charity is at the heart of the Church’s social doctrine” (CiV 2). 
They are moral obligations, which should not be ignored when the dignity and 
human rights of migrants are threatened, but which should also be followed 
when different solutions are allowed in the name of the common good if we 
want to build a civilization of love. In this regard, the Church’s teachings often 
depart from the normative and political solutions prevalent within the 
international community and the individual countries and it must be so, as the 
                                                      
40  Hollenbach 2016. 
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Church is oriented toward the eschatological horizon of the full implementation 
of the kingdom of God. That horizon requires the constant overcoming of unjust 
structures, a contemporary social sin,41 that force people to migrate and do not 
provide them a welcoming environment. 
 A few obstacles keep resurfacing and require the vigilant guidance of the 
teachings of the Church. Many Christians find love for migrants in conflict with 
love for neighbour and are challenged by the need to prioritize. It is a concern 
voiced also by the Lutheran Church (LC-CTCR 26): “for the immigrant is not 
the only neighbour Christians are called to love. There is also the neighbour 
citizen or resident of a nation, who may or may not be as vulnerable or needy as 
the immigrant neighbour in every case, but whose well-being is also a matter of 
concern for both the government and for Christian citizens.” On a pragmatic 
level, research tends to indicate (although the issue remains controversial) that 
migrants are marginally substitutes for citizens, as they are mostly com-
plementary to them.42 Love for migrants and love for fellow citizens does not 
have to be in conflict, and the misinformation spread by political forces for 
electoral purposes should be corrected. 
 Increasing terrorism in the world has led to the securitization of migration 
and the support for restrictive migration policies, with stunning examples in the 
popular UK referendum that led to Brexit and the executive orders of Donald 
Trump, president of the US, building the wall between the US and Mexico and 
banning the entry of citizens from seven countries to the US.43 Security is a 
fundamental good for everyone. While building walls to protect those inside 
against migrants, countries forget that migrants are trying to enter because they 
are in search of security, not because they intend to export insecurity. Security 
is obtained only if it is searched for together and if it is security for all. From its 
vantage point of a reality without borders, the Church is recommending 
overcoming barriers. In the words of Pope Francis: “A person who thinks only 
about building walls, wherever they may be, and not building bridges, is not 
Christian.”44  
 Obligations toward migrants formulated in CST constitute an application of 
social ethics to the field of migration. At the same time, migration constitutes a 
vantage point, a sign of the times, for a hermeneutical rethinking of ethics and 
in particular for the call for an ethic of inclusion and proximity. In the words of 
the EMCC (8): “migration raises a truly ethical question: the search for a new 
international economic order.” Ethics of inclusion and proximity require that 
“the dynamics of poverty creation for the defense of the welfare of few should 
be radically revised. It is contradictory to frustrate the attempt of the poor toward 
development and at the same time reject them at the borders. Borders intend to 
impede that the poor become our neighbours. But if we do not allow them, we 
                                                      
41  Heyer 2012. 
42  Ottaviano & Peri 2007. 
43 This latest decision, however, has encountered wide opposition, also by the courts. 
44 Pope Francis, In-flight Press Conference from Mexico to Rome, 17 February 2016. 
 CHAPTER 2 DO LIKEWISE 40 
will just remain on the side of the street, victims of our own violence”.45 The 
waters lapping at our shores or flowing at our rivers should no longer return the 
bodies of little children with their faces in the sand. They should carry the hopes 
for dignity and murmur the songs of liberty. 
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 Chapter 3 Proposals for a ‘Better World’ 
Pope Francis’ contributions in order to generate a 
‘culture of welcome’ to face the current challenges of 
human mobility 
Jorge E. Castillo Guerra  
3.1 Introduction 
Since the beginning of his pontificate, Francis has taken on migration as one of 
his main preoccupations and supports this subject with the Social Doctrine of 
the Catholic Church. His visit to Lampedusa, on 8 July 2013, was not a unique 
event in his pontificate. On the contrary, he has taken on the challenges 
provoked by the migrant flows as one of the main concerns of his ministry. And 
he seeks support in the teachings formulated to orient answers of the Catholic 
Church to issues concerning social justice. In fact, the interest of the Church in 
migratory affairs was already present in the Encyclical Rerum Novarum by Pope 
Leon XIII, who showed concern about the labour situation of migrants when he 
affirmed, among other things, that “no one would exchange his country for a 
foreign land if his own afforded him the means of living a decent and happy 
life” (Leo XIII 1891, no. 47). Awareness on this topic has conjured up social 
teaching that merits special attention and is contained in the Apostolic 
Constitution Exsul familia nazarethana: On spiritual care to migrants (Pius XII 
1950), the Encyclical Pacem in Terris (John XXIII 1963), the instructions De 
Pastorali Migratorum Cura (Congregation for Bishops1969), and Erga 
Migrantes Caritas Christi (Pontifical Council for the Pastoral Care of Migrants 
and Itinerant People 2004). In these documents, there are topics that concern 
human mobility and instructions for the pastoral accompaniment and the 
defence of the rights of migrants, in addition to instructions to guide the 
destination nations and societies on their responsibilities to the migrants as well 
as the obligations of the migrants once they arrive in these destination countries.  
 In this chapter I reflect on the Social Teaching of Francis as related to the 
topic of migration from three basic questions:1 What are his contributions, in 
light of the dilemmas, challenges and tensions, surrounding the boundary 
policies and the reactions from both the original and destination locations? Is it 
                                                      
1 An earlier version of this text appeared under the title “’A Church without Boundaries’: A 
New Ecclesial Identity Emerging from a Mission of Welcome Reflections on the Social 
Magisterium of Pope Francis as related to Migration” in the Journal of Catholic Social 
Thought 2017, 14(1), p. 43-61.  
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possible to distinguish the various contexts towards which his message is 
directed? What are the repercussions for an ecclesial identity, of a mission 
oriented towards migrants?  
 In this chapter I attempt to answer these questions from the perspective of 
the nascent theology of migration that has, among its goals, the defence of the 
life and rights of migrants.2 This theology reflects a diversity of ways through 
which migrants experience and express their faith in specific contexts in order 
to understand, through them, God’s promise of liberation and universal 
communion.  
 Various studies concerned with migration, find support in the social 
teachings of the Catholic Church as a framework within which to analyze 
migration and to discern God’s path through our history, as is manifested 
through the practices of migrants and the groups in the destination societies that 
are engaged in creating a convivial society.3 
 In this chapter I do not consider the perspective of the ecclesial mission that 
the migrants themselves develop; mainly my reflection points to the respon-
sibility of societies and ecclesial communities in general, with regards to 
migration.4 I approach this by studying Pope Francis’ social teachings as he 
develops a motivation to welcome migrants and to answer situations that are 
generated by migration. I also explore how the ecclesial mission of welcoming 
migrants proposed by the Pope, has a bearing on the understanding of ecclesial 
identity.  
 I begin with an interdisciplinary approach to inquire into the reasons that 
legitimize the creation of mechanisms for border controls that endanger the lives 
and increase the suffering of migrants. By the same token, I study the Pope’s 
contributions in order to generate a “culture of welcome”. In the conclusions, I 
will highlight that migration is an issue that has to do with faith in Jesus and his 
Spirit, which allows the Church to recover its identity as a pilgrim Church 
“without boundaries”.  
3.2 Fear and Migration Policies  
During the past two decades, the increase in human mobility has led to 
extremely ambiguous interpretations, according to the contexts that migrants 
include in their treks between countries of emigration, transit and destination. 
                                                      
2  Castillo Guerra 2004; Campese 2008; Tulud Cruz 2010; Kim 2012; Kessler 2014. 
3  Blume 2003; Battistella 2003; Tassello, 2010; Baggio and Susin, 2012; Castillo Guerra 
2015a. 
4 In other publications, I have highlighted how migrants themselves contribute criteria to 
overcome the limitations of practices and theological reflections that lack a true awareness 
of the power relationships that tend to reduce the migrant to the category of guest. I have also 
reflected in this sense, on the intercultural transformation of the deaconry set forth by the 
migrants which when unified with koinonia generates human communion. Cf. Castillo 
Guerra 2010; 2011, 2013; 2015b. See also: Schroeder 2015 
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Within these interpretations, the one that seems to prevail is that of the 
destination rich countries, because of their political and economic capacity to 
define the rules of the game. These countries dominate the migratory process 
even before they are initiated by the migrant; in other words, even before the 
migrant crosses the borders of his or her home territory. Due to the inefficacy 
of border policies, there is pressure placed on the transit countries to become 
guardians of the external borders.5 Transit countries, for their part, use the 
migrant flows as part of a political game to negotiate advantages with the 
destination countries. In the specific case of Europe, since the beginning of the 
new millennium European countries have placed more and more restrictions on 
visas to enter the Schengen Zone, they have militarized international borders 
and drawn up agreements with countries such as Morocco, Turkey, Nigeria and 
Senegal, in order to create new external borders to discourage migration; they 
have built detention and deportation centres and waged war against human 
trafficking networks. European frontiers garner a sense of defence and 
repression. Walls are built, access points are blocked and high technology 
instruments are employed to detect irregular migrants.  
 The goal of blocking the migration process is based on a deterrent strategy 
implemented by building walls and the increased militarization of boundary 
zones. Physical barriers such as oceans, rivers, deserts, tropical jungles or 
mountains also play an essential role in this strategy, where the risk of losing 
human lives is taken as a significant warning within the deterrent strategy. 
Frontex, a European agency that manages borders, has a central role in the 
implementation of this dissuading strategy. Their actions are well known both 
on land and at sea, where international rights are often violated, such as the right 
to be rescued at sea that stress the obligation to save the lives of endangered 
survivors in international waters, and the human right to asylum, when they 
apply their pushback methods or “summary removal”, to obstruct refugees from 
asking for asylum.6 
 Migrants who are desperate, for various reasons, take on the deadly risks of 
these frontier policies. Those who travel in order to ensure their own lives or to 
improve the lives of their families have to confront new problems that arise 
when they move through countries that have criminal organizations and corrupt 
officials that assault, extort, and sequester them for trafficking or to sexually 
exploit them.  
 The deaths of migrants throughout the so-called “death routes”, found on all 
continents, bear witness to the modus operandi of the frontier policies. They 
prevent the crossing of thousands of human beings through their frontiers 
because nature takes charge and punishes them with death, or because migrants 
lose when they attempt to cross a fence in Melilla or fall under the wheels of a 
                                                      
5  Menjívar 2014. 
6  Strik 2015:52; Ferrer-Gallardo & van Houtum 2014. 
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train apocalyptically called “The Beast”, in Mexico.7 The routes of death acquire 
even more relevance; so much so that Fargues and Bonfanti state that, within 
the Mediterranean context, the “sea routes to Europe are increasingly lethal”.8 
 How can we explain the existence of border control mechanisms that 
endanger the lives and increase the suffering of the migrant? How can we 
understand the relationship established by the Pope, between the suffering of 
the migrants and the attitude of indifference they face?9 The destination 
countries implement control mechanisms that are determined by subjects who 
have been politically empowered by their own societies. The border or frontier 
policy answers to a public agenda where political games, pressure and 
international agreements enter the arena. According to Zapata-Barrero, the 
criteria on which to admit or exclude foreigners in the destination countries are 
based on three social concerns: security, wellbeing, and identity.10 
 The first concern has to do with the fear of losing security, which is linked 
to an a priori perception of the foreigner as a social danger. The fear of losing 
security gives way to measures of restraint as instruments of political 
management that serve an even more important goal, which is the security and 
the internal freedom of its citizens. A goal which is reached through the 
mechanisms that unchain vulnerability issues within their “recipients”. In this 
way, on the other side of the border, the values that are upheld are inverted 
within the destination country because the security and liberty of the citizens are 
preserved through the insecurity and lack of liberty of mobility of the non-
nationals. Therefore, the fear of loss of security protects the deterrent decrees 
which outside the frontiers, induce migrants to transit through the death routes 
and, within the frontiers produce a mindset of the migrant as a dangerous and 
“illegal” subject.  
 The fear of losing the sense of wellbeing awakens a second social concern 
that legitimizes the exclusion of migrants. However, regarding this concern, two 
ambitions are set against each other; on the one hand the “fear of losing 
comfort”, and on the other hand the drive to increase it. These seemingly 
contrary elements imply that destination societies are formulated as “gated 
communities”, because they cannot close the doors to all migrants. The oasis of 
wellbeing, cannot easily relinquish the cheap “illegal” labour which is necessary 
to reach their “targets” of economic growth and to carry out agricultural, 
industrial or domestic tasks that the “happy few” consider below their own level 
of dignity and quality of life standards.11  
                                                      
7 According to the International Organization for Migrations, in 2013, worldwide, at least 
2,300 emigrants lost their lives while attempting to arrive in another country (OIM 2013). 
The newspaper El País published that in the last two decades 25,000 migrants have died in 
the Sicilian Canal, known now as the Island of Lampedusa, including 2,700 victims during 
the Libyan conflict of 2011 (El País 2013). 
8  Fargues & Bonfanti, 2014, 5. 
9  Francis 2013. 
10  Zapata-Barrero 2012. 
11  Van Houtum & Pijpers 2007, 116. 
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 A final concern that the topic of border control imposes on the public agenda 
emerges from the fear of losing “frontiers”, which is not defined solely as the 
border or wall, to prevent the entry of intruders but rather, as a defence of 
national identity. New nationalistic discourses regarding identity begin to 
emerge that tend to homogenize ethnic characteristics, dialects or religions, 
among other aspects. Myths also arise regarding an epic of evolution and 
historical destiny, over which the emblem of nationalism is hoisted. The 
following is a rather long quote in which Brenna explains the dynamic of the 
invention and idealization of one’s own identity and the exclusion of the identity 
of others:  
These frontiers end up being a space of tension: identity 
illusions shared with those inside, conflicting categories of 
differentiation from those outside. It speaks of the space 
where, rather than taking on the differences, we underline 
them, we measure them out and use them; we need to 
categorize the unknown in order to ensure that the unknown 
does not bring us unrest or threatens us; we need 
categories; we cannot live without them.12  
We may conclude from this quote, that the defence of national identity operates 
from a dynamic that in social psychology appears as the dynamic between the 
in-group and the out-group.13 This dynamic operates with mechanisms of 
negative attribution values placed on the non-nationals. A discourse emerges, 
which is imposed, consumed, and is taken on socially as a true experience which 
becomes a part of the common meaning, such as investigations from the 
perspective of the critical analysis of discourse so advocate.14 Lastly, a 
government resolves to prevent the entrance of bearers of so-called ethical, 
cultural, or social counter values, which represent a “danger” to national 
identity. Nevertheless, what are the effects of this discourse, formulated as a 
border policy, when the foreigners or the migrants are already inside the 
nations? How is it possible to build a society with people whose position, 
traditions or religious beliefs are constantly being devaluated? Obviously, 
society needs to build different types of discourses within their frontiers in order 
to avoid the divisions that are built on the outside to permeate them and make 
them ungovernable, due to xenophobia or intolerance.  
 One of these discourses is that of assimilation, which aims to colonize the 
migrant so that he or she is not different and is able to fully reproduce the 
characteristics of the dominating social group. Another discourse is that of 
multiculturalism, which opposes assimilation and presupposes that social 
cohesion can be achieved through the preservation of the identity of each group. 
                                                      
12  Brenna 2011, 12. 
13  Verkuyten 2014. 
14  Van Dijk 2004. 
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The type of tolerance of this second discourse rises over an essentialization of 
cultures as if these could be perpetuated or reduced to a single one, and it lacks, 
as well, a proposal able to dynamize the interaction between the various groups 
comprised within social multiculturalism. In this same manner, it reflects the 
so-called mosaic of cultural diversity that characterizes many destination 
societies, but defends the autonomous identity of the groups in such a way that 
it deepens social segmentations. We can therefore understand that the fear of 
the loss of national identity has generated assimilationist and multiculturalist 
discourses, with inappropriate proposals. First of all because they have a bearing 
on the negative perception of the migrant outside and inside the frontiers of the 
nation states. And, secondly, because the critical search for intercultural 
affinities and interactions that are able to foster social cohesion or human 
conviviality are not taken into account.  
 Fortunately, even though the echoes of fear due to the presence of migrants 
in destination societies grab the main focus of the communications media, there 
are groups that are in solidarity with the migrants both in the transit countries as 
well as in the destination societies. These groups organize rescue missions in 
the seas or deserts; they hold protests in order to lobby governments to humanize 
their frontiers and to receive those who are persecuted and who are refugees; 
they participate as volunteers in hospitality centres and open the doors of their 
homes to the recent arrivals. According to Kymlicka this second attitude 
towards migrants can be understood within the tendencies that comprise the 
“new progressive’s dilemma: the fear that there is a trade-off between being pro-
immigrant and being pro-welfare state”.15 It is a dilemma heavily politicized by 
the political parties that use fear in society with electoral intentions. Lastly, we 
also have the political and ideological interests that have the power of 
channeling or hegemonizing social fear that translates into migratory policies.16 
 In conclusion, and making reference to the question of how to explain the 
existence of frontier control mechanisms that endanger the lives and increases 
the suffering of migrants, I would answer, supported by various authors, that 
there is a fear based on a negative image of the other, that provokes the 
formulation of strict border policies. The fear of losing security, identity and 
comfort, also provoke identity shaping policies that lack a vision and a pathos 
to foster intercultural relations. Both within and outside the frontiers these 
policies have a bearing on exclusion and even on the death of the non-national. 
They also have a bearing on the loss of a sense of responsibility, for example, 
for the 25,000 human beings that have died in the waters of the Mediterranean 
in the new millennium, because as the Pope said in Lampedusa, “they don’t 
concern us”.  
                                                      
15  Kymlicka 2015, 1. 
16  Boswell, Geddes & Scholten 2011. 
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3.3 A culture of Welcome - The Magisterium of Pope Francis 
in matters concerning migration 
In this second part I will analyze the considerations and proposals made by Pope 
Francis to face the current challenges of human mobility and in this way clarify 
the main contributions in order to achieve what he has called “a culture of 
welcome”. I will start with a reflection on Francis’ prophetic reading on 
migration, and then on his proposal for change.  
3.3.1 Prophetic reading regarding a culture that discards the meaning of 
community and places limits on human life 
Together with the interdisciplinary analysis presented in the previous section 
regarding the fear that legitimizes restrictive border policies, the Pope holds true 
that the craving for well-being and the determination to conserve it leads to the 
exclusion of the other. A repressive border policy is a reflection of this aim as 
we note in his prophetic denunciation of a social injustice with connotations for 
the whole world:  
The culture of comfort, which makes us think only of 
ourselves, makes us insensitive to the cries of other people, 
makes us live in soap bubbles which, however lovely, are 
insubstantial; they offer a fleeting and empty illusion which 
results in indifference to others; indeed, it even leads to the 
globalization of indifference.17 
The “globalization of indifference” that Pope Bergoglio denounces is not 
limited to the walls of exclusion, because in fact it extends throughout the routes 
of death, already mentioned in the first part of this paper, with the intention of 
restraining the entry and intermixing with him or her that “bothers me in my life 
and my wellbeing”.18 The Pope denounces, therefore, a logic of exclusion based 
on materialism and a pattern of consumerism that places the needs and the lives 
of migrants at the lowest level of their value scale. Because they are on the other 
side of the border, because of their non-national classification, the life of the 
other is less valuable and can even be dispensed with.  
 Certainly, this rationality has been pointed out by the liberation theologians 
based on Franz J. Hinkelammert’s denouncement of an “ethics” of the sacrificial 
economic policies. In his words: “This ethic is demanding and entails sacrifice. 
It rises over the loser and leaves him lost. It is the ethic of the elected by success; 
the success that elects the elected and condemns the losers”.19 
                                                      
17  Francis 2013. 
18  Francis 2013. 
19  Hinkelammert, 2001, 170; 1977; 1989; Richard 1983. 
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 In this sense, Jon Sobrino affirms that “in the face of postmodernity there is 
a need to express the passion and the struggle of God against the idols in order 
to overcome indifference—even the tolerance with what this indifference may 
have of falsity—as though history were a mere wandering of whatever is human, 
without the powerful forces in place to oppose them”.20 The struggle against the 
death of the victims and the unmasking of the idols of death, have given way to 
a rethinking of the image of God, of the hope placed in God and the way we 
speak of God. This rethinking of the radical “no” of God to human sacrifice, 
exposed exemplarily by Monsignor Óscar Arnulfo Romero, has been coined as 
“the theology of the God of Life”.21  
 The Pope is very close to the theology of the God of life, when he states that 
God is life, Jesus Christ is the font or source of life and the Holy Spirit sustains 
life, while contrasting this image to the image of ideologies and logic that limit 
human life. In Evangelii Gaudium he insists that the idols, the idolatry of money, 
or the “deified market”, provoke an anthropological crisis that is manifested in 
“the denial of the primacy of the human person”.22 He therefore emphasizes 
later that “following God’s way leads to life, whereas following idols leads to 
death”.23  
 This brief reflection regarding one of the backdrops of his words at 
Lampedusa, allows us to understand why Pope Francis warns that the world 
cannot continue without understanding that the modus vivendi of societies must 
break off from the ideologies that do away with the sense of community and 
uphold patterns of exclusion and even the death of the other. In his words: “New 
ideologies, characterized by rampant individualism, egocentrism and 
materialistic consumerism, weaken social bonds, fueling that ‘throw away’ 
mentality which leads to contempt for, and the abandonment of, the weakest and 
those considered ‘useless’”.24  
3.3.2  Proposals for a Better World  
A short time after his visit to Lampedusa (8 July 2013), Pope Francis 
broadcasted his “Message for the World Day of Migrants and Refugees” for the 
year 2014, in which he complemented his prophetic homily with proposals for 
change. Is it possible to distinguish between the various contexts to which he 
directs his social teachings? In fact, yes; the Pope focuses on the different fields 
in which change can begin in order to avoid the death of migrants and the 
prevalent social indifference in the face of this human drama, and to embrace 
Christ revealed in the migrant.25 Let us consider this further.  
                                                      
20  Sobrino 1995, 83. 
21  Romero 1980. 
22  Francis 2013b, no. 55. 
23  Francis 2013c. 
24  Francis 2013d, no. 1. 
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3.3.3 International Cooperation 
At the international level, the Pope revisits the main lines from the social 
teachings of the Catholic Church regarding migration, and accordingly exposes 
that migration needs a new international policy based on cooperation and 
attitudes of solidarity. Countries cannot, on their own, continue the search for 
solutions to the dilemmas they face in dealing with migration, because the 
problems they are attempting to solve are only one of the manifestations of a 
process that investigators propose as a transnational issue. 
 International cooperation is necessary in order to avoid seeing emigration as 
the only alternative for a life with dignity, justice, work and security. Pope 
Francis’ proposal is supported by affirmations made in the Social Doctrine of 
the Church, regarding the right to not need to emigrate.26  
 In his Message for the Day of the Emigrant and the Refugee for the year 
2016, Pope Francis makes another proposal at the international level: that 
countries pay attention to migration according to a new value scale that 
prioritizes the problems according to their importance. This means that the first 
thing that needs attention is the emergency of human beings involved in the 
migratory process. Secondly, the need to address the problems that emigration 
entails for other societies and peoples. The concern for the problems of migrants 
and particularly regarding refugees does not imply that attention is being denied 
regarding its effects in other societies, as is evidenced by the social 
repercussions of the so-called crisis of refugees in Europe. The Pope is 
suggesting, rather, a logic to implement policies that take the most vulnerable 
into consideration first, and then attend to the other problems, following the 
criteria of the common good.  
3.3.4 Recovery of truth 
Secondly, the Pope reminds us of the responsibility of the communications 
media, in spreading an image of the migrant free of prejudice; that they 
understand the problems that they cause, and to remember that these people 
comprise a fraction with regard to the majority that deserve the portrayal of a 
fair image. This responsibility entails, among other aspects, to correctly report 
the contributions that migrants make to their societies in their countries of origin 
and destination, in various fields.27 For example, in recent years there has been 
a generalization of an extremely negative image on the subject of the religions 
that migrants introduce to the destination societies. However, empirical data 
report that Muslim and Christian migrants participate constructively in public 
spaces, when they invest their social capital to foster social cohesion both inside 
and outside their communities. In other words, the Pope encourages the media 
to report the truth and not fall prey to generalizations or assumptions regarding 
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the negative impact of migration, their cultures or religions on the destination 
societies.28 It should also, be borne in mind that the propagation of correct 
information reduces the risk of falling into the trap of political correctness, 
which hides the social tensions and problems in the relationship between 
migrants and the rest of society. By the same token, correct information does 
not fall prey to biased positions that support a monocultural or multicultural 
discourse with regard to the insurmountable incompatibility between migrants 
and the destination society.  
 Information therefore, plays a crucial role in counteracting the fear of losing 
security, wellbeing and identity which has a bearing on many people and incites 
the “culture of rejection” in the destination societies. An adequate image of the 
migrant, free of hostility and fear is a fundamental step in overcoming the so-
called culture of rejection and leads to the construction of a “culture of 
encounter”. Paraphrasing the words of the Pope when he spoke before the 
Congress of the United States of America, quoted above, it can be said that the 
role of the communications media is to disseminate truth so that society can 
recover its notion of belonging to only one humanity, and from that truism, is 
able to come together as one.29  
3.3.5 Ecclesial Mission: welcome without discrimination 
The third proposal of Pope Francis implies concern for migrants as a constitutive 
element of an ecclesial mission that takes into account that “each person belongs 
to humanity and shares with all the peoples, the hope of a better world”.30 
However, the construction of a better world presupposes a missionary task that 
highlights that each and every one is entitled to a life with dignity. This is a task 
that begins with a transformation of the understanding of migrants, where the 
human being is discovered within them, where there is acceptance of the fact 
that they have been created in the image and likeness of God and “flesh of 
Christ”.31 The Pope uses arguments taken from the theology of creation, as well 
as from Christology to propose fundamental criteria for the ecclesial mission 
within the context of migration, that is, to value the human genre as a family 
with only one origin and dignity that shares creation.  
 In his Message for the World Day for Migrants 2015, the Argentinian Pope 
clarifies the breadth of the understanding of the migrant as the “flesh of Christ”, 
for the ecclesial mission. By way of that identification he calls on us to discover 
Jesus in the migrant, while at the same time he reminds that this has its roots in 
the following of the evangelizing message of Jesus. It is Jesus who invites us to 
care for those who are suffering and to discover him within them, just as is 
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mentioned in the Gospel of Matthew 25, 35-36.32 The discovery of Jesus, as we 
read the Papal message, has to correspond with a mission of the Church as a 
mother who receives migrants without discrimination, without frontiers, 
because this is the way of testifying the sending off of the Church into the world, 
to proclaim God’s love and compassion.  
3.4 Church to the world, to proclaim God’s love and 
compassion  
The mission of a Church that is faithful to the sending by Jesus, has a universal 
reach that is made specific through the service of the Church to migrants, when 
she reacts to its urgencies, and when she overcomes the barriers between 
religions and cultures and when she does not allow herself to be intimidated by 
human diversity. We observe that the Pope interprets the ecclesial mission as a 
message translated and witnessed through the specific embracing of the other, 
and without exclusion of any distinct trait or orientation. However, we ask, what 
is the scope of this acceptance mission in the face of the religious plurality of 
migrants? Is the reception and acceptance being instrumentalized for conversion 
to Catholicism?  
 During his visit to a shelter for refugees in Rome, the Pope had already 
expressed the interreligious extent of the ecclesial mission in a sense that can 
clarify our questions: “Many of you are Muslim or members of another religion. 
You come from various countries, from different situations. We mustn’t be 
afraid of differences! Brotherhood enables us to discover that they are riches, 
gifts for everyone! Let us live in brotherhood!”.33  
 In the words of the Pope we find elements of the mission of welcoming. The 
first is the acceptance of the cultural or religious diversity of the persons 
involved, and the second element is valuating this as enriching. The reception 
of persons with different cultural or religious orientations has fraternity as an 
underpinning and predisposes persons to a religious and intercultural dialogue 
which can contribute to overcoming extreme positions, when they understand, 
appreciate their differences and share the common elements. It also encom-
passes the incentive of the values that support a “peaceful coexistence between 
persons and cultures”, such as solidarity, by letting go of attitudes against 
migrants and by embracing a “culture of encounter”.34 Therefore, the ecclesial 
mission of reception or welcome acquires an interreligious perspective, first of 
all, through the religious diversity of its recipients and of those who collaborate 
in this mission. Second, when the reception of migrants becomes an encounter 
with diversity that has no pretention of religiously colonizing the other but rather 
that favours his or her fidelity to the ethical imperatives of his or her own 
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religion. In other words, an inverted proselytism, that invites a constant 
conversion to each person’s own religion through that food for thought that 
emerges in the encounter with religious otherness.  
 This missionary work leads the Church towards those contexts linked by 
human mobility in the countries of origin, and the countries of transit and 
destination. And, by inserting herself into them she educates to provide an 
understanding of the causes of migration, to denounce the dangers and injustices 
that emerge in the day-to-day experiences of the emigrant and immigrant, and 
to offer support to groups and institutions in solidarity with migrants and, in 
particular, with refugees. Lastly, from that context, the Church is able to 
contribute criteria for judgment in order to face the dilemmas that migration 
poses to destination societies.  
3.5 Conclusion: A Church Without Boundaries: her mission 
and identity  
In this chapter I have highlighted the points made by the Pope regarding the 
effects of the attitudes and border policies that provoke the suffering, exclusion 
or death of migrants. With the aid of interdisciplinary studies, I have reflected 
on the social concerns that these policies engender. Now, in closing, I propose 
to answer a question posited in the introduction regarding the repercussions of 
a mission oriented towards an ecclesial identity on the topic of migration.  
 In my analysis, I note that the Pope affirms that in her path towards migrants 
and refugees, the Church walks together with them, and in that way she recovers 
her identity as a pilgrim Church, a Church on route, “without boundaries”, 
because to approach others is an approach without distinctions. 
 Francis offers other theological insights in favour of the identity of a Church 
without boundaries. Migration is not a mere ethical issue, rather, it is a faith 
issue. In his arguments, the Pope holds true that the origin of a Church that 
understands herself as being without boundaries, relies on Jesus and his Spirit. 
In Jesus, through the calling to receive and adore him through those who need 
the most. And in the Spirit, manifested at Pentecost, that invigorates the Church 
to overcome fear, to understand the message of the Reign of God, each in his or 
her own language and, to give testimony to the world, of the love of God.  
 In fact, from its origin, as illustrated by the Council of Jerusalem (Acts 15, 
Galatians 2) the Church feels the calling and feels invigorated to go into the 
world; to answer that vocation, in the midst of limitations and errors, she is 
present in various countries, where she is incarnated in the cultural diversity of 
peoples. It has to do with what Jon Sobrino explains as partial incarnations, 
particularly from the margins of the world. These are precisely the incarnations 
that enable the Church to be truly catholic, that is, Universal.35  
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 Finally, the identity of a Church “without boundaries” conveys the image of 
a Church that serves the mission of a single people of God and precisely by 
carrying out this service, she exceeds the frontiers that divides it.  
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 Chapter 4 Immigration and Talmudic Law 
Myron M. Cherry 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The topic - Immigration and Talmudic Law - directs me to look at Talmudic law 
for the answer to questions of immigration policy. These questions are not new 
to any established culture or group of people, and certainly not new to the Jews 
who have substantial millennial experience in immigration, as well as being 
strangers and aliens in many strange countries. Let me pose that the subject 
matter of immigration may rest on two principles. 
 The first principle is that of granting rights of immigration - that is, someone 
with the power to permit or deny immigrants entry. The second principle is the 
responsibility and latent, if not active, power of the immigrant to get along in 
his or her new country and refuse the temptation of bending the will of a country 
to suit his own cultural or economic interests. Before I touch upon these two 
principles in more detail, I will review the general principles of Talmudic law. 
 First, all Jewish law and thus what we may refer to as Talmudic law is based 
upon the Bible or the Five Books of Moses, commonly referred to as the Old 
Testament. This is the source of all Jewish biblical law, and if it is explicit on a 
topic, it is the final and only word. 
 But ambiguity has a righteous place in Jewish law, as often the question is 
far more important than the answer. Sharp edges in discussions of Jewish law, 
particularly among friends, is required; this requirement for sharp discussion is 
put clearly in focus when one understands that the Hebrew word for pepper is 
the same root as the Hebrew word for discussion. Aggressive discussion is a 
watchword of Talmudic interpretation. 
 Following the Old Testament, which I may refer to as the Torah or Bible, 
there were commentaries on the day-to-day implementation of the Bible's 
principles of law. These commentaries were in the form of case disputations and 
answers to questions brought before the rabbinic authorities over the ages. This 
process set the tone and structure that is referred to in Jewish history as the 
making of the Oral Law and for deciding a myriad of questions facing the Jewish 
people. This process of questioning helped form the Jewish people into a 
structure which thankfully has lasted for centuries and enabled Jews to 
contribute and survive in small communities as well as in larger non-Jewish 
communities.   
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The Jews recognized that government and respect for rule of law, whether 
Jewish or non-Jewish, was essential to prevent chaos. This concept of respect 
for order is extremely important and is aptly summed up in a quote from Pirkei 
Avot (Ethics of Our Fathers 3:2): 
Pray for the integrity of the government, for were it not for 
the fear of its authority a man would swallow his neighbor 
alive. 
Hillel, a well-known Hebrew scholar, summed it up more homiletically when 
he said: 
If I am not for myself, who is for me? And if I am only for 
myself, what am I? If not now, when? (Ethics of Our Fathers 
1:14) 
Whoever destroys a soul, it is considered as if he destroyed 
an entire world; and whoever saves a life it is considered as 
if he saved an entire world. (Sanhedrin 4:9) 
What is hateful to you, do not to your neighbor: that is the 
whole Torah, the rest is the commentary, go and learn it. 
(Shab. 31A) 
Thus, over thousands of years, scholars and rabbis interpreting principles of the 
Bible into everyday life developed an oral discourse much like one may find in 
a case book in a law school outlining problems and giving answers. If a co-
worker broke down his neighbor's fence, what was the outcome? If one was 
encroaching on another's rights, who prevails? Does it matter if the parties are 
both residents or if one is an alien or foreigner? 
 Decisions on such questions over literally thousands of years affected a great 
deal of the basis for Western common law. In Talmudic terms, the general body 
of this oral law is sometimes referred to as the Mishnah. The Mishnah was 
finally recorded in writing somewhere around 200 A.D. Generally, the Mishnah 
was a series of statements of the law without necessarily the process by which 
decisions leading to that law were made. In other words, the Mishnah is a 
collection of legal statutes without discussion and without footnotes. A few 
hundred years later, rabbinic scholars began capturing both the statements of 
legal principles, called the Mishnah, and the peppery discussion which formed 
the decision-making process. This process gave birth to the Talmud. 
 There were two groups of rabbis and scholars putting together two separate 
Talmuds over many years. One was in Israel, and became known as the 
Jerusalem Talmud, the other was outside of Israel, which became known as the 
Babylonian Talmud. The discussion (see previous page for an example) is the 
implementation and collection of rabbinic opinion over a long period of time, 
setting forth pros and cons and only citing rabbis by name if they had achieved 
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a sufficient reputation during their lives. Otherwise, the opinion is stated 
generically ‘as the Talmud says’ or sometimes ‘as the Rabbis said’.  
 The Talmud, which is the combination of the Mishnah and the implementing 
discussions, is what we today refer to as the basis of Talmudic law. It obviously 
has nuances and additions by various Rabbinic authorities over the years. There 
are 63 volumes of the Talmud with subject matters as diverse as the Sabbath, 
contracts, conveyances, injuries, et cetera. There is, however, no volume entitled 
Immigration Policy. For this we must be prepared to ask the right questions in 
order to get the right answers. 
4.2 Immigration status 
Now I would like to go back to the first two questions mentioned earlier the 
conflict and juxtaposition between the two parties in immigration decision: the 
person who confers the immigration status and the person who receives the 
immigration status. What does Jewish law say about this potential conflict? 
 First, as I mentioned to you, the source of all Jewish law is the Bible. But 
what does the Bible say about immigration law? We know from the story of 
Joseph that Jewish immigration to Egypt came with a bargain: protection and a 
place to live in exchange for a contribution to society. Eventually Joseph's 
contribution was costly as it led to conflict and expulsion. Nonetheless, we are 
taught by this history to be kind to strangers because in the words of Exodus 
and Deuteronomy, ‘We were strangers in a strange land’. So, Talmudic law 
starts with the principle, indeed the obligation, for us to be kind to strangers. 
This means when someone comes to seek permission to enter your country's 
borders, Talmudic law would require an initial presumption of allowance of that 
person to enter the country. 
 But as we shall soon see, there are limits. What if the stranger takes away the 
job of a resident who now goes on the dole to support his family? What if the 
stranger is trying to impose his own cultural values and to change the essence 
of the City to which he immigrated? How are these conflicts resolved in 
Talmudic law? The answer will give us insight into the question of what 
Talmudic law requires in the broad case of immigration principles. So now I 
turn to some examples which I hope will lead us to some answers. 
4.3 Examples 
The Ten Commandments speak of the obligation to love God, but only to honor 
one's mother and father. It is obvious that one can honor someone without loving 
them, and love is a commandment reserved for God. But in the Book of Deute-
ronomy (10:19, King James Version), we are told: 
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Love ye therefore the stranger: for ye were strangers in the 
land of Egypt. 
The obligation to love a stranger is unique from among all ancient civilizations. 
This concept of loving strangers appears elsewhere and throughout the Bible. 
For example, in Exodus (22:21) we are told: 
Thou shalt neither vex a stranger, nor oppress him: for ye 
were strangers in the land of Egypt.  
Don't pressure the stranger: you know the feelings of being a stranger, seeing as 
you were strangers in the land of Egypt. Further, in Deuteronomy (23:15):  
Thou shalt not deliver unto his master the servant which is 
escaped from his master unto thee. He shall dwell with thee, 
even among you, in that place which he shall choose in one 
of thy gates, where it liketh him best: thou shalt not oppress 
him. 
This then sets out the general obligation in non-contextual circumstances to 
allow open borders and not only protect the foreigner or alien, but love him. 
 Clearly, this positive and welcome approach to a stranger or immigrant is no 
doubt one of the foremost missions of the Exodus and the experience in exile 
which the Jewish people faced over the many years they were held in bondage. 
Indeed, the promise to the Jewish people to have their own land made early 
through Abraham came with the understanding that the Jews would be enslaved 
themselves for 400 years and thus the promise of salvation for the Jewish people 
was intertwined with the recognition that Jews would one day earn their 
freedom, but only by recognizing their eternal obligations to others. In Genesis 
and the story of Jacob and the spies, the brothers themselves are treated kindly 
-even though they were foreigners to Joseph in the story and the principle of 
kindness to strangers prevailed. 
 In the story of Adam and Eve, God said ‘Be fruitful and multiply and fill the 
earth’. The Bible encouraged Adam and Eve and their progeny to spread from 
each other and not stay in one place. Later the Bible told us that the whole earth 
had one language and spoke the same words, and a united humanity attempted 
to build a tower, the Tower of Babel, to reach to the heavens and prevent 
themselves from being dispersed throughout the world. This effort failed. The 
people were directed to dwell in tribes, in their respective quarters, so that they 
were not intermingled. 
 From this we learn the Talmudic principle that each tribe of Israel was 
obligated to establish countries and borders for the development of a wide 
variety of communities. These communities in turn could, over the course of 
history, be in conflict with each other, and the question now arises: what are the 
rules for resolving these conflicts when people cross borders? 
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 These national characteristics and the distinct bounded lands that gave rise 
to them are part of the providential plan in the Bible and place in stark relief 
questions for supporting those borders and opposing keeping those borders 
closed. Thus, we come upon the question of how do we solve in a community – 
small or large – the issues of security, cultural coherence, economics and 
expectations as well as immigration whether legal or illegal?  
 While the dispersed people are obligated by the bounds of common humanity 
to respect each other, the Bible offers no privileges without responsibilities, and 
the mutual respect of those bearing shared responsibilities have a common goal. 
The holiday of Passover, which commemorates the exodus of the Jewish people 
from Egypt where they were enslaved, is a biblical holiday. The obligation to 
eat only unleavened bread during the holiday is set forth in Exodus (13:8), and 
fathers are commanded to tell their sons: 
It is done because of that which the Lord did unto me when 
I came forth out of Egypt. 
This concept of identification of modern Jews who celebrate Passover with the 
Jews who are released from Egypt is carried forward in the Haggadah, the prayer 
book used during the Passover service, as a recognition of an individual redemp-
tion. The specific language of the Haggadah is instructive on this subject. The 
pertinent part states: 
In each generation, each individual Jew is obliged to regard 
himself or herself as if he or she had personally gone out of 
Egypt. (...) And it was not our ancestors alone who the Holy 
one did redeem, but he also redeemed us with him.  
Each Passover, biblical and Talmudic law obligates each Jew who participates 
in the Passover service to identify as one of the Jews who themselves were 
released from Egypt. Thus, Jews are annually thankful by this holiday 
observance for being freed. This again is a specific recollection that Jewish 
history, as well as modern Jewish observances, has an annual reminder that the 
current Jewish generation only exists because that ancient Jewish civilization 
was freed from Egypt. This obligation to recognize that communication and 
personal identification with that exodus forms a powerful recognition of the 
obligation referred to earlier to be kind to strangers and have empathy for 
immigrants. 
 In the Book of Deuteronomy (33:25), Moses, addressing the Jewish people, 
told Asher: ‘Iron and brass shall be thy bars’. Asher's tribe dwelled in the far 
northern territory on the seacoast and Moses was telling Asher to fortify his 
borders against enemies and that only mighty warriors should dwell in the 
border cities in order to ‘lock up’ or protect the land. 
 Rashi, the famous French commentator who wrote annotations for the Bible 
and the Talmud, underscores the necessity of protecting borders from enemy 
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immigrants. So now we know that the obligation to love a stranger is biblically 
modified by the obligation to protect yourself. 
 In the Talmud volume entitled Bava Batra at page 21B, we see a discussion 
that makes it clear that residents of a town can prevent an outsider from setting 
up a business competing with residents in that town. However, a different result 
obtains if the new person who wishes to open up the new business is willing to 
contribute and pay local taxes. If that occurs, then according to Talmudic law, 
the residents cannot prevent the competition from a new business. What we 
learn from this is the principle that immigration denial is not absolute and that 
an immigrant who is willing to contribute to the welfare of the city to which he 
wishes to move, must then be accorded the rights of other citizens. 
 Over the years this balancing concept has permitted Jewish communities to 
enact rules with the power to regulate local conditions to prevent immigrants 
from coming in and taking employment when the competition would prevent 
the residents of the city from earning a living. 
 Thus, if immigration will prevent the residents of the city to which 
immigration is sought from earning a basic livelihood, immigrants can be barred 
from residing in a town but not from contributing to the town. Thus, an 
immigrant could spend money in the town but not start a business which would 
not only compete but take away the main earning power of those living in the 
city. This led to principles of Talmudic law which rendered it appropriate for 
city leaders to deport anyone who entered without permission; and even people 
who came with permission can be required to contribute to various tax 
obligations for the upkeep of the city in order to do business, even if they do not 
reside there. 
 And, while the Talmud generally provides that an outsider cannot be rejected 
if she is willing to pay taxes, and there is no ethical backing to ban an outsider 
from entering the city, the city authorities could, as I have mentioned, entertain 
enforceable regulations which would prevent the destruction or substantial 
impairment of the residents’ ability to make a living. 
4.4 Conclusion 
If strangers come to a community because they are fleeing danger, Talmudic 
law generally provides that such immigrants who are fleeing danger have the 
right to settle in any community until the crisis passes, and they may remain if 
it is impossible to return to their homeland. This Talmudic principle emphasizes 
the overarching principle of Talmudic law, which is the obligation to save a life. 
 So, going back to the first two principles I mentioned – the power to grant 
immigration and the obligation of the immigrant to fit in to his new country, we 
can sum up by recognizing that the presumption of Talmudic law is to help 
immigration and the power to deny entry is not absolute. Indeed, as we have 
seen, the power to grant or deny immigration must be exercised by the concept 
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of loving strangers, which mirrors the history of the Jewish people who were 
strangers in a strange land. 
 However, equally important is the role of the immigrant. He may not come 
to a country to take advantage of that country without making contributions, and 
even with a recognition of an immigrant's obligation to make contributions to 
the place he wishes to immigrate, his conduct and responsibilities may not be 
such as to destroy the character of the community or the right of its residents to 
support themselves. 
 In the end, we will find that Talmudic law regards immigration policy as 
circumstantial and transactional. Citizens with roots in a particular place have 
an obligation to help others but not so that they have to risk destroying the very 
society which they have built for themselves. 
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 Chapter 5 Can one still call it ignorance or 
improper bias? 
Nexus test modified, but courts still fail to address 
international law under the International Religious 
Freedom Act 
Craig B. Mousin 
5.1 Introduction 
The United States Congress passed the International Religious Freedom Act on 
October 27, 19981 (IRFA) to address what it considered a global scourge of 
religious persecution. According to Congress, over half “of the world’s popu-
lation lives under regimes that severely restrict or prohibit the freedom of their 
citizens to study, believe, observe, and freely practice the religious faith of their 
choice”.2 But Congress also found fault in the unfairness of the United States 
adjudication of asylum and refugee claims. Congress specifically criticized U.S. 
government agencies and individuals involved in refugee screening and 
adjudicating claims, including immigration judges (IJ), Asylum Officers, 
consular officials, and border enforcement officers for their failure to properly 
recognize and respond to the many ways persons of faith faced persecution for 
their religious beliefs and practices.3 Finding that it was either “improper biases 
or (…) lack of proper training”, many victims of religious persecution had not 
been treated fairly.4 
 To address this concern, in a particularly rare development in United States 
immigration law, Congress did not look to United States domestic law or to the 
Constitution’s First Amendment as the primary protector of the religious claims 
of refugees, but instead named international law the relevant source of 
                                                      
1  22 U.S.C. §§ 6401–6481 (2000) (enacted 27 October 1998). 
2  22 U.S.C. § 6401(b)(5). 22 U.S.C. § 6401(a)(4)–(6). 
3  The House Report on IRFA stated: “The primary impetus behind the immigration provisions 
of H.R. 2431 is the concern that victims of religious persecution may not be treated fairly by 
the organizations and individuals responsible for screening applicants for asylum or refugee’s 
status and adjudicating their claims. Such unfair treatment could arise from improper biases 
or from lack of proper training”. 
 H.R. REP. NO. 105-480, pt. 3, at 16 (1998), reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 602, 628. 
Although Congress made significant changes in H.R. 2431 in enacting IRFA, IRFA retained 
the mandate for training and eliminating bias and misunderstanding in the final bill. 
4  Id. 
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protection.5 Congress called for reform and mandated new training to ensure the 
elimination of potential biases to protect religious “practices which would meet 
the definition of persecution under international refugee law”.6 In addition to 
legal training, adjudicators needed to understand the “nature of religious 
persecution abroad, including country-specific conditions, instruction on the 
internationally recognized right to freedom of religion, instruction on methods 
of religious persecution practices in foreign countries, and applicable 
distinctions within a county in the treatment of various religious practices and 
believers”.7 Confirming the new changes to asylum law, Congress added that 
“the promotion of international religious freedom requires new and evolving 
policies (…)”.8  
 Initially, the Immigration and Naturalization Service acknowledged this 
major transformation of asylum law. In particular, the Asylum Officers Basic 
Training Manual affirmed: “In IRFA, Congress invoked the understanding of 
religion found in international instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and 
found that freedom of religious belief and practice is a universal human right 
and fundamental freedom”.9 By naming international religious freedom as 
codified under international law, Congress instructed Asylum Officers and 
immigration judges to look to both a persecutor’s intent and the effect of a law 
or practice in judging whether violations of religious liberty occurred.10 By 
requiring the consideration of effect to asylum law adjudications, IRFA 
modified existing asylum law regarding nexus. This conclusion presented a 
radical change in United States asylum law.  
                                                      
5  22 U.S.C. § 6401 (a)(2)–(3) provide: 
 (2) Freedom of religious belief and practice is a universal human right and fundamental 
freedom articulated in numerous international instruments, including the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 
Helsinki Accords, the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, the United Nations Charter, and the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
 (3) Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes that “Everyone has 
the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. This right includes freedom to 
change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in 
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship, and 
observance”.  
 Article 18(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognizes that 
“Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. This right 
shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, 
either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief in worship, observance, practice, and teaching”.  
6  22 U.S.C. § 6473 (2002). 
7  22 U.S.C. § 6473(b) (2002). 
8 22 U.S.C. § 6401(b)(2) (2002). 
9  Immigration & Naturalization Serv., INS Asylum Officer Basic Training Manual, Immi-
gration Officer Academy (Nov. 20, 2001), 12.  
10  See infra note 56. 
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 Although the Refugee Act of 198011 brought the United States into confor-
mance with the United Nations Protocol of 1967,12 subsequent attempts to look 
to international law for protection have been rebuffed by the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA or Board) and the courts.13 IRFA, at least for 
purposes of asylum and refugee adjudication, recognized the need to include the 
protection offered by international law for religious claimants. It stressed the 
need to remedy past failures by conducting specific training “on the inter-
nationally recognized right to freedom of religion, the nature, activities, and 
beliefs of different religions, and the various aspects and manifestations of 
violations of religious freedom”.14 Such language corroborates that adjudication 
of religious claims of persecution under domestic refugee law prior to IRFA had 
failed. Therefore, through the language of IRFA, Congress ordered the federal 
agencies, consulates, and judges to follow international law to address this 
critical problem of protecting religious liberty.  
 Despite the initial fanfare and opportunities IRFA offered, however, a search 
of the electronic data bases of immigration cases decided since 1998 reveals not 
one published decision citing the legal protections offered by IRFA.15 Congress 
enacted a radical change by changing the nexus standard, but the courts, as well 
as attorneys representing asylum applicants, have spurned this remedy, leading 
to a continuing failure to protect applicants seeking safe haven from religious 
persecution.  
 Indeed, courts continue to downplay the need to examine international law 
in asylum cases. In Romeike v. Holder, for example, the applicants urged the 
court to recognize that Germany violated their right to home school their 
children under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Righters art. 
18(4) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (UDHR) but the court 
said “that, by itself does not require the granting of American asylum 
applications”.16 In a concurring opinion, Circuit Judge Rogers flatly stated, “Our 
                                                      
11  Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 8 U.S.C.).  
12  I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436 (1987). 
13  Bradvica v. I.N.S., 128 F.3d 1009 (7th Cir. 1987), citing In Re Medina, 19 I & N Dec. 734 
(1988), (BIA lacks jurisdiction to hear international claims unless specifically delegated by 
the Attorney General or by Congress). Congress authorized such consideration in IRFA. The 
Act also established the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) to 
monitor the status of freedom of thought, conscience and religion or belief abroad, as defined 
in the universal Declaration of Human Rights and related international instruments, and to 
give independent policy recommendations to the Executive and Legislative branches of 
government. United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, 
<www.uscirf.gov/about-uscirf>. 
14  22 U.S.C. § 4028(a)(1); see id. § 4028(a)(2); id. § 6473(a)–(c). 
15  IRFA also tasked the USCIRF to prepare Annual Reports on religious liberty conditions. 
Case law does reveal that parties have cited the Annual Reports and courts have addressed 
the use of the Reports, but no published cases have raised IRFA’s international protections 
as part of the asylum or withholding adjudications.  
16  718 F.3d 528, 534 (6th Cir. 2013), Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Den., July 12, 2014, 
cert. den. 134 S.Ct. 1491 (2014). 
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role, however, is not that of an international court adjudicating Germany’s 
obligation to other countries in respect of its own citizens. Instead we sit as a 
court of the United States, enforcing statutes that implement some of the 
international obligations of the United States to other countries in respect of 
asylum applications”.17 Conceding that some international obligations were 
initially implemented within the 1980 asylum law, Judge Rogers finds no inde-
pendent investigation under international principles notwithstanding IRFA’s 
1998 enactment. As Romeike reveals, despite nineteen years of litigation, no 
court through a published decision has seen fit to respond to Congress’ 
frustration with prior adjudication of religious persecution claims and analyze 
an applicant’s request under international protections. This paper focuses on the 
consequences of judicial failure to understand the “international” in IRFA and 
invites courts and attorneys representing asylum applicants to apply IRFA in 
adjudicating religious persecution cases.  
 In a 2003 article, I celebrated IRFA’s promise for expanded concepts of 
religious liberty in asylum adjudication and suggested several areas where IRFA 
provided new tools for courts to evaluate claims of religious persecution.18 
IRFA called for broader comprehension of religious liberty than prior domestic 
law offered.19 IRFA required greater sensitivity to the legal and factual issues 
involved in credibility determinations.20 IRFA expanded the understanding of 
religious persecution beyond domestic United States law.21 IRFA recognized a 
government’s affirmative duty to protect against violations of freedom of belief 
or religion.22 No published cases citing these provisions exist, however, leaving 
the record bare in resolving religious persecution cases under IRFA and 
perpetuating what Congress perceived as the failure of federal adjudicators to 
fully understand religious persecution in asylum determinations. 
 Par. 5.2 of this chapter will discuss how IRFA changes the nexus issue in 
religious asylum cases. Because international law protects individuals from both 
intentional persecution as well as persecution resulting from the effect of a law 
or practice, IRFA should mitigate some of the difficulty religious applicants face 
under the Supreme Court definition of nexus in INS v. Elias-Zacarias.23 Par. 5.3 
will look at one case under IRFA, but its particular procedural history has 
minimized its impact instead of providing a map for relief. Par. 5.4 suggests as 
a thought experiment of IRFA’s potential, re-litigating one pre-IRFA case to 
consider what might have happened if IRFA had been applied to the litigation. 
Par. 5.5 examines the interrelationship between United States First Amendment 
                                                      
17  Id. at 535.  
18  Mousin, Craig B. (2004), ‘Standing with the persecuted: adjudicating asylum applications 
account of religion after the enactment of the international religious freedom act of 1998’, 
Brigham Young University Law Review, p. 541. 
19  Id. at p. 561-568. 
20  Id. at p. 568-573. 
21  Id. at p. 573-587. 
22  Id. at p. 587-590. 
23  502 U.S. 478 (1992). 
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law with IRFA. Finally, Par. 5.6 argues that even if IRFA did not change the 
law of nexus, IRFA still mandates enhanced training for adjudicators and 
government attorney to eliminate improper asylum adjudications. International 
law emphasizes the many manifestations of how religion is practiced, how 
religion impacts identity, and how persecutors violate religious liberty as 
compared to the narrow interpretations followed prior to the enactment of IRFA.  
At the very least, applicants should receive what Congress intended in a fair 
appraisal of their cases to ensure they retain the universal human right of 
religious liberty under the “internationally recognized right to freedom of 
religion, and religious belief and practice”.24  
5.2 The Nexus Problem 
The failure to use the tools IRFA provides has had particularly negative 
consequences in the context of nexus. To prevail in an asylum case the applicant 
must show he or she possesses one or more of the enumerated grounds, for 
example, religion, and that the persecutor intended the harm based on the named 
grounds.25 When the Supreme Court established the necessity of proving this 
connection between the enumerated ground and the persecutor’s intent, it 
increased the difficulty in obtaining asylum when neutral laws of general 
applicability interfere with faith or practice.26 As I discussed more extensively 
in my earlier paper,27 prior to IRFA, the confluence of two United States 
Supreme Court cases involving First Amendment law and immigration law in 
                                                      
24  22 U.S.C. § 6402 (16). 
25  The Refugee Act of 1980 defines a refugee, in part, as: “any person who is outside any 
country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside 
any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to 
return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that 
country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion”, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(42). The Refugee Act further included the remedy of non-refoulement. Under 
Section 241(b)(3) an applicant may not be removed to their native country if his or her “life 
would be threatened in that country because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion”. The United States Supreme 
Court has held that this restriction on removal must meet the higher standard that persecution 
will be more likely than not, but IRFA’s modification of nexus analysis for on account of 
religion should be the same as addressed in this chapter. I.N.S. v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984). 
26  To be clear, courts have granted asylum to some applicants seeking asylum or withholding 
based on religious persecution. Even under the First Amendment to the Constitution 
intentional restrictions on life or liberty based on persecution on account of religion would 
make one eligible for asylum. Immigration Judges, the BIA have granted asylum and the 
Courts of Appeal have remanded cases when they find the nexus, or a direct connection, 
between the applicant’s religious faith and the persecutor’s intent to persecute. See, e.g., In 
re L.K., 23 I. & N. Dec. 677, 2004 WL 2211892 (B.I.A. 2004); Shi v. U.S. Attny. Gen., 707 
F.3d 1231(11th Cir. 2013). 
27  Mousin, Standing, supra note 18, at 547, p. 551-555. 
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the early 1990s played a significant role in limiting protection of refugees 
seeking safe haven from religious persecution: Employment Division, 
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith28 and INS v. Elias-
Zacarias.29 In Smith, Justice Scalia stated that First Amendment law held that 
neutral, generally applicable laws that did not intentionally discriminate against 
religion did not violate the Constitution. Prior to Smith, most claimants alleging 
violations of the Constitution’s Free Exercise clause had the opportunity to 
request exemptions from neutral laws of general applicability when they were 
able to demonstrate that their infringed rights were not limited by a compelling 
state interest in the law and, should such interest exist, no less restrictive means 
existed to achieve the same ends without violating their beliefs or practices. 
After Smith, the neutrality of a law sustained its validity against a First Amend-
ment claim. The Court subsequently confirmed that any government legislation 
or action that intentionally discriminated would violate the Free Exercise 
clause.30 Since Smith, the Court and the Congress have jockeyed back and forth 
with congressional attempts to restore the earlier balancing test with some 
success while federal courts still struggle with whether a balancing test for 
exemptions can be found under federal law.31 
 For asylum purposes, however, the Court’s decision in Elias-Zacarias 
further constricted asylum as a remedy. Raised under the aegis of a political 
opinion case, Justice Scalia, without benefit of precedent or citation to any 
authority, discovered a new test defining “on account of” under the Refugee Act 
of 1980.32 According to Justice Scalia, the ordinary meaning of the phrase 
“persecution on account of (...) political opinion” is persecution on account of 
the victim's political opinion, not the persecutor’s”.33 International law had not 
recognized nor currently recognizes Justice Scalia’s “ordinary meaning” of on 
account of with such a restricted limitation.34 In an Elias-Zacarias amicus brief, 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees set forth that international 
law never required such a restrictive test for nexus limited to the intent of the 
                                                      
28  494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
29  502 U.S. 478 (1992). 
30  Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
31  Lupu, Ira C. (2015), ‘Hobby Lobby and the dubious enterprise of religious exemptions’, 
Harvard Journal of Law & Gender, 38, p. 35; Laycock, Douglas (2009), ‘The religious 
exemption debate’, Rutgers Journal of Law & Religion, 11, p. 139. See e.g., Gonzales v. O 
Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211 (2006) (finding exemption 
for use of restricted drug when used in religious ceremony). See also Laycock, Douglas & 
Steven T. Collis (2016), ‘Generally applicable law and the free exercise of religion’, 
Nebraska Law Review, 95, p. 1; Lund, Christopher C. (2017), ‘Religion is special enough’, 
Virginia Law Review, 103, p. 481; Gedicks, Frederick Mark (2017), ‘“Substantial” burdens: 
how courts may (and why they must) judge burdens on religion under RFRA’, George 
Washington Law Review, 85, p. 94. 
32  Elias-Zacarias, supra note 29, at p. 482. 
33  Id. (emphasis in original). 
34  Musalo, Karen (1994), ‘Irreconcilable differences? Divorcing refugee protections from 
human rights norms’, Michigan Journal of International Law, 15, 1179, p. 1191-1192. 
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persecutor persecuting on account of the applicant’s political opinion; rather: “It 
is enough that the persecution is a consequence of political opinion. Proof of the 
persecutor’s motive is not required to establish this link”.35 Consequently, 
IRFA’s invocation of international religious freedom law sought to correct the 
failure of the immigration courts and asylum officers to properly adjudicate 
religious asylum cases. Through IRFA, Congress reinstated the “effects” test as 
part of the nexus calculation. 
 In Elias-Zacarias, an indigenous young man from Guatemala feared 
recruitment from guerrillas fighting against the government. He claimed that his 
refusal to accept their demands to join their forces constituted a political opinion 
that they would punish him or kill him for rejecting their struggle. He argued 
that they knew his political opinion by his actions to flee.36 The Court held that 
the Refugee Act required adjudicators to examine Mr. Elias-Zacarias’ political 
opinion, not that of the persecutor.37 Based on a very sparse record, the Court 
could not determine whether the applicant informed the guerrillas of his specific 
reason for refusing to join them, leading the Court to conclude that the applicant 
failed to show that he resisted recruitment due to his political opposition to the 
guerrillas. The Court, therefore, found that “[e]ven a person who supports a 
guerrilla movement might resist recruitment for a variety of reasons—fear of 
combat, a desire to remain with one’s family and friends, a desire to earn a better 
living in civilian life, to mention only a few”.38 In this key ruling, the Court held 
that Mr. Elias-Zacarias had the burden of proving the persecutor “will persecute 
him because of that political opinion, rather than because of his refusal to fight 
with them”.39 Recognizing the high burden this placed on asylum applicants, the 
Court concluded that applicants did not have to show direct proof of a 
persecutor’s motive, but nonetheless, the applicant needed to provide some 
evidence of motive, “direct or circumstantial”.40 
 The new nexus test of Elias-Zacarias had an immediate negative impact on 
protecting religious liberty. In 1990, prior to Elias-Zacarias, two Jehovah’s 
Witnesses from El Salvador claimed that their faith prevented them from 
participating in the military notwithstanding El Salvador’s mandatory military 
service for all males between the ages of 18 and 30.41 El Salvador permitted no 
exceptions to the conscription policy.42 Moreover, young men who refused the 
conscription notice were either jailed, murdered or subjected to extrajudicial 
                                                      
35  Brief Amicus Curiae of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner For Refugees 
in Support of Respondent, 1991 WL 11003984 (U.S.) (Appellate Brief). 
36  502 U.S. at 478. 
37  Id. at 481. 
38  Id. at 482. 
39  Id at 483. 
40  Id. 
41  Canas-Segovia v. I.N.S., 902 F.2d 717 (9th Cir. 1990) vacated and remanded, I.N.S. v. Canas-
Segovia, 112 S. Ct. 1152 (1992), on remand, 970 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1992).  
42  Id. at 720. 
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torture.43 The brothers sought asylum based on their faith and on account of 
political opinion. The immigration judge denied their cases based upon their 
failure to show that the Salvadoran government had intentionally singled out 
Jehovah’s Witnesses for persecution because of their religious beliefs.44 After 
the BIA affirmed the denial,45 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and 
remanded the case noting first that the Board erred by requiring proof of intent 
or motive to persecute: “Under the Salvadoran conscription policy, if the 
Canases refuse to do military service, they will go to prison. Any reasonable 
person in this position would conclude that the punishment would be on account 
of his religious beliefs”.46 In addition, their refusal quite possibly would subject 
them to torture and death on account of their religious beliefs.47 Indeed, that 
conclusion revealed a clear probability of persecution, thus satisfying the non-
refoulement standard permitting withholding of deportation as well as asylum.48 
  After granting review, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and 
remanded the case for consideration after Elias-Zacarias.49 Subsequently, the 
Ninth Circuit in concise language held, “In light of Elias-Zacarias’s adoption 
of a motive requirement, Canas-Segovia can no longer prove religious 
persecution. In our decision, we took pains to explain that although evidence of 
a persecutor’s intent was relevant, it was not required (…). Because the key ‘on 
account of’ language applies equally to religious and political persecution, 
Elias-Zacarias dictates that Canas-Segovia must show some evidence of his 
persecutor’s intent, which he is unable to do”.50 Elias-Zacarias simply involved 
a political opinion case and did not explicitly address if the intent standard 
applied to all the enumerated grounds. The Ninth Circuit did not cite any 
authority for the conclusion that it applies equally to religious and political 
persecution. Instead, the court stated: 
We reject the argument on rehearing that religion should be 
treated differently. Political opinion is admittedly a narrow 
term, encompassing beliefs but not activities. Religion, on 
the other hand, is much broader, describing both beliefs and 
practices. Canas-Segovia argues that (1) it is undisputed 
that his sincere religious conviction require him to refuse to 
serve in the military, (2) his refusal to serve is a religious 
practice, and (3) he is being persecuted because of his 
                                                      
43  Id. at 720-21. 
44  Id. at 721. 
45  Id.  
46  Id. at 727. 
47   Id. at 729. 
48  Id. 
49  112 S.Ct. 1152. 
50  970 F.2d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1992). Canas-Segovia II addressed the asylum claim of only Mr. 
Jose Canas-Segovia. Prior to this second case, his brother, who was included in the first 
decision, had obtained lawful status through a different immigration procedure.  
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religious practice, i.e. his refusal to serve. But this alone 
cannot satisfy the requirement of demonstrating his per-
secutor’s motive or intent.51 
Noting that there might be many reasons for refusal to serve, for example, fear 
of combat or fear of reprisal from opposing forces, the court was not permitted 
to find that the motive was on account of religion unless the applicant tied “the 
persecution to a protected cause”.52 Fortunately for Mr. Canas-Segovia, the 
Court upheld its earlier finding that he was eligible for asylum and withholding 
based on an imputed political opinion.53  
 Critical for all applicants, but especially those fleeing religious persecution, 
as Professor Karen Musalo recognized, Elias-Zacarias eliminated an effects-
based test which looked at the consequences of persecution and replaced it with 
an intent-based test where the applicant had to demonstrate that he or she 
possessed at least one of the enumerated grounds and the persecution intended 
or actually persecuted them on account of that ground.54 Immediately, this 
changed the prospects for asylum applicants.  
 IRFA, enacted subsequent to Elias-Zacarias, provides new avenues of relief 
because international law protects religious freedom from violations of both a 
law’s intent and its effects. IRFA names numerous international protections as 
critical to a new understanding of protection through international religious 
liberty. Article 18 of the UDHR protects the “freedom to change [one’s] religion 
or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public 
or private, to manifest [one’s] religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship, 
and observance”.55 Practice can be harmed by a neutral law such as the 
Salvadoran conscription law. In addition, Article 2 of the Declaration on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on 
Religion or Belief acknowledges that neutral laws can improperly obstruct 
freedom of religion or belief, providing, in part, “the expression ‘intolerance 
and discrimination based on religion and belief’ means any distinction, 
exclusion, restriction or preference based on religion or belief and having as its 
purpose or as its effect nullification or impairment of the recognition, enjoyment 
or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms on an equal basis”.56 For 
Article 2 to fully protect religious liberty, the Elias-Zacarias nexus definition 
must be expanded to include a review of how any laws or actions by purported 
persecutors impacted the religious freedom of the applicant. Under the Refugee 
Act of 1980, at least since 1992, neutral laws of general applicability may harm 
                                                      
51  Id. (emphasis in original). 
52  Id.  
53  Id. at 602. 
54  Musalo, Irreconcilable, supra note 34, at p. 1181. 
55  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, 
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); see also 22 U.S.C. § 6401(a)(3) (2000).  
56  G.A. Res. 55, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/36/684 (1981) (emphasis 
added). 
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religious liberty, but still preclude grants of asylum because of the failure to 
show intent to harm religion. Thus, IRFA’s absence in published decisions is all 
the more surprising because the effect of a neutral law might, nonetheless, 
violate an applicant’s religious liberty permitting a grant of asylum otherwise 
denied under the Elias-Zacarias nexus test.  
 In 2005, Congress further restricted the nexus test.  It passed the REAL ID 
Act requiring that an enumerated ground must be at least “one central reason” 
for the persecution.57  Subsequently, the Third Circuit held that  
Section 208’s use of the phrase “one central reason” rather 
than “the central reason”, which (…) was a deliberate 
change in the drafting of this provision, demonstrates that 
the mixed-motives analysis should not depend on a 
hierarchy of motivations in which one is dominant and the 
rest are subordinate. 
See Amicus Br. 8–10; In re J—B—N— & S—M—, 24 I. & 
N. Dec. at 212–13. This plain language indicates that a 
persecutor may have more than one central motivation for 
his or her actions; whether one of those central reasons is 
more or less important than another is irrelevant.58 
As no cases have cited IRFA to date, courts have not yet addressed the REAL 
ID Act’s intersection with IRFA.  Congress did not explicitly repeal any aspect 
of IRFA in enacting the REAL ID Act.  Moreover, in its first precedent decision 
on the REAL ID Act, the BIA stated in In re J-B-N- & S-M-,  
Having considered the conference report and the language 
of the REAL ID Act, we find that our standard in mixed 
motive cases has not been radically altered by the REAL ID 
amendments. The prior case law requiring the applicant to 
present direct or circumstantial evidence of a motive that is 
protected under the Act still stands.59 
REAL ID made no radical changes to the burden test in mixed motive cases.  
Often proof of the effect of a law persecuting religious liberty might be shown 
through circumstantial evidence which retains its relevance after enactment of 
the REAL ID Act.  Congress’ great concern about the unfairness of asylum and 
refugee adjudications, moreover, provides strong support that IRFA still must 
be followed to protect this fundamental right, necessitating that adjudicators 
examine both the intent and effect of a persecutor’s actions upon a belief or 
practices as a central reason for the persecution. 
                                                      
57 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2005). 
58  Ndayshimiye v. Attorney General of the U.S., 557 F.3d 124, 129 (3rd Cir. 2009) (emphasis 
in the original). 
59 24 I & N Dec. 208, 212-213 (2007), footnote omitted. 
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5.3 The Lost Opportunity: Mr. Li and the Neutral Law of 
General Applicability 
One case suggested the power IRFA could have had in protecting religious 
asylum applicants, but IRFA’s subsequent impact was doomed by its initial 
success. In Li v. Gonzalez,60 a Chinese Christian who organized a Protestant 
home church in opposition to the government-approved and regulated Protestant 
Church was arrested, beaten, and interrogated with electric shocks until he 
signed a confession. After release, he fled to the United States and sought 
asylum and withholding of deportation. After the Immigration Judge granted 
withholding, the Immigration and Naturalization Service appealed his case. The 
Board sustained the appeal, holding that he was not “punished on account of his 
religion. Rather, he was arrested for a crime in China. We find that the 
Government of China has a legitimate right to enforce the laws which it 
creates”.61 The Fifth Circuit upheld the Board, concluding:  
The BIA held that Li did not establish that he would be 
persecuted if he was returned to China because Li did not 
prove that his punishment was on account of his religion. 
The BIA held that Li was punished for violating the law 
regarding unregistered churches and not because of his 
religion. The BIA noted that “China does not prohibit 
registered religions and its law is a legitimate sovereign 
right ‘not institutional persecution’”.62 
The court did express concern for the difficulty of its holding:  
The issue in this case is perplexing not only because it 
involves affairs of a foreign state that are contrary to our 
fundamental ideals but also because the line between 
religious belief and religious activity here is indeed a fine 
one and it is colored by sensitive political and religious 
concerns. However, while we may abhor China's practice of 
restricting its citizens from gathering in a private home to 
read the gospel and sing hymns, and abusing offenders, like 
                                                      
60  420 F.3d 500 (5th Cir. 2005), (Dismissed, Opinion Vacated by Li v. Gonzalez 429 F.3d 1153 
(5th Cir. 2005). 
61  Matter of Li, unpublished decision at 2 (BIA July 17, 2003), quoted in Jonathan Robert 
Nelson (2006), ‘Shaking the Pillars: An Asylum Applicant Shakes Lose Some Unusual 
Relief’, Interpreter Releases, 83, 1, p. 1. Mr. Nelson’s account provides a fuller description 
of the procedural steps and impact of IRFA leading to Mr. Li’s receipt of withholding of 
deportation. See also Churgin, Michael J. (2016), ‘Is religion different: is there a thumb on 
the scale in refugee convention appellate court adjudication in the United States? Some 
preliminary thoughts’, Texas International Law Journal, 51, 213, p. 222-224. 
62  Li at 509. 
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Li, who commit such acts, that is a moral judgment not a 
legal one.63 
Jonathan Nelson reports that although Mr. Li’s lawyers filed for a rehearing en 
banc, public uproar against this decision changed the course of this case. Nelson 
noted: “the coup de grace in the campaign to overturn the decision (…) came in 
the form of an unprecedented letter to the Attorney General from the United 
States Commission on International Religious Freedom”.64 USCIRF’s Chair, 
Michael Cromartie, expressed concern about the Li decision and its precedential 
impact that would “undermine the international leadership of the United States 
in protecting asylum seekers and advancing the right to freedom of religion or 
belief”.65 In addition to supplementing the record regarding China’s human 
rights violations, Chair Cromartie emphasized the Commission’s concern about 
“the increasing trend by China and other authoritarian governments to 
criminalize religious activity on the sole basis that the activity is not approved 
or the relevant religious organization registered by the government”.66 Chair 
Cromartie concluded, “as precedent, Li v. Gonzales will effectively provide a 
refuge from international law for those countries that criminalize ‘unregistered’ 
religious activity. It will refuse refuge, however, to those who flee persecution 
from such countries”.67 
 Within weeks of the USCIRF letter, the Department of Justice moved to 
withdraw its appeal. Two days later, the BIA vacated its prior decision and 
granted Mr. Li withholding of deportation. Subsequently, the Fifth Circuit 
vacated its decision for mootness.68 By vacating its decision, the Fifth Circuit 
contributed to the IRFA void once again – no published decision cites IRFA for 
its introduction of international law into asylum adjudications – further 
eviscerating international law from IRFA’s asylum protections. The Department 
of Justice, by moving to vacate the decision cited the Cromartie letter,69 
implicitly acknowledged his argument that the effects of neutral laws should be 
considered as sufficient to show persecution on account of religion under IRFA. 
Although Chair Cromartie’s letter specifically addressed China, he noted that 
other countries also persecute religion through criminalization of practice. In 
lauding the vacated Li decision, the USCIRF reported that it was clear that 
China’s policies criminalizing unauthorized religious activity “are clearly in 
                                                      
63  Id. at 511. 
64  Nelson, Relief, supra note 60, at 3. 
65  Id.; Michael Cromartie, United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, 
China/Asylum Issues: USCIRF Deeply Troubled by 5th Circuit Decision in Li v. Gonzales 
(October 3, 2005), available at <www.uscirf.gov/news-room/press-releases/chinaasylum-
issues-uscirf-deeply-troubled-5th-circuit-decision-in-li-v>. 
66  Id. 
67  Id. 
68  Li v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 1153 (5th Cir. 2005).  
69  Nelson, Relief, supra note 60, at 3. 
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violation of international law with regard to freedom of religion or belief”.70 The 
effect of the law violated Mr. Li’s liberty. The Li case underscores how 
Congress intended international religious liberty law to modify Elias-Zacarias’ 
limited understanding of nexus. 
 The vacated Li case also reveals one other issue with the failure to recognize 
international protection for religion. The Fifth Circuit cited boilerplate language 
in affirming the Board regarding the definition of persecution: “The term 
‘persecution’ is not defined in the immigration statute, Chang v. INS, 119 F.3d 
1055, 1060 (3rd Cir.1997), therefore, the court must accept any interpretation 
by the BIA that is not arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the 
statute”.71 Some courts have criticized the Board of Immigration Appeals for 
not adequately defining persecution. In Sahi v. Gonzalez, Judge Richard Posner 
complained that “We haven’t a clue as to what it [BIA] thinks religious perse-
cution is”.72 Jonathan Nelson observed that although IRFA does not specifically 
define persecution, it sets forth “[p]articularly severe violations of religious 
freedom”73 and “[v]iolations of religious freedom”.74 As such, IRFA gives 
                                                      
70  China/Asylum Issues: Fifth Circuit vacates troubling asylum decision on religious freedom 
in China, November 4, 2005: <www.uscirf.gov/news-room/press-releases/ chinaasylum-
issues-fifth-circuit-vacates-troubling-asylum-decision>. 
71  Li at 508. Although many courts frequently cite similar boilerplate language that Congress 
did not define persecution in the Refugee Act, the boilerplate designation does not accurately 
reveal what Congress has done since its enactment in 1980. For example, Congress modified 
the definition of refugee when it added language to protect individuals and families fleeing 
coercive population controls: “For purposes of determinations under this chapter, a person 
who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has 
been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to 
a coercive population control program, shall be deemed to have been persecuted on account 
of political opinion, and a person who has a well-founded fear that he or she will be forced 
to undergo such a procedure or subject to persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance 
shall be deemed to have a well-founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion”. 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). Although not a complete definition of persecution, the statutory 
language does describe specific conduct pursuant to population control that constitutes 
persecution providing a relevant example of Congress defining some actions that constitute 
persecution. Moreover, as discussed in footnotes at 73 and 74, infra, IRFA directed 
adjudicators to examine particularly severe violations and violations of religious freedom in 
analyzing persecution. 
72  416 F.3d 587, 589 (7th Cir. 2005). 
73  Nelson, Relief, supra note 60. See also Mousin, Standing, supra, note 18, at p. 573-581. 22 
U.S.C. § 6402(11) provides: ‘The term “particularly severe violations of religious freedom” 
means systematic, ongoing, egregious violations of religious freedom, including violations 
such as: 
 (A) torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment;  
 (B) prolonged detention without charges;  
 (C) causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction or clandestine detention of those 
persons; or  
 (D) other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of persons’. 
74  22 U.S.C. § 6402(13) provides: ‘The term “violations of religious freedom” means violations 
of the internationally recognized right to freedom of religion and religious belief and practice, 
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guidance to the courts of the wide variety of activities that governments engage 
in or tolerate to violate religious liberty. By simply adopting boilerplate 
language and not following IRFA, the courts continue to minimize protection 
of persecution of persons of faith from the multiple ways religion can be 
restricted through persecution. The combination of ignoring the effect of a law 
or practice without understanding the full manifestation of ways religious liberty 
can be constrained, limits asylum protection. Not only does IRFA provide more 
than a clue, many of the international covenants and declarations cited by 
Congress delineate the types of activities that constitute severe violations of 
religious liberty – the type of violations previously ignored by the courts that 
inspired Congress to enact IRFA’s asylum reforms. International protection 
would guide courts who otherwise defer to an agency that is overworked and 
has been criticized by Congress for not comprehending the full scope of 
religious persecution, and therefore, not protecting religious freedom. Mr. Li’s 
eventual receipt of withholding of deportation and the Li case’s unique 
procedural result as a vacated appellate court case, however, contributed to the 
failure of IRFA to protect persons of faith. 
5.4 A Thought Experiment of Re-litigating  
the Canas-Segovia Cases Under IRFA 
The Canas-Segovia cases provide an excellent example of how IRFA should be 
applied to religious asylum cases. Consider the thought experiment of asking 
what would have happened if the Canas-Segovia brothers’ cases came before 
the Ninth Circuit after IRFA. It was the first case to address religious perse-
cution after Elias-Zacarias. The Ninth Circuit concluded that Elias-Zacarias 
required it to find that the persecutor intended to persecute the brothers because 
of their religious beliefs. Because the Salvadoran conscription laws were found 
to be neutral laws of general applicability, the Court determined that it could not 
grant relief based on religious persecution. With the passage of IRFA, 
persecution can now be found based on the effects of a law, not just the intent. 
IRFA protects religious practice as well as belief while simultaneously 
critiquing governments that not only engage in persecution, but also tolerate it. 
                                                      
as set forth in the international instruments referred to in section 6401(a)(2) of this title and 
as described in section 6401(a)(3) of this title, including violations such as:  
 (A) arbitrary prohibitions on, restrictions of, or punishment for: (i) assembling for peaceful 
religious activities such as worship, preaching, and prayer, including arbitrary registration 
requirements; (ii) speaking freely about one’s religious beliefs; (iii) changing one’s religious 
beliefs and affiliation; (iv) possession and distribution of religious literature, including 
Bibles; or (v) raising one’s children in the religious teachings and practices of one’s choice; 
 (B) any of the following acts if committed on account of an individual’s religious belief or 
practice: detention, interrogation, imposition of an onerous financial penalty, forced labor, 
forced mass resettlement, imprisonment, forced religious conversion, beating, torture, 
mutilation, rape, enslavement, murder, and execution’. 
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The record contained no dispute that both brothers, who were practicing 
Jehovah’s Witnesses since their early childhood, possessed a genuine faith. 
Canas-Segovia I had found that “the tenets of their faith prohibit them from 
participating in military service of any kind”.75 The Salvadoran government 
recognized no exemptions for young males to avoid military service. If they 
refused to serve, they faced imprisonment from six months to 15 years.76 More 
important, at the time, the record was undisputed that many Salvadorans who 
avoided conscription were not sent to jail, but faced extrajudicial torture and 
murder by the authorities.77 The effect of the law and the government’s 
extrajudicial punishments meant the brothers faced either lengthy 
imprisonment, torture, or death as soon as they informed the authorities that 
their faith prevented them from serving in the military. The Ninth Circuit 
acknowledged that United States constitutional law might be relevant to the 
analysis, and cited Wisconsin v. Yoder78 for the proposition that a religious 
exemption could be granted under a neutral law of general applicability.79 
According to the Court, “the mere facial neutrality of the Salvadoran 
conscription policy does not preclude it from amounting to persecution”.80 
 Given those facts, although the conscription law was neutral on its face, the 
effects of the law to bona fide believers such as the Canas-Segovia brothers led 
to either imprisonment, torture or death. Canas-Segovia II dismissed the 
religious persecution claim for failure to show a nexus to religion. IRFA 
provided a new test for nexus permitting the effect of a law to be considered as 
well as the intent and expanded how manifestations of belief or practice could 
be protected. First, Article 2 of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief protects 
persons suffering from the effect of a law, stating, in part, “the expression 
‘intolerance and discrimination based on religion and belief’ means any 
distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on religion or belief and 
having as its purpose or as its effect nullification or impairment of the recog-
nition, enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms on an 
equal basis”.81  
 The effect of El Salvador’s conscription law left the Canas-Segovia brothers 
with no choice but to abdicate their beliefs, leave their nation, or serve up to 15 
years in prison, face torture or death. El Salvador offered them no options—
                                                      
75  Canas-Segovia, supra note 41. 
76  Id. at 721. 
77  Id. at 720-21. 
78  406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972). The Court also cited Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) 
and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) for granting exemptions from neutral laws. 
Canas-Segovia I was decided on April 24, 1990. Employment, 494 U.S., was decided on 
April 17, 1990. 
79  Canas-Segovia I at 723. 
80  Id. at 724. 
81  G.A. Res. 55, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/36/684 (1981) (emphasis 
added). 
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either practice their faith and die or abdicate their faith through conscription. 
Compare the choice the Canas-Segovia brothers had to Mr. Li’s choice—
practice and go to prison or abdicate his practice. To paraphrase Chair 
Cromartie’s letter, El Salvador left no “refuge” but only persecution for the 
brothers.82 The brothers could not simultaneously practice their pacifist faith 
and serve in El Salvador’s military. Mr. Li could not practice his faith within a 
registered house church. In both cases, practicing their faith put them in line for 
at a minimum, criminal violations, and at most beatings, torture or death. Chair 
Cromartie’s letter noting that “criminalizing religious activity on the sole basis 
of that activity” underscores that international protections protect the effects of 
a law as well as its intent.83  
 Second, by linking asylum claims to international religious freedom, IRFA 
points to additional international resources for understanding the many 
manifestations of religious persecution such as the 2004 UNHCR Guidelines 
which state: “religious belief, identity, or way of life can be seen as so 
fundamental to human identity that one should not be compelled to hide, change 
or renounce this in order to avoid persecution”.84 For the Canas-Segovia 
brothers to thrive and survive in El Salvador they would have had to deny their 
belief, identity, and way of life. Paragraph 25 states “in conscientious objector 
cases, a law purporting to be of general application may, depending on the 
circumstances, nonetheless be persecutory where, for instance, it impacts 
differently on particular groups…where the punishment itself is excessive or 
disproportionately severe, or where the military service cannot reasonably be 
expected to be performed by the individual because of his or her genuine beliefs 
or religious convictions”.85 All of these factors address the nexus issue. Other 
religious youth in El Salvador faced extrajudicial torture or murder for refusing 
to serve. Paragraph 14 of the Guidelines adds: 
In this context, the well-founded fear “need not necessarily 
be based on the applicant’s own personal experience”. 
What, for example, happened to the claimant’s friends and 
relatives, other members of the same religious group, that 
is to say to other similarly situated individuals, “may well 
show that his [or her] fear that sooner or later he [or she] 
also will become a victim of persecution is well-founded”.86 
                                                      
82  See Cromartie, supra note 64. 
83  Id. 
84  UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: Religion-Based Refugee Claims under 
Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of 
Refugees: <www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=4090f9794> [28 April 
2004]. 
85  Id. 
86  Id. 
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El Salvador provided a significant example in the life and death of the 
Salvadoran Archbishop. In 1980, Archbishop Oscar Romero preached a sermon 
urging the young men of El Salvador to refuse to serve in the military, to put 
their guns down and not kill. One day later, Archbishop Romero was assas-
sinated while presiding over a Catholic Mass.87 The Canas-Segovia brothers 
were neither clergy nor leadership, but the public interpreted Archbishop 
Romero’s assassination as a message to those who might refuse to serve such as 
the Canas-Segovia brothers. IRFA would have enabled the brothers’ advocates 
to present Romero’s assassination as evidence of the effect of El Salvador’s 
murderous treatment of conscientious objectors. 
 Moreover, IRFA’s international protections place an affirmative duty on the 
state to protect religious minorities.88 In the case of the Canas-Segovia brothers, 
the government of El Salvador failed that duty in a number of ways. First, it 
enacted a law that provided no exemption for persons whose very religious 
identity was tied to not participating in military service. It offered no protection 
for them despite this duty. Moreover, in light of the extrajudicial torture and 
murder, El Salvador failed its affirmative duty to protect the brothers even if 
they were willing to face the consequences of legal penalties, thus leaving them 
no option but to seek asylum. By pointing to international protection against the 
effects of a law, Congress, through IRFA, sought to remedy the unfair treatment 
previously experienced by persons of faith claiming asylum on account of 
religion.  
 The Canas-Segovia II precedent further limits religious liberty. Because of 
the narrow nexus limitations, many bona fide persons of faith seek to fit their 
cases within social group or imputed political opinion categories, further 
marginalizing religion in asylum adjudication. Often parties use political 
opinion or particular social group in what appears to be obvious situations where 
a full-blown religion argument would be more effective. For example, the 
meaning of particular social group has been intensely litigated over the last 
fifteen years, with different courts of appeals establishing distinctive tests and 
the BIA regularly modifying its tests as cases are remanded, leading to 
“jurisprudential confusion”.89 Thus, attorneys ignore a faith-ful life or 
membership in a recognized church or denomination as a primary enumerated 
ground of protection, and instead, base their argument on a purported social 
group that requires additional complex tests to meet one’s burden.90 
                                                      
87  See, e.g., Ana Carrigan (1984), Salvador witness: the life and calling of Jean Donovan, NY: 
Orbis Books, p. 157–158. On 23 March 1980, Archbishop Romero urged all members of the 
military to lay down their arms and “remember instead the voice of God: ‘Thou Shalt Not 
Kill!’ God’s law must prevail”.  
88  See Mousin, Standing, supra note 18, at p. 589–590. 
89  Ardala, Sabrineh & Thomas Boermann (2016), ‘Dynamics between gangs and the church: 
An overlooked dimension of Central American asylum claims’, Immigr. Briefings, 16-07, 1, 
p. 2. 
90  Id. at 2 (“Yet, within the larger story of gang warfare in Central America, one aspect is too 
often overlooked: the targeting of individuals on the basis of religion”. Note omitted). 
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International law has developed a broader conception of what religion is and 
demands careful inquiry into how a law or persecutory acts interfere with a 
belief or practice. 
 Similarly, given the narrow scope of the nexus standard, courts have denied 
asylum to persons of faith who have refused to join criminal or guerilla gangs 
in Central America by holding the guerillas would harm them due to their 
refusal to join rather than based on their religious beliefs to avoid murder, rape, 
or assault of other persons. In Tecun-Florian, a young Guatemalan who held 
sincere religious beliefs preventing him from killing anyone refused to join a 
criminal gang.91 The gang watched him go to church and then kidnapped and 
tortured him for ten days until he was freed through the efforts of a human rights 
group. He fled to the United States and sought asylum. The court acknowledged 
that Mr. Tecun-Florian refused to join the guerrillas because they violated his 
religious beliefs, but under the Elias-Zacarias nexus test, “the BIA could 
reasonably determine that the guerillas tortured Mr. Tecun-Florian solely in 
retribution for refusing to join their group—and not because of his religious or 
political beliefs”.92 In dissent, Judge Ferguson wrote, “he was deeply devoted 
to the Catholic faith, attending its services twice a week, and actively partici-
pating in other activities. His faith taught him that killing for any purpose is 
wrong. It was for this reason that he resisted joining the guerrilla’s cause despite 
their many efforts to conscript him”.93 His belief taught him to resist which led 
to torture and detention — it was part of his identity. The effect of his belief led 
to the retribution.  
 Similarly, in Bueso-Avila v. Holder, a young Honduran Christian actively 
proselytized other youth to join his church, the largest evangelical church in 
Honduras.94 A criminal gang tried to recruit him, including at least once when 
he was leaving the church. He frequently carried his Bible with him. His faith 
defined his identity, yet the court rejected his claim on nexus. International law 
recognizes that belief and practice have consequences, sometimes fatal 
consequences that Congress intended to be mitigated through the remedy of 
asylum.  The failure to follow IRFA has forced persons of faith to seek relief 
under the confused jurisprudence of social group, at a time when Congress 
sought to provide more protection for religious liberty. 
5.5 Romeike Family and Home Schooling 
Another case of interest that reflects the failure of the litigants and the courts to 
follow Congress’ direction to look at international protections involved German 
natives who sought asylum in the United States because they faced financial 
                                                      
91  207 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2000). 
92  Id. at 1109. 
93  Id. at 1114, (Ferguson, J., dissenting).  
94  663 F.3d 934 (7th Cir. 2011). 
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penalties and potential loss of custody of their children when they chose to home 
school their children in violation of German law requiring attendance at public 
school.95 As with Canas-Segovia II, the court may have had a fuller discussion 
of the impact of international law on religious liberty if it followed IRFA’s 
direction to include analysis of the effect of a law or practice. 
 In Romeike, the immigration judge granted asylum on account a particular 
social group of homeschooling families. The BIA reversed. The Romeikes 
appealed the denial to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals which upheld the 
Board and denied their request for asylum.96  
 In a strange twist on the issue I have raised about expanded protection for 
religion under IRFA, the court opened its opinion by stating, “[h]ad the 
Romeikes lived in America at the time, they would have had a lot of legal 
authority to work with in countering the prosecution”, citing three United States 
Supreme Court cases including Wisconsin v. Yoder, the same case that Canas-
Segovia I had applied to find protection for the applicants.97 Yoder provides 
strong constitutional protection for parents’ faith in determining the appropriate 
education for their children when they decide not to send their children to public 
schools. Apparently, both the litigants and the court ignored the Convention’s 
Travaux Préparatoires which note that although one of the five enumerated 
grounds of protection, religion “is the only article in the convention where 
treatment is ‘at least as favorable’ as that accorded to nationals of the contracting 
states”.98 Instead, the court stated, “Congress might have written the immi-
gration laws to grant a safe haven to people living elsewhere in the world who 
face government strictures that the United States Constitution prohibits. But it 
did not”.99 Even without IRFA, the Travaux Préparatoires suggest that the court 
should have looked at the parental rights protections under the Constitution as 
the minimum standard for asylum applicants. Although protections of the 
Convention and the Protocol were fully integrated into the Refugee Act of 1980, 
IRFA and its inclusion of international law further strengthens the Travaux 
Preparatoires’ relevancy. The court’s discussion of the First Amendment protec-
tions under Yoder becomes relevant and not simply discarded as dicta. 
 Here, too, the court’s failure to rely on IRFA doomed the Romeike’s chances 
for asylum. First, although mentioning that the Romeikes sought to home school 
based on their faith, the court primarily examined the Board’s decision that the 
Romeikes failed to establish themselves as homeschoolers who were within a 
particular social group in Germany. The court noted, “there is a difference 
between the persecution of a discrete group and the prosecution of those who 
violate a generally applicable law”.100 The court found that Germany neither 
                                                      
95  Romeike, supra note 16, at 528. 
96  Id.  
97  Id. at 530. 
98  The Refugee Convention (1951), Travaux Préparatoires analysed 42–43 (Paul Weis ed., 
1995). 
99  Romeike, supra note 16, at 530. 
100 Id. 
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selectively applied the compulsory school attendance law to the Romeikes or 
that they were more severely punished than other parents who broke the law.101  
But IRFA demands more, requiring the court to determine if religious 
persecution could be found under violations of international religious freedom 
which includes, “arbitrary prohibitions, restriction of, or punishment for (…) 
raising one’s children in the religious teachings and practices of one’s 
choice”.102 At the very least the international treaties require a more sensitive 
analysis of how a law impacts a person of faith. The UNHCR Guidelines, for 
example, state: 
Each claim requires examination on its merits on the basis 
of the individual’s situation. Relevant areas of inquiry 
include the individual profile and personal experiences of 
the claimant, his or her religious belief, identity and/or way 
of life, how important this is for the claimant, what effect the 
restrictions have on the individual, the nature of his or her 
role and activities within the religion, whether these 
activities have been or could be brought to the attention of 
the persecutor and whether they could result in treatment 
rising to the level of persecution.103 
Although the Romeikes raised international protections, the court failed to cite 
IRFA in dismissing those claims.  
 Instead the court acknowledged that although international treaties signed by 
Germany might give the Romeikes the right to decide the education of their 
children, “that by itself does not require the granting of an American asylum 
application”.104 IRFA does not require the granting of asylum, but as the 
USCIRF letter in the Li cases stated, it would have provided a more expansive 
analysis of a violation of a generally applicable law.105  
 The court, apparently unaware of the reasons Congress reacted so strongly 
to the improper adjudications of religious claimants was because over half the 
world’s population lives under regimes that persecute on account of religion,106 
quoted then-Judge Alito from a pre-IRFA case: “If persecution were defined 
that expansively, a significant percentage of the world’s population would 
                                                      
101 Id. 
102 See supra note 24. 
103 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Guidelines on International Protection No. 
6: Religion-Based Refugee Claims under Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or the 
1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 April 2004, HCR/GIP/04/06: 
<www.refworld.org/docid/4090f9794.html> [8 September 2017] 
104 Id. at 534.  
105 Erin Welch writes in a student note that the court ignored significant evidence of selective 
punishment against religious homeschoolers in Germany. Welch, Erin (2015), ‘Disguised 
persecution in Germany: the Romeike asylum case’, University of Cincinnati Law Review, 
83, 1029, p. 1043-1051. 
106 22 U.S.C. §§ 6401–6481 (2000) (enacted 27 October 1998). 
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qualify for asylum in this country – and it seems most unlikely that Congress 
intended such result”.107 
 Contrary to the Romeikes’ court’s reliance on Judge Alito’s assumption, 
Congress specially cited the great numbers, especially in terms of religious 
persecution, as cause for chastising the government adjudication of religious 
claims and seeking expansive protection.108 The concern of courts that great 
numbers of asylum applicants would flood the system ignores the particular 
requirement for asylum that in addition to examining whether the intent or effect 
of a law was directed at an applicant, the applicant must still prove harm or fear 
of harm that meets the definition of persecution. That is, the Romeikes would 
still have had to show that their fears of a government school violated their 
religious freedom to the extent, for example, that Mr. Yoder experienced in 
seeking to exercise his religious freedom to raise children within his faith. A 
speculative fear about too many applicants should not override congressional 
findings of improper bias or unfairness against bona fide applicants. Seemingly 
oblivious of IRFA, however, the court citing Elias-Zacarias, concluded,  
The question is not whether Germany’s policy violates the 
American Constitution, whether it violates the parameters 
of an international treaty or whether Germany’s law is a 
good idea. It is whether the Romeikes have established the 
prerequisites of an asylum claim – a well-founded fear of 
persecution on account of a protected ground.109 
If the court does not provide the opportunity to explore homeschooling as a 
religious liberty issue, it ignores the many manifestations of religious 
persecution. Congress intended through IRFA to expand the protection beyond 
the bare minimum set by Elias-Zacarias. The USCIRF letter in the Li case 
pointed to the parameters of international law on religious liberty to question 
the effect of a nation’s law when it criminalizes religious conduct. It further 
called for those individuals adjudicating cases to show more sensitivity to the 
individual’s faith and impact of such laws on faith. Through IRFA, courts must 
fully plumb all the manifestations of religious liberty rather than dismissing 
claims for failure to meet the Elias-Zacarias nexus test — something clearly not 
accomplished in the Romeike case.110 
                                                      
107 Id. at 535, citing Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3rd Cir. 1993). 
108 Id. 
109 Romeike, supra note 16, at 535. 
110 Fred Gedicks describes an issue in United States First Amendment jurisprudence. He argues 
that courts have not fulfilled their obligation to address the severity of the burden when 
persons of faith seek accommodations under the First Amendment. See generally Gedicks, 
Substantial, supra note 31. In asylum cases, adjudicators must decide when the intent or 
effect of the purported persecutor’s actions constitute persecution and not a necessary 
inconvenience of living in a pluralist nation. Mr. Yoder and his community feared their faith 
community would not survive if children were not raised in its faith without the competing 
demands of a public-school education. IRFA’s requirement that adjudicators understand the 
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5.6 Even if the courts refuse to modify the Nexus Test for 
religious asylum claims, IRFA still calls for greater 
sensitivity to religious claims of persecution. 
Even if the courts decide that IRFA did not change the nexus requirement for 
religious asylum claims, the bias or ignorance that Congress chastised 
adjudicators for still appears in court cases to the detriment of religious liberty. 
Congress demanded additional training on international religious liberty law for 
adjudicators precisely because either improper bias or lack of training led to 
federal unfairness. Indeed, eight years after its enactment, USCIRF Chair 
Michael Cromartie testified before Congress that the training had mixed 
results.111 He expressed concern that DOJ and DHS attorneys had taken 
positions contrary to IRFA’s intent, stating: “the Commission has recommended 
that both the Board and the Office of Immigration Litigation should be subject 
to mandatory training under IRFA”.112 Now, ten years since that testimony, the 
BIA and the Office of Immigration Litigation continue to reveal that govern-
ment officials still do not understand that the extensive manifestations of 
religious persecution, including when laws tolerate religious persecution or 
forced conversions, constitute serious violations of religious liberty. Similarly, 
living in secret to avoid persecution should not eviscerate a legitimate claim. 
International religious liberty cannot coincide with governments that tolerate 
persecution, but courts continue to misconstrue all of these issues absent more 
effective training.113 
5.6.1  Failure to Understand the Context of a Nation’s Law and Culture 
By not understanding the many manifestations of faith, courts fall prey to 
IRFA’s conclusions about unfair treatment of religious asylum claimants. In 
                                                      
full range of potential violations of religious freedom necessitates a broader understanding 
of religious persecution. 
111 Testimony by United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF 
Chair Michael Cromartie, Hearing on the U.S. Refugee and Asylum Programs, May 10, 
2006, <www.uscirf.gov/advising-government/congressional-testimony/testimony-united-
states-commission-international>. 
112 Id. 
113 It appears that even the limited training that occurs will soon be reduced or eliminated. See 
Sherman-Stokes, Sarah (2017), ‘Immigration Judges Were Always Overworked. Now they’ll 
be untrained, too’, The Washington Post, July 11: 
 <www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/immigration-judges-were-always-overworked-now-
theyll-be-untrained-too/2017/07/11/e71bb1fa-4c93-11e7-a186-60c031eab644_story.html 
?tid=sm_tw&utm_term=.cb49e698dba7>. “Justice Department confirmed that it has 
eliminated what little continuing judicial education and professional development once 
existed for immigration judges”. 
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Faour v. Gonzalez,114 Faour, a Christian shopkeeper in Syria, was accosted by 
a female customer. When he resisted her advances, she left the store. Shortly 
thereafter, her brothers returned and demanded that he marry their sister or they 
would kill him. Mr. Faour refused. He claimed that he refused to convert to 
Islam which was required if he were to marry their sister. He then left his home 
and moved around the country, hiding from his tormentors before he was able 
to travel outside of Syria. He sought asylum based on persecution on account of 
religion. After explaining that her brothers demanded that he marry their sister, 
the immigration judge asked: “What does the religion have to do with 
anything?”.115 Mr. Faour replied: “Because if I ever wanted to marry the woman, 
I would have been a Muslim, I would have converted to Islam, and I don't want 
to convert to Islam”. The immigration judge responded: “Okay. That's all right, 
you don't have to convert”.116 Mr. Faour later testified that if returned to Syria, 
the brothers would kill him because he did not marry their sister. In her opinion 
denying asylum, the immigration judge held: “Although a feeble attempt has 
been made to allege religion as the statutory ground, the evidence is devoid or 
the record is devoid of any evidence”.117 She also found: “the respondent has 
not carried his burden and the testimony is not credible”.118 
 The Board, in affirming the decision, noted that even if “respondent's 
testimony were found to be true (...) the respondent has not met his burden of 
establishing that he was a victim of past persecution”.119  Mr. Faour testified that 
he faced the tragic choice of a forced conversion or death. IRFA mandated 
immigration judges to attend training to understand the complexity of religious 
liberty issues in different nations. Syrian law offers the possibility of exemption 
from criminal penalties for honor killings.120 At the time of the brothers’ threat, 
Syrian law exempted murderers of either the woman or the man involved in the 
conduct that led the brothers to threaten Mr. Faour.121 Mr. Faour would have 
had reasonable grounds to believe the brothers could act with impunity if they 
murdered him, or at least face a very limited incarceration. The Syrian govern-
ment not only tolerated religious persecution, its laws enabled it.  
                                                      
114 125 Fed. Appx. 863 (9th Cir. 2005). The Ninth Circuit opinion had a limited review of the 
record. These facts were taken from the government's brief to the Ninth Circuit unless 
otherwise noted.  
115 2004 WL 3155108 (C.A.9) (Brief for Respondent), 6. 
116 Id at 7. 
117 Id at 9. 
118 Id.at 8. 
119 Id at 10. 
120 Syrian Penal Code, art. 548. See also Abu Odeh, Lam (2010), ‘Honor killings and the 
construction of gender in Arab societies’, American Journal of Comparative Law, 58, 911, 
p. 929-930. 
121 On July 1, 2009, Syria amended Article 548 which waived punishment for honor killings, 
but caps the punishment at a sentence of two years. See Syria: No Exceptions for ‘Honor 
Killings’, (2009, July 28), Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <www.hrw.org/news 
/2009/07/28/syria-no-exceptions-honor-killings>. 
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 Despite the immigration judge’s retort that Mr. Faour did not have to convert, 
his fear of a forced conversion also was reasonable within the Syrian legal 
system. Article 3 of the Syrian Constitution states that “Islamic jurisprudence is 
a main source of legislation”.122 Muslim women cannot marry Christian men. If 
Mr. Faour was to remain in Syria and escape death, he had no choice but to 
convert. Notably, IRFA lists forced conversions as violations of religious 
liberty.123 If the training that IRFA mandated was effective, it would be almost 
impossible for the IJ to hold the record was devoid of evidence of religious 
persecution of Mr. Faour given the laws and culture of Syria. At the very least 
the IJ should not have terminated testimony about the forced conversion simply 
by concluding that Mr. Faour did not have to convert – perhaps a right held 
within the United States, but not within Syria.  
5.6.2  Worship in Secrecy 
Mr. Faour's case also highlights another element that IRFA's enactment should 
have at least shed some light in understanding the religious liberty implications 
of his case. One difficulty some religious claimants face in proving their cases 
involves the impossible choice of worshipping in the open and facing 
persecution or worshipping in secret, but then facing the possibility that their 
case would be denied because the persecutor did not know they possessed this 
enumerated ground. Be public and be persecuted or be private, survive, but 
perhaps lose their asylum case. Unlike political opinion which can sometimes 
be expressed in private through anonymous social media sources or distribution 
of unsigned publications, religion often requires community worship or worship 
at sacred spaces that may be public, but limited to a specific location. In Mr. 
Faour's case, he fled his home and lived in Syria for three years, hiding and 
moving about to keep from discovery.124 In the meantime, his parents continued 
to worship in their hometown. The IJ and the BIA interpreted his three years in 
Syria as proof of his safety, totally disregarding that he could not worship 
publicly, nor remain at home and worship with his family. The Ninth Circuit 
found no reason to disagree with the BIA. In contrast, Judge Posner in a Seventh 
Circuit case rebuked an immigration judge's decision denying a Jehovah's 
Witness religious persecution claim: 
But the fatal flaw in the immigration judge's opinion lies (...) 
in the assumption – a clear error of law – that one is not 
entitled to claim asylum on the basis of religious 
persecution if (...) one can escape the notice of the 
persecutors by concealing one's religion. Christians living 
in the Roman Empire before Constantine made Christianity 
                                                      
122 Constitution of the Syrian Arab Republic Feb.26, 2012, art. 3. 
123 See supra note 74. 
124 2004 WL 3493875 (C.A.9) (Petitioner’s Opening Brief), 6. 
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the empire's official religion faced little risk of being thrown 
to the lions if they practiced their religion in secret; it 
doesn't follow that Rome did not persecute Christians, or 
that a Christian who failed to conceal his faith would be 
acting “unreasonably”.  (...) One aim of persecuting a 
religion is to drive its adherents underground in the hope 
that their beliefs will not infect the remaining population.125 
IRFA defines forcing persons of faith from publicly expressing their faith as a 
violation of religious liberty. In Faour, the Board found, however, that his three 
years living in Syria without harm undermined his case.126 The Board committed 
the same fatal flaw found by Judge Posner in Muhur. Given that the Board 
examined the record as if Mr. Faour's testimony was true which included his not 
returning home and hiding in several different locations during those three 
years, his safety amounted to emulating the pre-Constantine Christians, not the 
absence of objective evidence of his faith.  
 The government's argument demonstrates the specific problem that IRFA 
sought to alleviate and why Chair Cromartie called for more training for judges 
and attorneys with the Office of Immigration Litigation. The government brief 
stated:  
Faour has clearly stated that his fears of persecution arise 
from his refusal to convert to Islam and to marry the woman, 
but not that he was sought out because of his religion. Thus, 
for the same reasons that were found to be inadequate in 
Elias-Zacarias (…), Faour has failed to present any 
evidence that the men's intent was to persecute him on 
account of his religion, that is, because he was Christian.127 
Examine that argument closely: Mr. Faour refused to convert from his faith to 
one demanded by his purported persecutors who could make such a demand 
with impunity from prosecution by Syria. Yet the government attorney claims 
such a conversion had nothing to do with Mr. Faour’s religion. Mr. Faour’s 
purported persecutors threatened to kill him if he did not marry, but if he 
married, he would have been required him to convert to Islam. Yet the 
government brief claims it had nothing to do with his religion. Ignoring IRFA’s 
many manifestations of ways persecutors persecute on account of religion, the 
government brief argues that simply because the persecutors did not say they 
                                                      
125 Muhur v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 958, 960 (7th Cir. 2004). See also Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Attny. 
Gen., 577 F.3d 1341, 1358, (Marcus, Circuit Judge, specially concurring): the right to 
practice one's faith and to do so in public stands at the heart of free exercise. See also Mousin, 
Standing, supra note 18, 580: historical understanding of the early Christians hiding in the 
catacombs of Rome demonstrated that the fear of persecution was reasonable and subject to 
remedy.  
126 2004 WL 3155108 (C.A.9) (Appellate Brief), 9. 
127 Id. at 18. 
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wanted to harm him because he was a Christian, there was no nexus to a specific 
religion. The Ninth Circuit agreed, however, denying Mr. Faour's claim holding 
that 
Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that 
Faour’s alleged persecutors did not and would not, act on 
account of his Christian faith. Faour himself stated that 
“[the brother] will kill [him] (…) because [he] didn’t marry 
their sister”. As a result, the record does not compel the 
conclusion that Faour demonstrated a nexus between the 
claimed persecution and a protected ground.128 
Here again the limitations based on the nexus test of Elias-Zacarias combined 
with Congress' concern of either ignorance or bias against religious claims limits 
remedies of persons of faith who face either murder or forced conversion. IRFA 
holds murder as a serious violation of religious liberty and forced conversion as 
a serious violation of religious liberty. Both together constitute persecution on 
account of religion, hardly a record devoid of religion. The combination of 
impunity for murder, sanctioned by custom and Syrian law, with the cultural 
requirement of forced conversion provides a perfect example of the dismissive 
ways government officials have treated religious asylum claims that Congress 
tried to remedy through IRFA. 
 Admittedly, Mr. Faour’s case contained a relatively meager record and 
credibility issues existed, but the government brief reveals the lack of sensitivity 
to national laws, cultures and practice that silence religious belief and practice. 
To ignore the full context of a person’s faith at a time of forced global migration 
undermines all asylum cases. The lack of sensitivity to a nation’s laws and 
customs denigrates the United States commitment to the fullness of this 
universal freedom.  
5.7 Conclusion 
Congress chastised the government for failing to live up to our national promises 
of religious freedom. Congress infrequently accuses federal adjudicators of bias 
or ignorance based on improper training. In 1998, however, Congress enacted 
IRFA to overcome the unfairness it found in the government determination of 
religious claims for asylum. Recognizing that such institutional unfairness 
undercut a universal right of religious liberty, it instructed that religious asylum 
claims should be analyzed under international religious liberty principles. Those 
principles were broader and more protective than domestic United States law 
had been interpreted previously. International religious liberty law examines 
both the intent and effect of a law. Moreover, Congress specifically listed 
                                                      
128 Faour, supra note 114, at 864. 
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particularly severe violations of religious liberty and violations of religious 
liberty underscoring the complex and diverse variety of ways governments and 
their agents persecute persons of faith. Despite this concern, no published cases 
cite IRFA for its international law principles. Despite this congressional intent, 
persons of faith, living lives endangered by their belief or practice, remain 
unprotected by United States asylum laws. Can one still call this refusal to 
follow IRFA simply bias or improper training? Greater protection on account of 
religion would occur, moreover, by the recognition that IRFA also modified the 
nexus test for religious claims by requiring courts and adjudicators to explore 
the persecutory effect of a law or practice on one's religion. IRFA remains the 
law. For the United States to truly stand with the persecuted and to recognize 
the fundamental universal right of religious liberty with the full protection of 
international law, advocates and adjudicators must bring IRFA into all asylum 
and refugee determinations. 
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Chapter 6 A challenge for Muslim migrants 
Entering the EU as well as into a sharīʿah-compliant 
relationship. The Italian case 
Federica Sona 
6.1 Introduction 
Pious Muslims have a religious obligation to marry. When adopting the point of 
view of European Muslim communities, entering into a sharīʿah-compliant1 
relationship is perceived as a pivotal part of the exercise of religious freedom as 
granted by domestic and international legal provisions on European soil.  
 This chapter focuses on the right to contract a valid marriage with civil (and 
religious) effects and, then, to claim related family reunification rights with 
respect to alien Muslims, in particular, Muslim migrant prospective spouses 
(ir)regularly settled in Italy. The foreign nationals’ statutory right to individual 
religious freedom is therefore analysed, whilst investigating whether this is de 
facto affected by the actual or assumed religious belonging of the non-EEA 
partner, as well as by the fiancé(e)’s migrant status.  
 Examining the impact of state and Islamic laws on the agency of prospective 
migrant Muslim spouses-to-be, a dichotomy becomes increasingly evident. On 
the one hand, Muslim migrant partners may be (unintended) victims of 
discriminatory provisions based on the fiancé(e)’s religious affiliation, as 
enacted by the national legal systems of European and Muslim majority 
countries. On the other hand, Muslim purported spouses, as well as official 
bodies, may gradually learn to elaborate on antidotes to the discriminatory 
effects of some state provisions. 
 Building upon empirical data,2 this chapter thus aims to discuss whether the 
Italian legal system can meet the needs of Muslim migrants, with regard to the 
                                                      
1 Sharīʿah is the Arabic word indicating Islamic divine law, in: real terms, this word designates 
a path (to a watering place). From the wording of the Qur’ān (V: 48; XLII: 13 and 42; 
XLV:18) it can be inferred that the word sharīʿah (as well as the terms and verbs which derive 
from the same root) identifies the way that shall be followed by Muslims, in this chapter, the 
expression sharīʿah-compliant is used to indicate Islamic and/or Muslim nuptial unions. For 
a clarification of the meaning of the adjective Islamic and Muslims see infra section 3 and 
footnote No. 16. 
2 The discussed empirical data was collected from 2004 to 2017. With respect to the employed 
research methodology, qualitative data were collected through a combination of oral 
(predominantly semi-structured research interviews and focus groups) and written 
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statutorily granted right to form a family. Analysing the nuptial prerequisites to 
be satisfied by prospective spouses (national and alien), the proposed analysis 
pinpoints the impairment of Muslim migrant fiancé(e)s’ right to marry, 
including the (impelled) shadowy exercise of the Islamic right-&-duty to enter 
into a nuptial union.  
 In the attempt to consider to what extent the examined European Member 
State has withdrawn from religious provisions (with respect to nuptial 
requirements)3 or, alternatively, Muslim partners have withdrawn from official 
state rules, strategically refined remedies - as elaborated either by Italian official 
bodies, or by Muslim parties (prospective spouses or Muslim majority 
countries) - are investigated. As a result, habitually unnoticed sharīʿah-com-
pliant or civil nuptial patterns, as well as Muslim family reunification tech-
niques, are brought to light in the next sections. 
6.2 Freedom of religion and Islām 
Freedom of religion is a key principle in the Italian legal system, a prerogative 
of every human being that is guaranteed under the 1947 Constitution of the 
Italian Republic.4 As a matter of fact, article 19 proclaims that anyone is entitled 
                                                      
(predominantly document examination and self-designed questionnaires) surveys, and field 
observations. Socio-legal deductive-inductive methods were relied upon and methodological 
triangulation techniques were combined. The interviewees were selected combining area 
sampling, stratified random sampling, accidental sampling and snowball techniques. On 
social research methods, see inter alia Weber (1949), Denzin (1989), Gray and Guppy 
(1994); Ringer (1997), Bryman (2001), Weinberg (2002), Bulmer (2003), Huff (2003), 
Banakar and Travers (2005), Walliman (2006). With respect to qualitative research, 
including empirical investigations, interviews, narrative, and evaluation, see respectively 
Denzin and Lincoln (1994; 1998), Flick (1998). Hollway and Jefferson (2000), Yanow and 
Schwartz-Shea (2006), Patton (2002). As far as the more specific legal field and Muslim 
peculiarities are concerned, see McConville and Chui (2007), and Jeldtoft and Nielsen 
(2012). Details concerning the interviewed diplomatic personnel (foreign country and Italian 
cities) are not reported in order to protect the participants and this is due to the highly 
sensitive nature of the released information. With respect to the diplomatic premises, the 
embassies/consulates of the countries of origin of Muslims settled on Italian soil were 
contacted and invited to take part in my research project. The percentages of relevant 
countries varied over the years; they included Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Bangladesh, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Kosovo, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, 
Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, SA, Senegal, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, 
UAE, and Yemen. 
3 Although the Italian legal system has withdrawn from including religious requirements in 
the Civil Code, (unintended) religious-based discrimination might be enacted, as the 
discussion reveals. Additionally, part of the legal vocabulary used to describe civil nuptial 
requirements is borrowed from Canon law; see infra footnote No. 20. 
4 Italian Constitution, ‘Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana’, 22.12.1947, in Gazzetta 
Ufficiale 27.12.1947 No. 298. 
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to freely profess his or her religious belief in any form, individually or with 
others.5 Additionally, article 3, states:  
All citizens have equal social dignity and are equal before 
the law, without distinction of sex, race, language, religion, 
political opinion, personal and social conditions. It is the 
duty of the Republic to remove those obstacles of an 
economic or social nature which constrain the freedom and 
equality of citizens, thereby impeding the full development 
of the human person and the effective participation of all 
workers in the political, economic and social organisation 
of the country. 
Accordingly, individual religious freedom cannot be constrained to the point 
where it impedes the full development of the human person.6  
 When adopting the Islamic point of view, an essential aspect for the full 
development of the human person is marriage. Indeed, according to sharīʿah, 
marriage is not simply an expression of individual agency, a manifestation of 
personal autonomy, but it is a ‘right-&-duty’ of the practising Muslim. The 
Qur’ān - chapter (sūrah) XXIV, verse (āyah) 32 - exhorts Muslims to marry: 
And marry the unmarried among you and the righteous 
among your male slaves and female slaves. If they should be 
poor, Allāh will enrich them from His bounty, and Allāh is 
all-Encompassing and Knowing. 
The imperative form of the verb ‘to marry’ adopted in the verse reported above 
is further corroborated by the sūrah XXX, āyah 21, as it clarifies that  
And of His signs is that He created for you from yourselves 
mates that you may find tranquillity in them; and He placed 
between you affection and mercy. Indeed in that are signs 
for a people who give thought.7  
The creation of mates - literally of spouses (azwāğan) - is thus perceived as one 
of the signs of God. Also, the Sunnah8 warmly recommends Muslim believers 
                                                      
5 The social dimension of freedom of religion is indeed explicitly recognised by the Italian 
Constitution, specifically by articles 8, 19, 20 117. For a study of the constitutional provisions 
granting religious freedom, see Barsotti et al. (2015: 114-122). 
6 As stressed by the Italian judiciary, see infra section 7. 
7 I am here reporting the English translation of the text as provided by The Qur’an: Saheeh 
International, published respectively by Dar Qiraat (2010), Umm Muhammed Al-Muntada 
al-Islami (2004), and Abul Qasim Publishing House (1997), as this is widely available in 
worship prayer centres and therefore well-known by European Muslims. The same 
publication is relied upon for the āyāt reported below in section 5. 
8 The Arabic word sunnah means ‘practice’. The Sunnah is usually referred to the Prophet 
Muẖammad’s living habits reported through aẖādīth (sing. ẖadīth), which give an account 
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to contract marriage: for instance, a ẖadīth recites: ‘I fast, eat, pray and sleep 
and marry women, and who does not follow my Sunnah does not belong to me’.9 
A family based on a nuptial union is regarded as the basis of human society,10 
and Muslims commonly recite the saying that ‘marriage is the half of the 
religion (dīn)’.11  
 Accordingly, when dealing with the religious freedom of (pious) Muslim 
partners, not only the ‘right’ to marry but also the ‘duty’ to marry is to be 
carefully taken into consideration. An Islamic or Muslim marriage is at the same 
time a religious, social and a civil duty when some requirements are satisfied: a 
Muslim man can afford to pay the dower (mahr or şadāq), he can support a 
family and he is afraid to commit sins as an unmarried person.12 
 Theoretically, this sharīʿah-compliant right-&-duty is not challenged on 
Italian soil. From a legal perspective, the right to marry and form a family is 
protected and granted by both Italian and European black letter laws. Article 
29(1) of the Italian Constitution recognises the rights of the family as a natural 
society founded on marriage, indeed it states that  
The Republic recognises the rights of the family as a natural 
society founded on marriage. Marriage is based on the 
moral and legal equality of the spouses within the limits laid 
down by law to guarantee the unity of the family. 
The same approach reverberates throughout the contemporaneous wording of 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
and its Protocols.13 Article 12 ECHR indeed stresses the right of men and 
women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family. Similarly, article 9 
                                                      
of the Prophet’s life as a role model behaviour. The Sunnah represents the second Islamic 
source, following the Qur’ān. 
9 As reported as al-Saẖīẖ al-Bukhārī, 7: 2 by Arabi (2001a: 150) and 67: 1 by ‘Ali (1936: 602; 
1944: 269).  
10 See inter alia ‘Ali (1936: 268); al-Faruqi (1982: 160). 
11 This sentence is widely reported by scholars, but regrettably they tend to cite different 
sources for the same expression. For instance, Arabi (2001a: 150) regards it as a proverb. 
The very same expression is an ẖadīth reported in the al-Mishkāt al-Masābīẖ by ‘Ali (1936: 
603), and referred by al-Bayhaqī in the opinion of Maqsood (2003: 1). Some authors 
generally mention al-Bukhārī or al-Ġazhālī - see e.g. Wiktorowicz and Farouki (2000: 690), 
and Blank (2001: 332, note No. 35) respectively; or some scholars simply do not report the 
source of the ẖadīth - see e.g. Lapidus (1976: 95) and Hoodfar (1997: 52). Islamic scholars 
and fieldwork informants almost unanimously reported this expression to me. With respect 
to empirical evidence, see infra footnote No. 2. 
12 See Santillana (1919: 157). 
13 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols 
(Rome, 04.11.1950), as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, in Council of Europe Treaty 
Series, No. 5, 01.06.2010. This is generally addressed as the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) and entered into force on 01.06.2010 in its last amended form. 
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of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union recognises the 
right to marry and to found a family as granted by domestic laws.14 
 This chapter thus intends to explore the ways in which migrant Muslim 
partners can exercise their own statutory right to individual religious freedom 
in the form of a (sharīʿah-compliant) nuptial union in Italy. 
6.3 Marrying and forming a family in Italy 
On Italian soil, Muslim migrant intended spouses can marry in compliance with 
Italian laws or sharīʿah. Muslim migrant fiancé(e)s can indeed contract a civil-
only nuptial union as regulated by Italian laws, or they can marry in compliance 
with sharīʿah. Specifically, Muslim partners can enter into a ‘religious-Islamic’ 
or a ‘customary-Muslim’ marriage. The former is the nuptial union perfected in 
compliance with religious provisions, namely the Qur’ān, the Sunnah and other 
acknowledged sources of Islamic laws.15 The adjective customary-Muslim 
instead refers to the partners’ sharīʿah-compliant relationship as recognised by 
the spouses, their kinship(s), their (local) Muslim community, or the law of the 
Muslim majority country of origin of one of the parties.16 
 An Islamic or Muslim marriage can then be recognised as valid with civil 
effect by the Italian legal system when some requirements are satisfied. Three 
options exist: the wedding is celebrated by an appointed religious minister; the 
nuptial union is perfected in compliance with the laws of a foreign country; the 
competent foreign authorities or diplomatic premises of a foreign country 
recognise as valid and register a Muslim-only or Islamic-only marriage.  
 In the above listed cases, a sharīʿah-compliant marriage is also (potentially) 
valid with civil effect on Italian soil.17 In other words, Muslim migrant spouses-
to-be can enter into a civil, religious, or religious-plus-civil marriage. In this 
chapter, the discussion concerns a specific model of sharīʿah-compliant nuptial 
unions, specifically civil marriages of Muslim migrant partners.  
                                                      
14 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, (2010/C 83/02), in Official Journal 
of the European Union, 30.03.2010, C 83/391. 
15 The other sources of Islamic law (e.g. consensus, analogical reasoning) and methods of 
scriptural interpretation are arranged following a different hierarchy by Islamic 
jurisprudence, Sunni and Shī’i various denominations, sects and schools of thought. 
Accordingly, different interpretations are given with respect to the requirements and the 
validity of a sharīʿah-compliant marriage. Since this chapter focuses on the Muslim migrants’ 
statutorily granted right to form a family on Italian soil and does not refer to a specific Muslim 
community, addressing all the conditions for validity of a Islamic and/Muslim marriage 
contract(s) is beyond the scope of the present work. 
16 For a study of the semantic meaning of the adjectives ‘Muslim’ and ‘Islamic’ frequently 
improperly used as synonyms, see Sona (2014: 116; 2015: 38; 2016a: 22; 2016c: 17-18). On 
the meaning of the word sharīʿah, see supra footnote No. 1. 
17 Empirical evidence disclosed that, whereas the former two cases are well-known, the last 
hypothesis seems to be frequently overlooked by scholarship and judiciary alike. 
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 The necessary conditions for entering into a civilly valid marriage are listed 
in Section I, Chapter III, Title VI of the Italian Civil Code.18 Accordingly, the 
vital statistics officer (ufficiale di stato civile) can perfect a civil matrimonial 
union between (Muslim) migrant parties when some legal requirements are 
satisfied;19 contrariwise diriment or impedient nuptial impediments arise.20 
Among the legal requirements, some prerequisites differ for Italian and foreign 
national fiancé(e)s, the nuptial conditions for a civilly valid marriage are thus 
examined in the following sections, whilst paying specific attention to Islamic 
principles and Muslim intended spouses.  
6.4 Nuptial prerequisite for nationals and aliens alike  
On Italian soil, the first nuptial prerequisite similarly affects Italian and foreign 
nationals. The marriage preliminaries required by the Italian Civil Code (articles 
93-96 and 106) clarify that the wedding celebration shall be preceded by 
publication (pubblicazioni) by the vital statistics officer.21 The publication is an 
impedient impediment to the celebration of a valid marriage: the spouses and 
the vital statistics officer who celebrate the marriage without prior publication 
are in fact punishable by administrative penalty. 
 The fiancé(e)s, or a person specially appointed by them for that purpose, are 
compelled to apply for the publication of matrimony to the vital statistics officer 
of the commune where one of the intended spouses resides. In the case of 
migrant partners, the procedure might differ: in effect, when a fiancé(e) is 
resident (not only domiciled) abroad, and the partners wish to marry in  foreign 
diplomatic premises (e.g. embassy or consulate of a Muslim majority country), 
the vital statistics officer shall request that the foreign diplomatic premises 
proceed with the publication.22 The publication is however not necessary if the 
parties marry abroad, before foreign authorities.23 As a result, if a migrant 
                                                      
18 For an English language translation of the Italian Civil Code see Beltramo et al. (1969-2007); 
a comment on the Italian legal system can be found in Cappelletti et al. (1967). 
19 For an in-depth analysis of civil marriages of foreign Muslim spouses-to-be, see also Sona 
(2015, 2016a, 2016c, 2017). 
20 This lexicon is borrowed from Canon law. The marriage between the parties is invalid in the 
case of diriment impediment. When the impediment is impedient, instead, the parties may 
simply be impelled to pay an administrative penalty. 
21 Articles 93-101 Italian Civil Code; arts. 50-53, Decree of the President of the Republic No. 
396 of 2000. From 01.01.2011, the publication is made online in compliance with 
Memorandum (circolare) of the Ministry of Interior No. 1, 05.01.2011; Memorandum of the 
Ministry of Interior No. 13, 21.04.2011; Memorandum of the Ministry of Interior No. 26, 
28.10.2011. 
22 Article 11 of the Decree of the President of the Republic 05.01.1967 No. 200 (1), ‘Disposi-
zioni sulle funzioni e sui poteri consolari’ (1/circ), Gazzetta Ufficiale 19.04.1967 No. 98 SO. 
See also Legal Decree 03.02.2011 No. 71, ‘Ordinamento e funzioni degli Uffici consolari’, 
Gazzetta Ufficiale 13.05.2011 No. 110. 
23 Article 13(2), Legal Decree No. 71 of 2011. 
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Muslim couple contracts a marriage outside the country, publications are not 
needed for the validity of their civil nuptial union. (Muslim) foreign partners 
marrying in a Muslim majority country are thus not affected by this provision. 
 Intended spouses can also request a reduction in or omission of the 
publication period.24 The tribunal, having heard the public prosecutor, may 
reduce the period required for publication by a decree non-susceptible to appeal 
and issued in chambers. The tribunal may also authorise the omission of 
publication for serious reasons and when the spouses-to-be give assurances (on 
their own responsibility) that the marriage is not prevented by the impediments 
specified by articles 85-89 Italian Civil Code.25 Additionally, the publication 
may be omitted if there is imminent danger of the fiancé(e)’s death. In these 
situations, the vital statistics officer can proceed with the celebration of the 
marriage without the publication and without the tribunal’s assent to the 
marriage, if the parties swear that there are no impediments susceptible to 
dispensation between them. It is worth mentioning that a marriage celebrated 
without publication is valid even if the spouses falsely declared the imminent 
danger of death of one future spouse.26 The provision of article 100 Italian Civil 
Code may thus represent an effective remedy for foreign Muslim fiancées who 
cannot produce a certificate called nulla osta to the vital statistics officer, as 
explained in the next sections 5-6. 
 With respect to the procedural aspects, the Italian legal system requires the 
intended spouses to provide their personal details - namely, name, surname, date 
of birth, citizenship, residence, and matrimonial status - to the vital statistics 
officer. The mention of the prospective spouse’s identity seeks to ascertain that 
no impediments to the marriage exists according to both Italian and the parties’ 
foreign laws, as clarified by the Ministry of Interior’s Instructions (2011a: 113, 
and 2012a: 119-120). The fiancé(e)s shall also give assurances that their 
marriage is not prevented by the nuptial impediments specified by articles 85-
89 Italian Civil Code – fiancé(e)s’ minor age, parties’ already married status, 
prohibited degrees of relations between the spouses-to-be, and partners’ 
interdiction for mental incapacity.27 As clarified further in the discussion, 
empirical evidence discloses that these conditions might specifically affect 
Muslim migrant spouses.28 The vital statistics officer is also entitled to ask 
intended spouses to produce additional documents;29 in particular, non-Italian 
                                                      
24 Article 100 Italian Civil Code. 
25 On this aspect, see infra section 5. 
26 Court of Cassation, 24.01.1967 No. 216, Foro Italiano 1967, I, 230. This provision can 
therefore be potentially abused by unscrupulous partners. 
27 Article 51(1), Decree of the President of the Republic No. 396 of 2000. 
28 For further details on the empirical evidence relied upon in this chapter please see supra 
footnote No. 2. 
29 Article 110, Decree of the President of the Republic No. 396 of 2000 repealed article 97 
Italian Civil Code; a formal comprehensive list of the necessary documents is not provided 
by the Italian Civil Code.  
 CHAPTER 6 A CHALLENGE FOR MUSLIM MIGRANTS 
 
108 
prospective spouses are compelled to satisfy further requirements, as scrutinised 
below in sections 5 and 7. 
 Once the above-mentioned procedures are concluded before the vital 
statistics officer, there are two possible scenarios. Either a public record is 
published and displayed on the commune’s main door for at least eight 
consecutive days;30 or, the officer deems that he or she cannot proceed with the 
publication and, accordingly, he or she issues a certificate reporting the reasons 
for the denial. In this case, the parties can bring a complaint against the denial 
before the competent tribunal, which shall ascertain whether the prerequisites 
can be satisfied by the partners and if the intended spouses can contract a valid 
civil marriage. 
6.5 Current ad hoc aliens’ nuptial prerequisites  
In addition to the prerequisites detailed above, alien intended spouses must 
satisfy two further conditions in order to contract a valid marriage with civil 
effect in the Italian legal system.31 Two additional documents are32 to be 
submitted to the vital statistics officer: a certificate of no nuptial impediments, 
and a regular residence permit. The first condition and its impact on the agency 
of Muslim migrant partners is discussed in the following sections 5-6; whereas 
the effects and the consequences of the second prerequisite are examined in 
sections 7-8.  
 First of all, the foreign purported spouse is impelled to present to the vital 
statistics officer a document called nulla osta from the Latin expression nihil 
obstat. This expression indicates a certificate of no impediments to a nuptial 
union. The certificate is to be issued by the foreign fiancé(e)’s diplomatic 
premises and it must prove that no impediments to the marriage exist ‘under the 
laws to which he is subject’.33  
 Two types of nulla osta can be submitted by non-Italian fiancé(e)s: either a 
document attesting that no nuptial impediments exist, or a certificate of legal 
capacity to marry. The intended foreign spouse shall submit a ‘certificate of 
                                                      
30 Articles 54-58, Decree of the President of the Republic No. 396 of 2000. 
31 A reviewer underlined that ‘[t]he author treats all Muslims in Italy as one homogenous group 
and does not mention whether there are differences between, for example, Muslims from 
Turkey and Morocco in terms of their eligibility to marry on Italian soil’. It should be 
pinpointed that, when adopting the point of view of the Italian legal system, aliens - 
independently form their religious affiliation - must satisfy the same nuptial requirement(s). 
The only difference in the treatment of foreign (Muslim) purported spouses that can be 
legally enacted by a European Member State is the one reported and explained in the next 
paragraph. 
32 The second condition was eventually repealed; see infra section 7. 
33 Article 116 Italian Civil Code, and Royal Decree 16.03.1942 No. 262, ‘Approvazione del 
testo del Codice Civile’, in Gazzetta Ufficiale 04.04.1942 No. 79. This provision does not 
necessarily refer to the foreign citizen’s national laws, due to the principle of renvoi 
(Ballarino, 2008: 136). 
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legal capacity to marry’, when the foreign fiancé(e) is a national of a country 
bound by the Munich Convention on the Issue of a Certificate of Capacity to 
Marry,34 or by the previous Hague Convention relating to the Settlement of the 
Conflict of the Laws Concerning Marriage.35 A ‘no nuptial impediment 
declaration’ is instead to be submitted by non-European citizens, who are 
nationals of a country which is not bound by the above-mentioned international 
treaties.  
 Introduced as a measure against cross-national polygamous nuptial unions,36 
this Italian provision de facto undermines the individual religious freedom 
statutory right of migrant Muslim parties, specifically their right to enter into a 
civil marriage in Italy. This discrimination can be described as a ‘side effect’ of 
a non-culturally-sensitive norm. Indeed, problems arise not in cases of 
polygynous nuptial unions - as originally intended by the Italian legislator - but 
in cases of inter-religious marriages. As a result, polygamous unions, which may 
in fact be valid in compliance with the laws of some Muslim majority countries, 
are not tackled by this provision, whereas inter-faith marriages are de facto 
impeded in cases of nationals of Muslim majority countries. 
 The explanation for this (unintended) reduction in the Muslim alien’s right 
to marry is grounded in the fact that the legal systems of Muslim majority 
countries have the tendency to comply with sharīʿah with respect to nuptial 
impediments. Accordingly, inter-faith marriages are limited. The Qur’ān 
prescribes that Muslims cannot validly marry idolaters and unbelievers. For 
instance, the sūrah II (āyah 221) declares: 
And do not marry polytheistic women until they believe. And 
a believing slave woman is better than a polytheist, even 
though she might please you. And do not marry polytheistic 
men until they believe. And a believing slave is better than 
a polytheist, even though he might please you. Those invite 
to the Fire, but Allāh invites to Paradise and to forgiveness, 
by His permission. And He makes clear His verses to the 
people that perhaps they may remember. 
Similarly, the sūrah V (āyah 5) and the sūrah LX (āyah 10) reiterate the ban 
when reciting as follows: 
This day good foods have been made lawful, and the food of 
those who were given the Scripture is lawful for you and 
your food is lawful for them. And chaste women from among 
the believers and chaste women from among those who were 
                                                      
34 International Commission on Civil Status (ICCS), Munich Convention No. 20 of 05.09.1980. 
35 Hague Convention of 12.06.1902. 
36 For a discussion on polygamous unions in Italy, see inter alia Campiglio (1999, 2008); 
Colaianni (2009); Galoppini (2000); Mancini (2003, 2008). For a study on Italian Islām see 
also Allievi and Castro (2000), Ferrari (2004, 2008). 
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given the Scripture before you, when you have given them 
their due compensation, desiring chastity, not unlawful 
sexual intercourse or taking lovers. And whoever denies the 
faith - his work has become worthless, and he, in the 
Hereafter, will be among the losers. 
O you who have believed, when the believing women come 
to you as emigrants, examine them. Allāh is most knowing 
as to their faith. And if you know them to be believers, then 
do not return them to the disbelievers; they are not lawful 
for them, nor are they lawful for them. But give them what 
they have spent. And there is no blame upon you if you 
marry them when you have given them their due 
compensation. And hold not to marriage bonds with 
disbelieving women, but ask for what you have spent and let 
them ask for what they have spent. That is the judgement of 
Allāh; He judges between you. And Allāh is Knowing and 
Wise. 
Accordingly, a Muslim man can validly marry a Muslim, Jewish, or Christian 
woman; whilst a Muslim woman can marry a Muslim man only. As disclosed 
by fieldwork evidence, in some situations, even Jewish or Christian prospective 
wives can similarly be required or advised to embrace Islām in order to enter 
into a valid marriage with a Muslim man. In compliance with a more restrictive 
interpretation, indeed, unless the partners live in a sharīʿah-compliant 
environment such as a Muslim majority country, a Muslim man cannot validly 
marry a ‘woman of the Book’.37  
 Controversial situations therefore arise when a Muslim, or a supposedly 
Muslim fiancé(e), wishes to marry a non-Muslim partner on Italian soil. 
Satisfying the nulla osta preliminary nuptial requirement can be highly 
challenging for a migrant intended spouse, who is a Muslim majority country 
national, whose domestic legal system prohibits inter-faith nuptial unions. It is 
worth mentioning that, in effect, this limit impacts both Muslim and non-
Muslim migrant prospective brides and grooms; a national of a Muslim majority 
country can indeed belong to a minority religious group, or the prospective bride 
or groom can abandon Islām and embrace another religion or become an atheist. 
 Furthermore, field-collected data indicate that the right of a foreign national 
to marry can be denied on the ground of his or her religious belonging and this 
data can also be simply presumed. Empirical evidence indeed revealed that the 
fiancé(e)’s religious affiliation (when not explicitly stated by the fiancé(e), or 
reported in the intended spouse’s documents establishing his or her identity) 
was assumed to be relying upon the family name and the given name of the 
future spouse(s). The diplomatic personnel of Muslim majority countries’ 
                                                      
37 The Qur’ān refers to Jews and Christians with the expression ahl al-kitāb, which means 
‘people of the Book’. A Christian or Jewish bride is thus called kitābiyyah. 
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consulates and embassies I interviewed in Italy clarified that sharīʿah-compliant 
nuptial impediments apply in the competent Muslim majority country’s 
diplomatic premises in EU countries when it is declared, or it can be inferred, 
that the prospective spouse’s parents are Muslim. This assumption is usually 
made relying upon the fiancé(e)’s personal names - such as patronymic, 
forename, surname - the (modest) behaviour of the intended spouses, or the 
parties’ dress code.  
6.6 The impairment of Muslim migrant fiancé(e)s’ right to 
marry 
A number of remedies to the above-mentioned limit to civilly valid marriages 
grounded in foreign religious impediments have been elaborated by the 
diplomatic premises of Muslim majority countries, as well as by the Italian 
judicial and administrative authorities. These two classes of remedies to the 
impairment of Muslim migrant fiancé(e)s’ right to civilly marry are analysed in 
this section.  
 With respect to diplomatic premises, the empirical investigation I conducted 
unveiled three different patterns followed by the embassies and consulates of 
Muslim majority countries: some diplomatic premises refuse to issue the nulla 
osta; some embassies and consulates of Muslim majority countries release either 
a negative document, or a conditional certificate of no nuptial impediments. 
 In the first case scenario, the diplomatic authorisation for an Italian civil 
marriage is provided only when the act of conversion to Islām is submitted by 
the non-Muslim partner. The requirements and the procedures significantly 
vary: in some cases, the foreign diplomatic premises may need a shahādah38 
released by a named Italian worship centre, or the religious authority of a 
determined Muslim majority country. The listed centres and authorities differ 
depending upon the Muslim majority country and the Ambassador or (vice) 
Consul’s interpretation of the foreign domestic legal system. As a result, diverse 
diplomatic premises can either accept or refuse the ‘profession of faith’ certified 
and released by the same Islamic authority.39 The diplomatic premises of 
Muslim majority countries on Italian soil, normally, address the ‘big mosque in 
Rome’ as the proper place in which to officially embrace Islām. This mosque is 
indeed the seat of the Centro Islamico Culturale d’Italia (CICI), the sole Islamic 
                                                      
38 This word comes from the Arabic verb shahida which means ‘to witness, to testify’; 
shahādah can thus be translated as ‘profession of faith’, and it is one of the five pillars of 
Islām. This word is also used to identify a person’s conversion to Islām. 
39 It is worth mentioning that the professions of faith of Sunnī and Shī’ī Islamic denominations 
slightly differ. The former states ‘There is no God but God, and Muḥammad is His 
messenger’; Shī‘ī Muslims add that ‘and Ali is the walī of God’. 
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organization recognised as a religious legal entity (ente morale di culto) in 
Italy.40  
 To further embroil the requirements to be met by the prospective Muslim 
spouse, diverse religious authorities can ask aspiring Muslim converts to follow 
different procedures in order to embrace Islām. In some contexts, obtaining a 
shahādah certificate may be relatively easy; whereas in some Islamic or Muslim 
centres, course attendance - sometimes including a final examination - may be 
compulsory. The mandatory syllabi usually encompass Islamic theology or 
history, Qur’ān recitation and memorisation, and Arabic language classes.  
 In the second case scenario, a conditional nulla osta is released. Field-
collected data indicate that there are two options. Sometimes, a consulate or 
embassy of a Muslim majority country issues a negative nulla osta on the 
ground of the religious belonging of the non-Muslim prospective spouse. In 
some cases, diplomatic premises release a conditional certificate of no nuptial 
impediments; in other words, the requested document is issued, but the 
certificate is valid only provided the non-Muslim fiancé(e) embraces Islām and 
proves his or her conversion. 
 In the third case scenario, the nulla osta is issued even if the conversion to 
Islām of the intended groom of the Muslim majority country national bride-to-
be is not submitted to the diplomatic personnel. An additional condition is to be 
satisfied for this to happen: the parties have to agree that this inter-faith marriage 
will never be acknowledged and registered in the migrant bride’s Muslim 
majority country of origin. Therefore, once a wife agrees not to register her 
marriage with a non-Muslim fiancée in the nuptial record of her Muslim 
majority country of origin and its foreign diplomatic premises, her certificate of 
no nuptial impediment is released.  
 The impact of this course of action on the spouses’ life is quite significant, 
as this choice implies consequences regarding the family member’s inheritance 
rights and the status of the couple’s offspring in Muslim majority countries. 
Additionally, the same person’s nuptial status under civil law differs in the legal 
system of the two states. To put it differently, the migrant Muslim majority 
country national is ‘married’ in the settlement country, whilst she remains 
‘unmarried’ in the country of origin. Accordingly, she would be able to legally 
and religiously enter into an Islamic or Muslim marriage. If this migrant Muslim 
woman (re)marries, she would then become a polyandrous wife only in the eyes 
of the (European and possibly Western) legal systems since these acknowledge 
as valid her marriage to a non-Muslim man. Naturally, the recognition of her 
multiple married status can happen only if and when her sharīʿah-compliant 
marriage is disclosed to the competent authorities in a European legal system. 
It should be pinpointed that the controversial situations described above are not 
                                                      
40 Decree of the President of the Republic 21.12.1974 No. 712, ‘Riconoscimento della 
personalità giuridica dell'ente “Centro Islamico culturale d’Italia” con sede in Roma Via A. 
Casella n. 51’, Gazzetta Ufficiale 10-11.01.1975 No. 10, p. I. 
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just hypothetical cases or anecdotal narratives, as the fieldwork investigations I 
conducted revealed. 
 Apart from the typologies of documents released by the diplomatic premises 
of Muslim majority countries, the nulla osta requested by Italian authorities 
raises controversial issues. In effect, the fulfilment of this legal requirement may 
lead to religious prejudice toward the migrant Muslim fiancé(e) wishing to 
marry in compliance with Italian law.  
 Administrative and judicial remedies have thus been created to tackle this 
unintended religious discrimination of alien prospective spouses, who can bring 
the case before the Italian judiciary. The Italian judge can be asked to state that 
the nulla osta limits the nuptial right of non-nationals and therefore that this 
requirement can be contrary to the Italian public order.41 The relevant Italian 
case law dates back to the mid-eighties and mid-nineties and is consistent. When 
the capacity to contract marriage to the non-Italian Muslim purported spouse 
has been made subject to the religious belonging of his or her fiancé(e), the 
Italian judge orders the vital statistics officer to proceed with the publication 
without the nulla osta, so that the inter-faith civil marriage can be perfected.42 
 Religiously discriminated migrant prospective spouses are however not 
impelled to resort to the ad hoc judicial remedy as described above. Where the 
nulla osta  has been denied on the ground of the fiancé(e)’s religious belonging, 
or the certificate is negative or conditional on the party’s conversion, the 
marriage can nonetheless be celebrated by the vital statistics officer, as clarified 
by the Italian Ministry of Interior’s Instructions.43 Any conditions inserted by 
Muslim majority countries’ diplomatic premises regarding the purported 
spouses’ religious belonging, in essence, are contrary to the Italian public order, 
and thus do not prevent the marriage celebration between the parties - as 
                                                      
41 Nonetheless, the Constitutional Court clarified that the requirement of a nulla osta does not 
per se infringe the inviolable rights of the person as protected by article 2 Italian Constitution. 
The Court order clarifies that the nulla osta is a ‘document that in the majority of cases does 
not limit but rather facilitates the enactment of the freedom of marriage’ (Constitutional 
Court, 16-30.01.2003 No. 14, Gazzetta Ufficiale 05.02.2003; Diritto di Famiglia e delle 
Persone, 2003, 331). 
42 Cases frequently concern non-Italian Muslim women impeded from marrying non-Muslim 
men; some case law regards foreign men whose nulla osta was denied by the diplomatic 
premises of their own country of origin on the ground that they were non-Muslims. See inter 
alia Tribunal of Reggio Emilia, 29.09.1986, Diritto di Famiglia e delle Persone 1987, 268; 
Tribunal of Verona, 06.03.1987, Foro Italiano, Rep. 1987, Matrimonio, 152; Tribunal of 
Potenza, 30.11.1989, Diritto di Famiglia e delle Persone, XXX, 2001, 558; Tribunal of 
Camerino, 12.04.1990, Diritto Internazionale Privato e Processuale, XXVII, 1991, 800-1; 
Rivista di Diritto Internazionale Privato Processuale 1991, 750; Tribunal of Genova, 
04.04.1990, Giurisprudenza di Merito, 1992, 1195; Tribunal of Torino, 24.02.1992, Rivista 
di Diritto Internazionale Privato Processuale 1992, 985; Tribunal of Torino, 24.06.1993, 
Diritto di Famiglia e delle Persone, 1993, 1181; Tribunal of Barcellona 09.03.1995, Diritto 
di Famiglia e delle Persone, 1996, 164; Giurisprudenza di Merito, 1996, 702; Tribunal of 
Napoli, 29.04.1996, Famiglia e Diritto, 5/1996, 454; Tribunal of Taranto, 13.07.1996, 
Famiglia e Diritto, 5/1996, 444. See also Sona (2014: 125). 
43 Ministero dell’Interno (2011a: 109; 2012a: 115-6). 
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underlined by the Italian Ministry of Interior.44 Furthermore, the more recent 
version of the Ministry of Interior’s Instructions explicitly states that ‘the lack 
of publication does not nullify the validity of the marriage deed’.45 
 Notwithstanding judicial and ministerial exhortations, field-collected data 
demonstrate that some Italian communes still assume that they are not 
authorised to proceed with the nuptial publication when a foreign purported 
spouse submits a nulla osta that is contrary to the Italian public order. Accor-
dingly, this remains a case-by-case solution-seeking situation,46 in particular for 
migrant Muslim fiance(é)s.  
6.7 Amended aliens’ nuptial requirement 
As clarified supra in section 5, the nulla osta is only one of the two nuptial 
prerequisites that were to be satisfied by foreign partners wishing to marry in 
Italy.  
 In addition to the certificate of no nuptial impediments, from 2009 to 2011, 
non-national fiancé(e)s had to submit to the Italian vital statistics officer, ‘a 
document attesting the regularity of his or her stay in the Italian territory’.47 This 
requirement implied that the capacity to enter into a civil marriage was 
contemporarily subordinated to the religious belonging of the intended 
spouse(s), as well as to the fiancé(e)’s regular permit to stay in Europe, in cases 
of non-European national migrant Muslim prospective spouses.48  
 The religious freedom right of foreign nationals irregularly settled on Italian 
soil was thus specifically challenged by this de facto ‘blanket prohibition’ of 
civil marriage.49 Although originally aimed simply to tackle marriages of 
convenience, the amended version of article 116(1) of the Italian Civil Code 
was eventually declared the unconstitutional by the Italian Constitutional 
Court.50 In July 2011, the Consulta asserted that this provision violated both 
                                                      
44 See Memorandum (circolare) of the Ministry of Interior No. 46, 11.11.2007 and Ministero 
dell’Interno (2009a: 96; 2011a: 109; 2012a: 115-6; 119). 
45 Ministero dell’Interno (2012a: 119). 
46 See for instance Tribunal of Milano, 13.03.2007, Quaderni di Diritto e Politica Ecclesiastica, 
2007, 829, and Tribunal of Piacenza, 05.05.2011, Sez. II, July, 2011, available online at 
http://www.stranieriinitalia.it/briguglio/ immigrazione-e-asilo/2011/luglio/trib-pc-nullaosta-
nozze.pdf (last accessed 01.02.2013). 
47 Article 116(1) Italian Civil Code as amended by article 1(15), Law 15.07.2009 No. 94, 
‘Disposizioni in materia di sicurezza pubblica’, in Gazzetta Ufficiale 24.07.2009 No. 170 SO 
No. 128. 
48 The Directive of the Ministry of Interior No. 2, 28.01.2010 clarified that European nationals 
were exempted from that provision. 
49 On this aspect, see also Sona (2014: 125-126; 2016a: 42-43). For a legal analysis of the 
phenomenon see Ferrando (2009), Morozzo della Rocca (2009a/b/c, 2010, 2011), Casoni 
(2010), Consorti (2010, 2011a/b), Nascimbene (2011), Spina (2011), Zanobetti (2011). 
50 As amended by article 1(15) of the Law No. 94 of 2009.  
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constitutional and international norms.51 In particular, the Constitutional Court 
elucidated that:  
the inviolable rights of article 2 Italian Constitution are 
owed to any person not since he or she may belong to a 
particular political community, but to human beings as 
such.   
The right of migrant partners to exercise their religious freedom in the form of 
a civilly valid marriage was thus stressed by the Court relying upon statutory 
provisions. Furthermore, the Court added that the blanket prohibition on the 
exercise of the right to enter into a civil nuptial union violated constraints 
deriving from international obligations.52 The national state’s margin of 
appreciation indeed cannot be broadened to the extent that this implies ‘a 
general, automatic and indiscriminate restriction of a fundamental right’, 
specifically of article 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights.53  
 Although stating that a national state has to control (im)migration flows, and 
national borders are to be protected and defended, the ‘imposed sacrifice’ of the 
matrimonial freedom should not be disproportionate, the Court clarified.54 
Irregularly settled migrant partners, therefore, cannot be prevented from 
marrying when not submitting a valid permit to stay. The impact of the amended 
version of article 116(1) Italian civil Code on migrant prospective spouses’ 
individual religious freedom was indeed beyond the protected statutory right. 
6.8 Provisional antidotes: Civil and sharīʿah-compliant 
marriages 
From 2009 to 2011, Muslim spouses-to-be not owning a valid permit to reside 
in Europe had to elaborate on effective counteractions in order to enter into a 
valid marriage. Field-collected data disclosed that two possible provisional 
                                                      
51 Constitutional Court, 20-25.07.2011 No. 245, Gazzetta Ufficiale 27.07.2011. See also 
Memorandum (circolare) of the Ministry of Interior No. 21 of 26.07.2011.  
52 As recognised by article 117(1) Italian Constitution. 
53 See para 3.2, Constitutional Court, 20-25.07.2011 No. 245, Gazzetta Ufficiale 27.07.2011, 
where the Italian Constitution Court also quoted O’Donoghue and Others v the United 
Kingdom, Application No. 34848/07, 14.12.2010 - 14.03.2011, [2011] All ER (D) 46 (Jan). 
54 See para 3.1, Constitutional Court, 20-25.07.2011 No. 245, Gazzetta Ufficiale 27.07.2011. It 
should be mentioned that the Court also conceded that citizens and foreigners differ. In 
particular, aliens have a merely ‘acquired and temporary’ relationship with the Italian state; 
nonetheless, the “foreign legal status” should not be regarded as ‘a justification allowing 
diversified or pejorative treatments’. The Consulta built upon the following: Constitutional 
Court, 19-26.06.1969 No. 104, Gazzetta Ufficiale 02.07.1969 No. 165; Constitutional Court, 
10-24.02.1994 No. 62, Gazzetta Ufficiale 02.03.1994; Constitutional Court, 05-08.07.2010 
No. 249, Gazzetta Ufficiale 14.07.2010. 
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antidotes were soon identified: civil or sharīʿah-compliant matrimonial unions, 
as discussed below. 
 With respect to civilly valid nuptial unions, migrant non-European national 
Muslim fiancé(e)s learned that they could still enter into a civil marriage 
compliant with a legal system other than the Italian one. In the examined interval 
of about three years, alternative non-Italian nuptial paths were soon identified. 
Muslim intended spouses could in fact marry in another state (European or 
Muslim majority country), or in a foreign country’s diplomatic premises while 
being on Italian soil.55 Provided that the foreign nuptial law did not require a 
residence permit to contract a valid marriage, the spouses-to-be could enter into 
a valid nuptial union with civil effect.  
 This procedure also implied that the irregularly settled migrant married 
partner could then submit an application to join as a validly married spouse his 
or her partner on Italian soil. Consequently, the Muslim migrants married in 
compliance with one of the two above-mentioned procedures were entitled to 
claim the recognition of their foreign nuptial certificate through private 
international law principles. Therefore, a Muslim fiancé(e) - who was originally 
irregularly settled in a European country - was then entitled to benefit from 
family reunification procedures (specifically to claim a spouse’s visa in Italy) 
on the ground of a civil marriage, which was originally prevented by Italian law, 
but recognised as valid if perfected abroad. 
 The fieldwork investigation I completed disclosed that, amid the concurrent 
possible categories of alternative legal systems,56 the favourite countermeasure 
chosen by irregularly settled Muslim partners on Italian soil was represented by 
a marriage celebrated in a European country. And, amongst European domestic 
legal systems, a micro-state called San Marino was soon identified as the best 
option. Thus, from 2009 to 2011, migrant Muslim spouses-to-be rapidly 
identified and skilfully learned how to take advantage of a loophole in the Italian 
legislation.  
 In real terms, in the Republic of San Marino, prospective spouses are 
requested to satisfy conditions that are nearly analogous to the Italian ones;57 
nonetheless, the alien fiancé(e)’s permit to stay is not listed among the necessary 
nuptial prerequisites. In addition, the marriage deed is automatically transmitted 
between the Italian and San Marinian administrative offices, and the marriage 
act is instantly valid in the other country.58 As a result, partners married in San 
                                                      
55 Naturally, when the marriage was contracted in the embassy or the consulate of a Muslim 
majority country, this union was not only civilly valid, but also sharīʿah-compliant. 
56 As stated above, these are a Muslim majority country, the fiancé(e)’s foreign diplomatic 
premises, or a European state characterised by less demanding nuptial provisions. 
57 A notarial act signed by the purported spouses and four Italian national witnesses are also 
requested. 
58 Articles 38(1) and 39(1) of the Law 06.06.1939 No. 1320, ‘Esecutorietà della Convenzione 
di amicizia e buon vicinato stipulata in Roma, fra l’Italia e la Repubblica di San Marino il 31 
marzo 1939’, in Gazzetta Ufficiale 16.09.1939 No. 217. Accordingly, the marriage act is not 
further examined by the Italian administrative competent offices when recording it.  
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Marino are almost immediately also regarded as civilly married under the Italian 
legal system. Skilfully manoeuvring across the provisions of two diverse but 
connected European legal systems, Muslim foreign intended spouses identified 
a way to benefit from a legal loophole. Consequently, migrant Muslim intended 
spouses learned how to legitimise the spouse’s reunification claim on the ground 
of the very same marriage that was forbidden by Italian authorities, but 
recognised as civilly valid when perfected in San Marino.59 
 As far as sharīʿah-compliant marriages were concerned, the prospective 
Muslim spouses increasingly resorted to unregistered Islamic-only or Muslim-
only marriages. The nuptial unions mentioned could be perfected either in Italy 
or abroad. In these cases, irregularly settled migrant Muslim partners were 
compelled to exercise their Islamic right-&-duty to marry in the shadow of 
European domestic legal systems; in other words, since the migrant parties’ 
right to religious freedom had been violated by the provisions of the Italian legal 
system, Muslim fiancé(e)s began to resort to the Islamic-religious or Muslim-
customary legal order to contract the marriage, as discussed above in section 3.  
 A second antidote to the shadowy exercise of the right-&-duty to marry as 
imposed by the Italian discriminatory provisions was elaborated by some 
Muslim majority countries and their diplomatic premises on Italian soil. 
Privately solemnised sharīʿah-compliant marriages were in practice recognised 
and recorded by foreign Muslim countries.  
 In this situation, the procedure was knotty but effective, as disclosed by the 
empirical investigations I carried out. Muslim prospective spouses first entered 
into a religious or customary marriage in Europe or abroad. This Islamic-only 
or Muslim-only marriage was then ‘raised’ to the standard of a nuptial union 
with civil effect when acknowledged as valid and, therefore, registered by 
foreign authorities or a Muslim majority country’s diplomatic premises. In other 
words, a Muslim-only or Islamic-only marriage contract was acknowledged as 
legally valid and therefore registered in the official civil record by the 
diplomatic premises of a Muslim majority country; consequently, a formerly 
religious or customary-only nuptial union also acquired (potential) civil effect 
on European soil.  
 Amid these legally acknowledged marriages there were Islamic or Muslim 
nuptial unions which had been previously solemnised in small Islamic worship 
centres. In real terms, an uncounted number of Islamic or Muslim worship 
centres celebrate religious-only marriages in Italy.60 Theoretically, only a ’aqd 
al-zawāğ61 perfected in the Grande Moschea di Roma (as well as in its affiliated 
worship centres and mosques) is to be recognised as valid and therefore 
                                                      
59 For an in-depth analysis of these nuptial procedures and their effects, see Sona (2015; 2016b).  
60 In 2007, the Chamber of Representatives reported 774 Islamic worship centres (Camera dei 
Deputati, 2008: 69). The research conducted by Allievi and Ethnobarometer (2009: 33) 
counted 661 non-purpose-built mosques and 3 purpose-built mosques in 2009. Cf. Coglievina 
(2013: 357). 
61 This is the traditional way to address an Islamic marriage contract in the Arabic language. 
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officially recorded by the diplomatic premises of Muslim majority countries.62 
This is due to two main reasons. First of all, the big mosque in Rome is the seat 
of the Centro Islamico Culturale d’Italia (CICI), which is the sole Italian Muslim 
organisation having the status of a non-profit corporation.63 Secondly, the CICI 
board of directors is constituted predominantly of ambassadors of Muslim 
majority countries accredited by the Holy See and the Italian state.64  
 As far as the privately solemnised sharīʿah-compliant nuptial contracts 
eventually recorded with civil effect, the diplomatic personnel interviewed 
described this conduct partly as a reaction to the discriminative Italian 
immigration laws, and partly as the result of a mistake. Although this matter 
was sometimes taken lightly by some informants, the (un)wanted or 
(un)expected consequences were however worthy of attention. In particular, 
when a foreign legal system legitimises nuptial unions, which are otherwise 
religious-only or customary-only, notable implications arise for European 
states. In effect, if an alien sharīʿah-compliant legal system recognises as civilly 
valid a Muslim-only or an Islamic-only marriage,65 this customary or religious-
only nuptial union can have civil effect on European soil, and related rights 
(such as family reunification claims) can be exercised by the parties.  
 It should be mentioned that, according to field-collected data, Muslim 
partners relied upon these remedies predominantly when the blanket prohibition 
to marry for irregularly settled migrants was enforced on Italian soil; however, 
in some cases these procedures are still followed. Regrettably, this marriage 
route was often left unnoticed by judicial authorities as well as academic 
literature.  
6.9 Conclusions 
Within the broader framework of interaction between (secular) (im)migration 
laws and religious autonomy, this chapter explored the extent and effectiveness 
of individual religious freedom as enshrined in domestic and international legal 
provisions, with respect to (ir)regularly settled migrant Muslim intended 
spouses on Italian soil. In particular, the potential or actual impairment of 
                                                      
62 For instance, the recently built Turin mosque could also release Islamic marriage certificates 
which can be recognized as valid with civil effect by some Muslim majority countries and/or 
some diplomatic premises on European soil. Nonetheless, it seems that they prefer to refer 
Muslim fiancé(e)s to the Rome mosque and/or to foreign diplomatic premises (interviews 
conducted by the author in February 2017). 
63 As clarified above when analysing the recognition of a valid conversion to Islām. See above 
footnote No. 39. 
64 This centre is indeed considered the ‘official Italian’ Islām. See inter alia Roggero (2002: 
136-7); Allievi (2002: 87; 2003: 73-9); Aluffi Beck-Peccoz (2004a: 184; 2004b: 136). 
65 For instance, in European legal systems, a foreign sharīʿah-compliant marriage is not 
recognised as valid when it is against the public order and morality.   
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(pious) Muslim migrant fiancé(e)s’ right-&-duty to marry was investigated 
alongside the challenges faced by migrant Muslims. 
 When relying upon European statutory declarations, individual religious 
freedom is a key prerogative largely acknowledged to every person: this 
principle cannot be constrained eventually impeding the full development of a 
human being, not even when relying upon the European Member State’s margin 
of appreciation. As a fundamental inviolable right, which is statutorily 
proclaimed and widely granted, Muslim migrant fiancé(e)s have theoretically 
recognised the possibility to exercise their religious freedom in the form of a 
civilly valid or sharīʿah-compliant nuptial union. Nonetheless, some matri-
monial restrictions might de facto be (in)voluntarily imposed on alien Muslim 
partners therefore limiting the foreign Muslim party’s agency. In particular, in 
the Italian legal system, some nuptial prerequisites - although originally 
intended to tackle marriages of convenience as well as polygamous nuptial 
unions - de facto limit the capacity of Muslim migrants to marry. Muslim 
partners might thus be compelled to favour shadowy nuptial routes. 
 Building upon more than a decade of extensive empirical evidence, the 
discussion discloses frequently unperceived tactics, which were gradually 
developed as antidotes to (unintended) discriminatory state provisions. When 
trying to enforce their right to form - and to reunify - a family on European soil, 
migrant Muslim prospective spouses might thus rely upon two different 
strategies. They can elaborate for themselves anti-prejudicial nuptial patterns; 
or they can refer to official authorities of European as well as Muslim majority 
countries. By way of illustration, a claim can be brought before the Italian 
judiciary when one of the foreign fiancé(e)s cannot produce a valid certificate 
of no nuptial impediments. Additionally, a Muslim majority country’s diplo-
matic premises can recognise, and therefore register with civil effect, religious-
only (Islamic) or customary-only (Muslim) marriages even though these were 
privately perfected in unauthorised Islamic worship centres. (Ir)regularly settled 
alien spouses-to-be can also enter into a civil marriage compliant with a legal 
system other than the Italian one. The consequences of these actions are rather 
significant, in effect, once legally wed, the spouses can submit - and obtain - a 
valid residence or settlement permit as a married partner.  
 In the explored and scrutinised scenarios, it is clear that Muslims have 
learned to manage intricate legal provisions in order to find remedies aimed at 
forming a family founded on an Islamic or Muslim marriage in Europe. 
Nonetheless, Muslim fiancé(e)s might be impelled to opt for knotty imple-
mentations of their partly impaired religious freedom right. For this reason, 
whereas entering into a civilly valid sharīʿah-compliant relationship in Italy 
might be even more challenging than entering the EU, (some) migrant Muslim 
prospective spouses appear to be versed in coping with their (unintendedly) 
limited Islamic right-&-duty to marry.  
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 Chapter 7 I could not do otherwise 
Disobeying migration laws under the ECHR on 
grounds of religion and conscience 
Dolores Morondo Taramundi 
7.1 Introduction 
I wish, for my own peace of mind, that you would not be 
frightened or disturbed by whatever the sentence they give 
to me (…) My dear mother, I would just like to hug you tight 
and let you know how much I love you and how I would like 
to comfort you for giving you this sorrow: but I could not do 
otherwise. Life is like this, very tough, and sometimes 
children have to give great pain to their moms if they want 
to preserve their honour and dignity as men.1 
The Mediterranean Sea is considered one of the deadliest border crossings in 
the world. Over the last 3 years, the effort to make it increasingly impenetrable 
for people devoid of approved entry clearance has claimed the lives of 13,452.2 
People fleeing from famine, war, endemic violence or persecution and those 
simply searching for a better future have found Europe ever more unwilling to 
receive and integrate the less than 15% of international human mobility flows 
knocking at our doors.3 
 Against the background of growing xenophobic discourse, political parties 
and governments are engaging in what appears more and more clearly as a vain 
effort to stop and control migration flows through the use of repressive and 
punitive measures, allegedly intended to protect the security of European 
citizens and offer them effective rights through the strengthened and modern 
management of the Union’s external borders.4 
 Yet in the midst of xenophobic prejudice and growing intolerance against 
religious and racialized groups, many Europeans have mobilised to support, 
help and welcome migrants and refugees while their governments and the 
                                                      
1  Gramsci A. (1928), Letter from prison to his mother, 10 May. 
2 For the period July 2014-June 2017, calculated on data by Missing Migrant Project: 
<missingmigrants.iom.int/mediterranean>. 
3 Of the 244 million international migrants in 2015 (UN Migration Report 2015), Europe hosts 
35.1 million people (Eurostat, Migration and migrant population statistics). This does not 
include 19.3 million EU citizens living in another Member State. 
4  See, for example: EU Council Conclusions June 2014. 
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European institutions dawdle. The newspapers all over Europe have reported 
plenty of cases. An olive farmer in the south of France was given a suspended 
€ 3,000 fine for aiding irregular migrants and housing them in an abandoned 
railway building.5 The Spanish government discontinued the access of 
irregularly resident migrants to universal healthcare provision and hundreds of 
doctors and nurses refused to abide by the new law.6 A Danish woman was fined 
after offering a lift in her car and some refreshment in her house to one of the 
Syrian families en route through the country to claim asylum in Sweden.7 And 
the list could continue. 
 The topic of this chapter is that in supporting, helping or even interacting 
with persons irregularly present in Europe (that is, without a valid form of 
residence permit), many Europeans have ignored or violated the law. Some of 
them knew they were breaking the law, others did not. Most of them did not 
care. Their reason is that they could not, and cannot, do otherwise: to help bring 
refugees to the shore of the island of Lesbos, to give a lift to a family to the 
harbour and get them a ferry ticket to Sweden, to assist them as doctors or 
nurses, to house them in the winter of the Alps, all those actions were compelled 
by a sense of human decency, they were the unavoidable corollary of the 
principle of human dignity. 
 Contrary to the declared intention of creating a common European 
immigration policy and led on by the discretionary powers granted to the 
Member States by European legislation, the application of national laws to these 
actions has resulted in legal uncertainty and inconsistency, creating a puzzle of 
cases and sanctions: prison terms, fines, application of humanitarian exemptions 
from sanction and even absolutions. We cannot focus here on how the different 
States have treated social interaction with, and even compassionate actions 
towards, people in irregular situations in Europe.8 This chapter aims more 
limitedly at looking at how those actions could be argued in relation to the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in the light of the case law of 
the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg (ECtHR). 
 Firstly, I shall analyse the increasing criminalisation of irregular migration 
and of the life around it (para. 7.2). Secondly, I’ll examine two routes open for 
arguing the position of those who have broken the law by assisting or helping 
so-called irregular migrants. The first route examined (para. 7.3) is for people 
who belong to faith-based organisations (FBOs) and church communities which 
undertake the support of marginalised social groups, including irregular 
migrants, or people who argue that their actions are part of their religion, 
following the teachings of the Bible or other sacred texts. In the second route 
                                                      
5 Adam Nossiter (2017), ‘Farmer on Trial Defends Smuggling Migrants: I Am a Frenchman.?’, 
The New York Times, 5 January. 
6 Giles Tremlett (2012), ‘Immigrants in Spain to lose right to public healthcare’, The Guardian, 
31 August. 
7 Lizzie Dearden (2016), ‘Prominent Danish activist and author prosecuted for ‘people 
trafficking’ after giving Syrian refugee family a lift’, The Independent, 11 March. 
8  See: Carrera et al. 2016; Provera 2015; FRA 2014. 
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(para. 7.4), conscience is invoked without any necessary reference to religion. 
Although, at times, the line that divides these positions blurs and, at times, these 
actions go further into civil disobedience, I shall assess them separately to see 
how the claims would fare under the different headings and how human rights 
protections could be extended.  
7.2 The criminalisation of irregular migration and its 
surroundings 
Migration law and policy has become a central item in European political 
agendas and discourse, both at the level of the European Union (EU) and in 
every single European State. Growing xenophobic and securitarian discourses 
have turned the management of migration flows and the reception and inte-
gration of migrant groups into a matter of “resistance against invasion”, 
“survival of the European identity”, “increased need for control, order and 
security”, or “fight against crime”.  
 Human rights frameworks have been largely neglected in the treatment of 
this question, when not patently violated. The Council of Europe Commissioner 
for Human Rights (2013), the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human 
rights of migrants (2013), the European Union Fundamental Rights Agency 
(2011, 2013 and 2014) have all highlighted the risks of trying to manage and 
deter irregular migration with criminal law measures, and their deleterious 
impact on fundamental rights, both because those measures often deprive 
irregular migrants of their basic rights and because they cause irregular migrants 
to be perceived and treated as criminals, making them more vulnerable to 
exploitation and abuse. 
7.2.1 The criminalisation of irregular migration under EU legislation 
The EU has played a decisive role in this trend, adopting legislation which 
obliges its Member States to punish persons who enter or stay in a territory 
without the permission to do so, and persons who help irregular migrants to 
enter and stay in the EU.  
 Article 79 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
calls on the prevention of “illegal immigration” as one of the aims of the 
developing common European immigration policy. Its normative framework as 
regards irregular migration9 is constituted by the notorious Return Directive10 
                                                      
9 It is worth noting that not only “irregular migration” but also the EU normative framework 
and policy for “legal” labour migration raises a number of human rights issues, specifically 
problems regarding equality (e.g., Friđriksdóttir 2016). 
10 Council Directive 2008/115/EC of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures 
in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country national (Return Directive), OJ 
2008 L 348. 
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(which was broadly criticised from the beginning and baptised “the Shame 
Directive”) and the “Facilitation Package”, composed of the Facilitation 
Directive11 together with its accompanying Council Framework Decision.12 
Some norms can also be found in the Anti-Trafficking Directive.13 Although it 
is frequently overlooked, Article 67 TFEU obliges the common immigration 
policy to respect the rights, freedoms and principles reaffirmed in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union.  
 In line with this framework, almost all EU Member States have legislation 
that criminalise irregular entry and stay as separate offences which might be 
punished with imprisonment or fines (FRA 2014). The Return Directive has 
been an object of heightened controversy and has drawn the attention of many 
scholars, as well as a number of judgments of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union.14  
 Yet the criminalisation of irregular migrants is not the topic that will be 
pursued in this chapter. Criminalisation does not stop at migrants themselves 
but has been progressively expanding to comprise the activity of those who 
come into contact with actual or even potential irregular migrants. It is, for 
example, well known that the Carrier Sanctions Directive15 makes it financially 
hazardous for shipping companies or airlines to allow on board people who do 
not have valid visas, which is, arguably, the main reason why refugees and 
migrants coming to Europe have to resort to smugglers and put their lives at 
peril instead of taking a plane or a regular ship. 
 This chapter will focus on the activities which might fall under the 
Facilitation Directive. Attention has been drawn to the Facilitation Directive 
because of the so-called solidarity crimes, that is, the criminalisation of acts of 
help or support to irregular migrants given by those moved by feelings of 
solidarity or compassion. The range of conduct comprised in solidarity crimes 
is very extensive: from extreme solidarity acts such as rescuing migrants from 
the sea or giving them shelter or food in the middle of the winter, to very socially 
common interaction, such as giving them a lift in the car or inviting them for a 
coffee in one’s own house. Although this might be the most appalling aspect of 
the Directive and related national legislation, this chapter will also look at other 
non-charitable activities the criminalisation of which leads to the social 
                                                      
11 Council Directive 2002/90/EC of 28 November 2002 defining the facilitation of unauthorised 
entry, transit and residence (Facilitation Directive), OJ 2002 L 328. 
12 Council Framework Decision of 28 November 2002 on the strengthening of the penal frame-
work to prevent the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence, OJ 2002 L 328. 
13 Council Directive 2011/36/EC of 5 April 2011 on preventing and combating trafficking in 
human beings and protecting its victims, and replacing Council Framework Decision 
2002/629/JHA, OJ 2011 L 101. 
14  Acosta 2009; Baldaccini 2009; Raffaelli 2016. 
15 Council Directive 2001/51/EC, of 28 June 2001, supplementing the provisions of Article 26 
of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985, OJ 2001 L 187, 
regulates the duty of carriers to return non-admitted third country nationals at their own cost, 
providing for sanctions against those who transport undocumented migrants into the EU.  
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exclusion and isolation of irregularly resident migrants. In this section, it will 
be argued that the indeterminacy of Article 1 of the Facilitation Directive (and 
related national legislation) criminalises almost every aspect of irregular 
migrants’ lives, the day-to-day social interaction with anyone who treats them 
as if they were not criminals, the most common cases being offering a job or 
renting a house, but it extends to all sorts of professional provision of goods and 
services.  
 The criminalisation of the social interaction with irregular migrants is strictly 
linked to the spreading of the idea that they are (because they must be treated 
like) criminals and that regular citizens should (want to) have nothing to do with 
them. In turn, the forced displacement of irregular migrants towards the realms 
of illegality (or even criminality), operated by the legislation, increases 
enormously the vulnerability of irregular migrants to exploitation and abuse, as 
their illegitimate legal status prevents them from accessing and defending their 
rights.16 
7.2.2 Defining punishable assistance 
The Facilitation Directive obliges Member States to punish two types of 
conduct. On the one hand, it establishes the obligation to punish any person who 
intentionally assists a third-country national to irregularly enter or transit across 
a Member State (Article 1(1)(a)). On the other hand, it also establishes the 
obligation to punish anyone who, for financial gain, intentionally assists a third-
country national to irregularly reside within the territory of a Member State 
(Article 1.1(b)).  
 In relation to the facilitation of irregular entry or transit, Article 1(2) of the 
Directive allows, but does not compel, the Member States to exempt from 
punishment the behaviour of those helping others to enter or transit across the 
territory of a Member State when their intention is to provide “humanitarian 
assistance to the person concerned”. Humanitarian assistance itself is not 
defined. Yet, the fact that conduct without financial gain is included in the 
provision and the explicit rejection of an exemption regarding family members17 
have led some authors18 to argue that “humanitarian assistance” does not mean 
solidarity assistance but rather conduct, which meets the requirements set by 
international law for “humanitarian intervention”.19 Furthermore, the Directive 
makes no reference to international norms or deontological codes that might be 
in conflict with Article 1(1) of the Directive, such as the UN Convention on the 
                                                      
16 A condition named ‘Legal isolation’ by Provera (2015, 2). 
17 An exemption similar to Article 1(2) regarding family members helping irregular entry or 
transit was dropped during the negotiations in the Council and was not included in the final 
text of the Directive (Carrera et al. 2016, 26). 
18  Muñoz 2016. 
19 The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, for example, stresses the principles of 
humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence of humanitarian aid to which all Member 
States are committed as signatories of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
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law of the sea (UNCLOS) which in Article 98(1) establishes the obligation to 
provide “assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost, and to 
proceed with all possible speed to rescue”. 
 In relation to the assistance to reside irregularly, the Directive does not give 
the possibility to Member States to introduce exemptions from punishment. Yet, 
the definition of the activities punishable under Article 1(1)(b) are delimited by 
two elements:  
• the assistance to irregular residence must be “intentional”, and  
• must be “for financial gain”.  
There would remain outside the scope of this provision, therefore, acts which 
involve the public in general and do not require the identification of the legal 
status (citizen, regular immigrant, irregular migrant) of the parties (such as 
selling and buying in shops or supermarkets), since they do not intentionally 
support irregular residence. 
 The second element in Article 1(1)(b), financial gain, is more complicated. 
It seems clear that this element excludes from the scope of application the 
provision of charity work and gratuitous support or assistance to irregularly 
residing migrants. But “activities for financial gain” is still a very broad defi-
nition and it could comprise any act which helps irregular migrants to remain in 
the country and involves an economic transaction, e.g. renting an apartment, 
offering a job, providing legal counselling, etc. 
 It is noteworthy that the actual endangering or violation of the rights of 
migrants is not required for the qualification of the conduct under Article 1(1).20 
The Directive seems thus rather clear in directing States to punish people who 
are not damaging, or intending to damage, the rights of migrants, but are just 
interacting with them. Some States, on the other hand, have established that the 
rights of migrants must be affected by the conduct, leaving outside the scope of 
the national provision those acts of assistance which tend to improve the 
situation of migrants.21 
 The text of the Directive does not contain much more beyond Article 1.22 It 
was the declared aim of the Directive to “provide a definition of the facilitation 
of illegal immigration” (incipit 4) since a “precise definition of the infringement 
in question and the cases of exemption” is essential for the approximation of the 
legal provisions in the Member States (incipit 3). Notwithstanding these 
intentions, it is precisely the indeterminacy of the kind of conduct aimed at by 
Article 1 that has raised the alarm regarding both the Directive itself and the 
domestic legislation adopted to transpose it in the Member States. From the 
                                                      
20 The Council Framework Decision requires Member States to ensure custodial sentences with 
a maximum sentence of not less than eight years if the lives of the migrants are endangered 
(Article 1.3). The violation of other rights, apart from life, is not contemplated. 
21 Spanish Supreme Court, Judgement 1378/2011, 14th December [RJ 2012/453]. Also, for 
example, the Italian legislation which punishes only those who rent apartments to irregular 
migrants at prices above the average price for the area. 
22 Article 2 extends the obligation to punish also those who instigate, attempt to commit, or are 
accomplices in the acts contemplated in Article 1(1)(a) or (b). 
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definition in the Directive it is difficult to know what is the harm that Directive 
wants to prevent or which is the good protected by the norm. In this respect, the 
Directive can be usefully compared to the UN Protocol against the Smuggling 
of Migrants23 which was adopted two years earlier.  
 The UN Protocol directs, as the Directive does, State Parties to treat the 
smuggling of migrants as a criminal offence (Article 6(1)). Yet smuggling of 
migrants is defined as the “procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, 
a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person” (Article 
3(a)). Also enabling a person to remain illegally in the territory of the State is to 
be punished, according to Article 6(1)(c) of the UN Protocol, but only when it 
is done by producing, procuring or providing fraudulent travel or identity 
documents or by other illegal means. The UN Protocol also contains a clause 
(Article 19) which establishes that nothing in the Protocol shall affect the rights, 
responsibilities and obligations of the State or the individuals under 
international law, including humanitarian and human rights law, with specific 
mention of the Refugee Convention and its Protocol. 
 We can therefore note that, on the one hand, the UN Protocol has a much 
more delimited definition of the punishable conduct. Firstly, because the 
Protocol is a norm supplementing a Convention aimed at fighting international 
organised crime. Thus, it defines its own scope of application accordingly in 
relation to conduct which is transnational and involves an organised criminal 
group (Article 4). This element, the involvement of an organised criminal group, 
which is missing in the European norm,24 is essential for determining the 
purpose of the legislation. Secondly because it promotes the persecution of 
activities which are both illegal and intended to produce financial or other 
material benefit. Differently from the European understanding of facilitation of 
irregular entry, in the UN Protocol migrant smuggling must be intended for 
profit; and differently from the European definition of facilitation of irregular 
residence, which only requires the irregular status of the migrant and the 
financial gain, the UN Protocol further delimits these actions to those committed 
through the use of illegal means such as the facilitation of false documentation.  
 As a result, the aim of the UN Protocol is also more clearly and consistently 
defined. The Protocol’s direction to punish smuggling is clearly placed in the 
fight against transnational organised criminal groups, because these groups have 
made a blooming business out of the violation of the States’ borders and 
sovereignty (and their migration legislation). In fact, States are the first victims 
of migrant smuggling mentioned in the Preamble of the Protocol. However, the 
UN Protocol adds, smuggling of migrants can also endanger the lives and 
security of the migrants involved and, therefore, in its provisions the Protocol 
                                                      
23 UN Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 15 November 2000. 
24 It is one of the circumstances for which the States should impose custodial sentences with a 
maximum sentence of not less than eight years, according to Article 1.3 of the Council 
Framework Decision. 
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establishes that migrants shall not be liable to criminal prosecution for having 
been the object of the conduct persecuted in the norm (which is the 
transnational, criminal and organised procurement of illegal entry) (Article 5).  
 Throughout the text, the UN Protocol refers to smuggled migrants as objects 
of the persecuted conduct and stresses the importance of guaranteeing their 
rights and well-being in different moments (Articles 2, 4, 6, 16 and 19). From 
the text of the Directive, and even more so from the EU Plan against migrant 
smuggling,25 this clear distinction between smugglers and smuggled migrants is 
blurred. For the European norm, smuggled migrants are not simply objects of 
persecuted criminal conduct. They play an active part in that conduct. In relation 
to smuggled migrants, the action of the EU is not directed primarily at protecting 
their safety and rights but, as the EU Plan against migrant smuggling shows 
clearly, at deterrence. In order to deter potential irregular migrants from 
engaging smugglers, the EU Directive and the EU Plan do not aim only – as the 
UN Protocol does – at the criminal networks of smugglers but rather at making 
the risk, the price and their day-to-day life as irregular migrants in Europe not 
worth their coming at all.  
 The European Union’s database EUR-Lex shows that the Directive has now 
been transposed into national legislation in almost all Member States.26 Some 
recent reports (Provera 2015) show that the legislation passed in transposition 
of the Directive has been used to prosecute a broader target27 than the “ruthless 
networks of smugglers with high returns and low risk” that the European 
Commission presented as the security threat that justified the norm. Although 
the 2015 EU Plan against smuggling arrives more than a decade after the 
deadline for the transposition of the Facilitation Directive, it does not contain a 
proper evaluation of the implementation of the Facilitation Package. It does 
acknowledge, however, the risk of expanding criminalisation to those providing 
humanitarian assistance. A recent study commissioned by the European 
Commission has indeed found that the Facilitation Directive has had profound 
unintended consequences for irregular migrants, people and the organisations 
assisting them, and society in general in terms of social trust and social 
cohesion.28  
 
                                                      
25 EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling (2015-2020) (COM(2015) 285). 
26 With the exception of Estonia, Malta and Austria. Denmark did not take part in the adoption 
of the Directive, and is not bound by it or subject to its application (Incipit 8 of the Directive). 
27 Data on the effective implementation of the Directive is scarce and does not disaggregate by 
type of conduct. However, Provera (2015) reports that in Germany one third of sentences for 
assistance have been passed against family members.  
28  Carrera 2016. 
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7.3 Breaking the law (1): the protection of religious freedom 
A first route to arguing cases in which national legislation deriving from the 
Facilitation Directive has been violated is that the contested action is a religious 
practice and, therefore, it is covered by the protection of religious freedom under 
Article 9 ECHR. These are cases where individuals or groups claim that their 
faith requires them to welcome and assist the foreigner and that in doing so they 
are practising their religious beliefs.  
7.3.1 Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself: caring for others as a 
religious practice 
On a first look, faith-based assistance to migrants can be understood as acts of 
charity, compassion and mercy mandated by religious sacred texts and religious 
teachings. Faith based organisations (FBOs) and Church communities have long 
played a front-line role in the support and integration of migrants, asylum 
seekers and refugees, as well as other marginalised groups in our society. 
Religious organisations offer a range of goods and services, such as shelter, 
food, education, health care, legal counselling, as well as moral support and 
spiritual comfort. The mission statements of many religious organisations report 
these activities as direct expression and realisation of their faith. Many mention 
passages of the Bible, for example, where those activities are required 
behaviour:  
Come, blessed of my Father, inherit the Kingdom prepared 
for you from the foundation of the world; for I was hungry, 
and you gave me food to eat. I was thirsty, and you gave me 
drink. I was a stranger, and you took me in. I was naked, 
and you clothed me. I was sick, and you visited me. I was in 
prison, and you came to me. (…) Most certainly I tell you, 
because you did it to one of the least of these my brothers, 
you did it to me.29  
Also, different denominations’ religious teachings include benevolent acts 
among the expression of faith and the expected behaviour of believers. The 
Works of Mercy, for example, which are charitable actions through which 
believers help others both in their spiritual and in their material needs, play a 
significant role in the Social Doctrine of the Catholic Church as well as for other 
Christian denominations.30  
                                                      
29  Matthew 25:31-40. 
30 The Works of Mercy might be corporal or spiritual. Corporal works include: to feed the 
hungry, to give water to the thirsty, to clothe the naked, to shelter the homeless, to visit the 
sick and the imprisoned, to bury the dead, and to give alms to the poor. The spiritual works 
include: to instruct the ignorant, to counsel the doubtful, to admonish the sinners, to bear 
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 As we have discussed in the preceding section, under the Facilitation 
Directive charity work aimed at the support of irregularly residing migrants falls 
outside the scope of Article 1(1)(b), which requires financial gain.31 Yet, on a 
closer look, faith-based assistance to irregular migrants goes beyond charity 
understood as gratuitous assistance (i.e. giving alms to the poor) to fall under a 
more complex understanding of charity as love. Based on the second half of the 
Great Commandment (Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself), this 
understanding of charity and compassion is not limited to providing for those 
dispossessed or unable to provide for themselves, but more generally is directed 
at promoting a feeling of solidarity with the others, to reach out and care for our 
neighbours. The definition of who is the neighbour is contained in the Samaritan 
Parable in the Bible, which commends the action of the Samaritan who helped 
a stranger in need but, more to the point, it does so by contrasting the 
Samaritan’s behaviour with the actions of those who “passed by on the other 
side” and were indifferent. The contrasting conduct is thus not that of the 
robbers who had inflicted the harm but that of those who did not care and did 
not offer to help. 
 Under this understanding of charity, efforts to assist irregular migrants 
according to the teachings of their faith might include actions which are either 
not gratuitous (and thus meet the requirement of financial gain) or that are of 
support for non-gratuitous acts. Believers or faith-based organisations could, for 
example, either offer jobs to migrants or rent them accommodation or other 
goods and services or – more frequently – help migrants to find jobs, rented 
accommodation, transport or any other goods or services. Religious organi-
sations can spend their contacts and influence as intermediaries between the 
irregular migrants and the wider society (or sympathetic segments of the wider 
society) in helping the former overcome distance, fears and prejudice created 
by the social isolation of irregular migrants. In doing so they are thus facilitating 
irregular migrants to function normally in society, offering them access to work 
or accommodation, making up for the legal isolation and the vulnerability which 
immigration law produces. This kind of action by faith-based organisations or 
their members, even when it does not meet in itself the requirement of financial 
gain, facilitates an action (the renting of the apartment, the hiring of the migrant 
person, the provision of goods or services) which does and is therefore 
punishable, as accomplices, under Article 2(b) of the Directive. 
 I shall assess, therefore, whether this kind of assistance can fall under the 
meaning of religious manifestation in Article 9 ECHR and should be protected 
                                                      
patiently those who wrong us, to forgive offences, to comfort the afflicted and to pray for the 
living and the dead. 
31 The fact that they cannot be criminally prosecuted does not entail that charitable activities 
are not affected by the turn to criminalisation of irregular migration and those assisting them. 
Among the “unintended effects” of the Directive, some organisations have reported the 
discontinuation of EU funding to support humanitarian assistance to irregular migrants as 
well as confusion among civil society organisations about how the Facilitation Directive 
might affect their work (Carrera 2016, 26). 
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from State interference (through an exemption from criminal liability, for 
example). 
7.3.2 Stretching the argument under Article 9 ECHR beyond charity  
Article 9 ECHR protects freedom of thought, conscience and religion. Freedom 
of religion is traditionally considered a primordial right and the ECtHR has 
declared this to be its understanding too.32 Yet, notwithstanding its importance 
within human rights systems, case-law on freedom of religion has kept a low-
profile for a long time33 and although it has been rapidly expanding lately there 
are still a number of controversial issues. 
 This freedom has been traditionally seen from a double angle: the internal 
forum, which refers to the ideas formed within an individual conscience and the 
external forum, which consists in the manifestation of those ideas. Article 9 
establishes the absolute protection of the internal forum, i.e. the right to have, 
adopt or change religious beliefs, as well as the right not to have religious 
beliefs.34 It establishes also protection for the external forum, for the mani-
festations of those religious beliefs, although in this case this protection is not 
absolute and can be limited according to the criteria set out in paragraph 2. In 
Article 9(1), external manifestations of religion include worship, teaching, 
practice and observance. 
 To determine whether the protection of external manifestations under Article 
9 cover the cases of assistance to irregular migrants punishable under the 
Facilitation Directive (and related domestic legislation), there is a “checklist”35 
of five questions that have to be answered. The first two questions refer to the 
applicability of Article 9(1) to the case at hand.  
 The first question in our checklist is: Does our case fall within the scope of 
Article 9? Article 9.1 protects external manifestations of religious beliefs both 
in the private and the public spheres; they are considered an integral part of the 
                                                      
32 In its first judgement on freedom of religion, the Court stated that “[F]reedom of thought, 
conscience and religion is one of the foundations of a ‘democratic society’ within the 
meaning of the Convention. (…) The pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, 
which has been dearly won over the centuries, depends on it”. ECtHR 25 May 1993, 
14307/88, Kokkinakis v. Greece, para. 31. 
33 This has been attributed not only to the high level of protection that freedom of religion 
enjoyed in Europe (as compared to other parts of the world) but also the restrictive approach 
towards this article taken first by the former European Commission of Human Rights and, 
later on, by the ECtHR. The first case on freedom of religion was decided in 1993, and case 
law on Article 9 started to increase (together with scholarly literature on this matter) from 
the mid-2000s. 
34 The absolute protection of the internal forum is, according to the Court, reflected in the 
wording of Article 9 para. 2: “Unlike the second paragraphs of Articles 8, 10 and 11 which 
cover all the rights mentioned in the first paragraphs of those Articles, that of Article 9 refers 
only to ‘freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief’”. Kokkinakis, cit., para. 33.  
35 Determined jointly by the wording of Article 9 and the reasoning of the ECtHR, this checklist 
is the backbone of argumentation in Article 9 cases and constitutes a common layout in 
guides on the implementation of Article 9 (Murdoch 2007); CoE 2015). 
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protected right: “bearing witness in words and deeds is bound up with the 
existence of religious convictions”.36 Moreover, in the determination of whether 
assistance to irregular migrants punishable under Articles 1(1) or 2(b) of the 
Facilitation Directive falls within the scope of “religious practice” within the 
meaning of Article 9, it must be borne in mind that States’ religious neutrality 
excludes any discretion on their part to determine whether religious beliefs or 
the means used to express such beliefs are legitimate.37 
 For a long time, under the influence of the early restrictive interpretative line 
of the former Commission (ECmHR), the established understanding was that 
the term “practice” refers to acts prescribed by religion but did not cover every 
act motivated or influenced by a religion or belief.38 Establishing whether a 
manifestation is prescribed or merely inspired by religion can be less than 
straightforward and, more often than not, would involve the States’ courts (or 
the ECtHR) in the determination of questions of theological conformity which 
would exceed the boundaries of the principle of neutrality. Some retreat from 
this restrictive and troublesome line of argumentation can be observed lately: in 
Eweida, for example, the ECtHR specified that whereas there must be a 
“sufficiently close and direct nexus between the act and the underlying belief” 
this is a matter to be determined on the facts of each case: in particular, it cannot 
be assumed that only recognised acts of worship or devotion or the fulfilment 
of duties mandated by religion constitute protected manifestations of belief.39  
 In the case at hand, assistance to irregular migrants either as gratuitous 
provision of basic needs or as support to avoid their being isolated and 
vulnerable to harm and exploitation in society can be considered a manifestation 
of religion, commanded in religious texts and practised as such by many people 
both individually and in faith-based organisations. It is irrelevant to the case, 
according to Eweida, that this manifestation is not considered a rite, that it might 
not have the strength of a religious obligation, or that it is not a practice 
undertaken by the majority of believers. 
 Once we have established that assistance to irregular migrants can be 
understood as a religious manifestation, we must then answer question number 
2 of the checklist: “Has there been any interference with Article 9 rights?” It is 
the combination of an interference with the lack of justification, under the 
criteria of Article 9.2, which determines the existence of a violation of the rights 
in Article 9. The ECtHR has maintained that not only the imposition of religious 
practices upon individuals but also the restrictions placed upon individual action 
                                                      
36 Kokkinakis, cit., para. 31. 
37 ECtHR 26 September 1996, 18747/91, Manoussakis a.o. v. Greece, para. 47; also, ECtHR 
26 October 2000, 30985/96, Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, para. 78.  
38 The leading case on this line of reasoning was Arrowsmith v. the United Kingdom, where the 
distribution of leaflets encouraging soldiers not to go to Northern Ireland was considered 
inspired by the pacifist beliefs of the applicant, but not a direct manifestation of those beliefs. 
ECmHR of 16 May 1977, 7050/75, Pat Arrowsmith v. the United Kingdom (dec). 
39 ECtHR 15 January 2013, 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 & 36516/10, Eweida a.o. v. the 
United Kingdom, para. 82. 
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or behaviour mandated by belief fall within the scope of Article 9. In the case at 
hand, following the Facilitation Directive States have put on those actions 
arguably the harshest restriction possible in a democratic society (i.e. criminal 
liability).  
 Over the years, the Convention organs have established that a restriction 
imposed on the manifestations of religious beliefs does not necessarily amount 
to interference under Article 9. This was the case, for example, if the persons 
involved had other means to manifest their religion (by changing jobs or by 
expressing their religion outside the professional sphere, for example).40 In 
Eweida, the Court moved away from that line and stated that “rather than 
holding that the possibility of changing job would negate any interference with 
the right, the better approach would be to weigh that possibility in the overall 
balance when considering whether or not the restriction was proportionate”.41 
 The Convention organs, especially the ECmHR, have also seemed reluctant 
to perceive an interference with religious manifestation when the acts do not 
directly express the belief concerned or are only remotely connected.42 This has 
been particularly consistent in the case where religious grounds were pitted 
against general legislation.43 However, in this respect it is important to recall 
that even when general legislation applies “on a neutral basis without any link 
whatsoever with an applicant's personal beliefs”,44 it may still have a differen-
tiated impact on certain groups and therefore, according to the Thlimmenos 
doctrine, discriminatory interference could result when “States, without an 
objective and reasonable justification, fail to treat differently persons whose 
situations are significantly different”.45  
 After establishing that a manifestation of religious belief has been interfered 
with, the checklist continues with three questions which assess whether the 
interference is justified under the criteria set out in Article 9(2). It is only if the 
interference with religious manifestation is not justified that we have a violation 
of freedom of religion. States’ interference, to be justified, must comply with 
three cumulative requirements: the limitation must be prescribed by law, must 
have a legitimate aim, and must be necessary in a democratic society.  
 The fourth question is therefore, “Is the limitation on manifestation of 
religion prescribed by law?” In the case at hand, this is an uncontroversial 
question, since the transposition of the Facilitation Directive required the 
constitution of criminal offences and these must be provided by law. The fifth 
question in the checklist is: “Does the limitation on manifestation of religion 
                                                      
40 ECtHR 13 April 2006, 55170/00, Kosteski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; 
ECtHR 2 October 2001, 49853/99, Pichon and Sajous v. France (dec.). 
41 Eweida, cit., para. 83. 
42 ECtHR 3 December 2009, 40010/04, Skugar a.o. v. Russia (dec.). 
43 ECtHR  15 December 1983, 10358/83, C. v. the United Kingdom (dec.); ECtHR 18 July 
1986, 11991/86, H. and B. v. the United Kingdom (dec.); ECtHR 18 February 1993, 
20747/92, Bouessel du Bourg v. France (dec.); Skugar, cit. 
44 Skugar, cit., p. 8. 
45 ECtHR 6 April 2000, 34369/97, Thlimmenos v. Greece, para. 44. 
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have a legitimate aim?” This question aims at determining whether the 
limitation imposed by the State protects one (or more) of the legitimate aims 
listed in Article 9.2: “in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public 
order, health and morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others”. Scholarship recognises that the interpretation that the Court has made 
of these aims is rather “nebulous”46 and that respondent States do not find great 
difficulty in showing that they were pursuing one or more of those, very broad, 
aims. In the case at hand, it is likely that the Court would accept public safety, 
public order and the rights of others as aims being pursued by anti-smuggling 
legislation, notwithstanding the defective legislative technique, already present 
in the Directive, which hints at all these aims without focusing on any.47 
 So, we reach the last question of the checklist, the test where the real stakes 
are, “Is the limitation on manifestation of religion necessary in a democratic 
society?” This question must be answered through a triple test: the interference 
must:  
a) correspond to a pressing social need,  
b) it must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, and  
c) it must be justified.  
Stopping the “ruthless networks” of profiteering smugglers and preventing the 
suffering and exploitation of smuggled migrants are compelling interests. Yet, 
necessary does not mean simply ‘admissible’, ‘ordinary’, ‘useful’, ‘reasonable’ 
or ‘desirable’,48 there must be proportionality and justifying reasons to make the 
interference necessary in a democratic society. In the case under examination, 
the proportionality test would raise doubts on the Facilitation Directive’s lack 
of exemptions from punishment for those actions which follow religious 
commands which have the aim of protecting the life and well-being of others.49  
 The lack of determinacy and the incoherence of the aims pursued by the 
Directive; the lack of concluding evidence on the capacity of these measures to 
stop criminal networks; the contrasting evidence on the unintended crimi-
nalisation of those helping others out of compassion; and the vulnerability of 
irregular migrants themselves, could all be powerful arguments for maintaining 
that making a criminal offence out of the religious mandate to love your 
neighbour is unnecessary in a democratic society and that the Facilitation 
Directive (and related national regulation) unjustifiably interferes with the 
religious practices of those who welcome, assist and support irregular migrants 
to lead decent human lives in European societies. 
                                                      
46  Harris et al. 2009, p. 436. 
47 At the time of writing this, the Court has just issued the judgement in ECtHR 20 June 2017, 
67667/09, Bayev a.o. v. Russia (request for referral to the Grand Chamber is pending), based 
almost only on the discussion of the legitimate character of the aims pursued by the anti-gay 
propaganda law. Maybe in the future the Court will not be so easily convinced by the 
legitimacy of declared aims and will look further into their plausibility and effectivity.  
48 ECtHR 7 December 1976, 5493/72, Handyside v. the United Kingdom, para. 48. 
49 Thlimmenos, cit. 
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7.4 Breaking the law (2): conscientious objection 
The second route for cases of infringement of legislation deriving from the 
Facilitation Directive is to argue that the contested actions were dictated by 
conscience. When confronted with the mandate of the legislation, the trans-
gressor felt that complying with it would violate deeply held convictions and 
therefore the contested action should be protected by an exemption, a right to 
conscientious objection to the law. 
7.4.1 Arguments for conscience and conscientious objection under Article 9 
ECHR  
There are people who violate national provisions transposing the Facilitation 
Directive out of a sentiment of human decency, because they are convinced that 
it is contrary to the very idea of human dignity and human rights to let irregular 
migrants drown in the sea, or die or suffer in their transit through Europe, or be 
left in the hedgerows of our societies, prey to criminal networks and heartless 
individuals that will abuse them and make profit out of their vulnerable 
condition.50 These convictions and the impulse to act on them is dictated by their 
conscience; they think that the indifference towards the suffering of irregular 
migrants, which is commanded by the law, is contrary to their most deeply held 
convictions about the relationship with, and the treatment of, others. For our 
argument here, I shall make no differentiation if that conscience and deeply held 
convictions have been formed through religious teachings or without any 
reference to religion. If the former, these conscience cases are different from 
those we have seen in the previous section because the contested conduct is not 
considered, by the claimant, as a religious practice.51 
 Notwithstanding the expanding jurisprudence under Article 9 ECHR, 
arguing these cases in Strasbourg would be an arduous task. Restrictive and 
limited as the understanding of religious freedom of the ECtHR has been argued 
to be, the right to freedom of conscience and the protection that individuals 
might derive from it is even less certain. I shall argue here that these kinds of 
cases would give the ECtHR a remarkable opportunity both for updating and 
upgrading the interpretation of freedom of conscience, and developing a 
substantive right. 
                                                      
50 I have argued elsewhere that I do not agree with the conception of vulnerability as a condition 
of human beings as human, but I rather see it as a condition of certain (groups of) individuals 
who are left without the forms of protection that society affords to those not seen as 
vulnerable (Morondo, 2016). The exposure of irregular migrants to abuse and rights 
violations is a very poignant case of this understanding of vulnerability. 
51 For example, one of the applicants in Eweida, Ms. Ladele, did not present her refusal to 
perform ceremonies of or register civil partnerships for homosexual couples as a mani-
festation of her religious beliefs but rather as a conscientious objection based on her religious 
convictions regarding homosexuality.  
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 The ECtHR’s case law on Article 9 is dominated by cases on religion and it 
is therefore difficult to find what is distinctive about the other two rights thereby 
contained: freedom of thought and freedom of conscience.52 Furthermore, there 
is no definition of religion either in the text of the Convention or in the case law. 
The Convention organs have not developed any specific notion to distinguish 
external manifestations of conscience from external manifestations of religion 
and the terms “beliefs” and, less frequently, “convictions” are used for expres-
sions of a religious and non-religious nature. I shall address the limitations 
which this lack of delimitation puts on the protection of conscience in the next 
section. Here I shall examine first the two paths open for our assistance out of 
conscience cases: either they could present the contested conduct as a 
manifestation of conscience which constitutes a belief under Article 9, or they 
could argue that the dictates of conscience prevent them from acting according 
to the law and thus present a case f for conscientious objection. 
 In the first case, the argument is similar to what we have seen in the 
preceding section in relation to religious practices, since our applicants would 
argue that their conduct is a manifestation of a philosophical or moral belief 
within the meaning of Article 9(1). There are, however, some particularities in 
relation to the first two questions of the checklist, i.e. whether the conduct is a 
manifestation of a belief and whether it has been interfered with. 
 Article 9 has a potentially very wide scope of protection53 since it protects 
not only the right to manifest one’s religion but also one’s beliefs. This is a 
wider safeguard than traditional religious freedom clauses because it encom-
passes personal, political, philosophical and moral beliefs and convictions.  Yet, 
these personal beliefs and convictions need to demonstrate that they are more 
than just either opinions or motivations to claim the protection of Article 9. The 
Court has constantly required that these convictions attain a certain level of 
cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance,54 that they express a coherent 
view on basic issues, that they denote convictions which are worthy of respect 
in a democratic society and which are not incompatible with human dignity,55 
and that they have an identifiable formal content.56 This attempt at 
distinguishing mere opinions or motivations from the convictions or beliefs 
covered by Article 9.1 has led, in practice, to uncertainty, especially so in those 
                                                      
52 I shall not discuss here freedom of thought. For this right, the scholarship directs us mostly 
to the case-law of the former ECmHR (Renucci 2005). Freedom of thought is understood as 
pertaining to the only internal forum and prohibits the State to interfering with it (ECmHR 
11 October 1991, 16311/90, 16312/90 and 16313/90, Hazar, Hazar and Açik v. Turkey 
(dec.)). Like freedom of religion, and differently from freedom of conscience, freedom of 
thought might be claimed by legal entities as well as by individuals (ECmHR 12 October 
1988, 11921/86, Verein “Kontakt-Information-Therapie” (KIT) and Hagen v. Austria 
(dec.)). External manifestation of thought may be protected under Article 10 (freedom of 
expression) and Article 11 (freedom of association). 
53  Renucci 2005. 
54 ECtHR 25 February 1982, 7511/76, Campbell and Cosans v. UK. 
55 Campbell and Cosans v. UK, para. 36. 
56 ECtHR 15 May 1980, 8317/78, T. McFeeley v. UK. 
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cases which cannot count on a religion to work as the supporting coherent 
system required by the Court.57 
 In the cases under examination, it is more likely than in the cases under the 
preceding section that the Court does not find that the moral or philosophical 
convictions of those assisting migrants out of a sentiment of human decency or 
by virtue of their understanding of human dignity and human rights constitute 
“convictions or belief” within the meaning of Article 9 or that the expression of 
these convictions has been interfered with by the adoption of criminal 
legislation to fight against irregular migration and human smugglers. 
Applicants, therefore, should highlight human rights as a political philosophy 
which imposes duties both on the States and on individuals in society (horizontal 
effect), to try to move the case into the requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 
9, which would work as discussed in the previous section, the main argument 
being that of the disproportionate relationship between a “blanket ban” and the 
(uncertain) aims of the legislation.  
 The second path opened in the argument for freedom of conscience is that of 
conscientious objection. Conscientious objection is raised when the law 
demands that one acts in a way which is contrary to the dictates of the 
individual’s conscience, to deeply held moral convictions about the rights and 
the wrongs of one’s own behaviour. Generally, conscientious objection consists 
in the refusal to perform an action commanded by the law (join the army, 
provide reproductive health services, register homosexual couples, etc.) 
whereas the cases under examination consist in the realisation of conduct which 
is prohibited by law. Yet, they can be easily considered from a reverse 
perspective, more fitting to traditional conscientious objection cases: the law 
demands abstaining or refraining from certain actions (assisting irregular 
migrants), but the individual’s conscience compels that action. The 
conscientious objectors in our cases refuse to be indifferent and to not help. 
 Conscientious objection is, in principle, not protected by Article 9 ECtHR. 
From the early former Commission case law, the Convention organs have 
consistently maintained that Article 9 does not guarantee the right to always 
behave in public in a manner governed by the individual’s convictions or 
beliefs. In particular, “general legislation which applies on a neutral basis 
without any link whatsoever with an applicant’s personal beliefs cannot in 
principle be regarded as an interference with his or her rights under Article 9”.58 
The Convention organs have thus consistently recognised the power of the State 
to introduce or not exemption clauses on grounds of conscience in particular 
pieces of legislation.59 
                                                      
57 Contrast for example, the acceptance of opposition to abortion or to homosexual marriages 
as convictions within the meaning of Article 9(1) (in Pinchon and Sajous and in Eweida), 
with the swift refusal to consider convictions regarding end-of-life situations equally 
included in Pretty. 
58 Skugar, cit. 
59 Eweida, cit. para 105-106. 
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 It is illustrative in this respect the case law on conscientious objection to 
military service, which has been, since 2011, the only form of conscientious 
objection recognised by the ECtHR as being protected by Article 9. Yet, the 
argument of the Court makes it clear that this protection is not enshrined as such 
in Article 9,60 but derives from the virtually general consensus which has 
evolved among the member States of the Council of Europe, along with other 
relevant international instruments.61 
 In the case at hand, we must also take into account that the Facilitation 
Directive does not allow for conscientious objections as such. Facilitation of 
entry and transit might be exempted when it is intended to offer humanitarian 
assistance, but as we have already noted, humanitarian is not here a synonym 
for a solidarity conscience but rather a reference to the requirements of 
humanitarian intervention under international law.  
 We must also take into account that there are particular cases within the 
broad conduct of punishable assistance where conscientious objection might be 
sustained by sectorial or professional deontological codes. As the Facilitation 
Directive has not taken those into account either, the command not to intervene 
might create a conflict of obligations for certain actors: fishing or leisure boats’ 
crews and occupants encountering migrants in distress on the high seas, for 
example, are under an international law obligation to help them to shore; doctors 
are under a deontological obligation to provide care to anyone without 
discrimination; and even average citizens might find themselves under the 
obligation to assist irregular migrants in situations of necessity or when 
omission of help would also be punishable. 
7.4.2 Conscience, conscientious objection and general obedience to the law 
It is only prudent to observe that the ECtHR’s approach to conscientious 
objection to legislation enacted by democratic States with internal mechanisms 
for the protection of fundamental rights is bound to be very cautious. Taking 
into account the supranational and subsidiary role of the Court and the 
controversial and highly political nature of migration management it is more 
likely that the Court will acknowledge the results of domestic or international 
processes of civil disobedience rather than trigger them. 
                                                      
60 In fact, it has taken decades of inadmissible or dismissed military objector cases before 
arriving at ECtHR 7 July 2011, 23459/03, Bayatyan v. Armenia. See, for example: ECmHR 
12 December 1966, 2299/64, Grandrath v. Germany (dec.); ECmHR 2 April 1973, 5591/72, 
G.Z. v. Austria (dec.); ECmHR 7 March 1977, 7565/76, Conscientious Objectors v. Denmark 
(dec.); ECmHR 11 October 1984, 10410/83, N. v. Sweden (dec.); ECmHR 7 March 1996, 
20972/92, Raninen v. Finland (dec.). 
61  Bayatyan, cit., para. 108. Together with the consideration that the Convention is a “living 
instrument” the Court dissociates itself from the previous reasoning of the ECmHR, whereby 
the application of Art. 9 was hindered by the wording of Art. 4.3(b), which explicitly 
excluded military service or the service exacted instead of compulsory military service from 
the definition of prohibited “forced or compulsory labour”. 
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 Yet, even if effective remedy in Strasbourg is still far away, arguing these 
conscience cases from the point of view of Article 9 not only gives them a 
human rights backing and recognisable language, but would also improve the 
Convention – as a living instrument – to meet the requirements of the 
consciences of today.62  
 It is unclear among the scholarship and in the case law of the ECtHR what 
is the relationship established between conscience and the notion of protected 
“religion and beliefs” that the Court has polished over the years. Indeed, several 
possibilities have been presented. For some authors, freedom of conscience is 
just a “negative” right as freedom of thought, referring solely to the internal 
forum. As such, its protection is absolute. The manifestations of conscience 
could be protected under Articles 8, 10 or 11, for example. This might have been 
the understanding of the Convention organs, which tended to view Article 9 as 
protecting the internal forum and was ready to examine violations of 
manifestations under other Convention Articles. 
 Others, however, have argued that freedom of conscience would have no 
significance if its external manifestations were not protected. These external 
manifestations may amount to beliefs within the meaning of Article 9.163 or, for 
some few authors (and some dissenting opinions of the ECtHR64) they are 
protected by a general right to conscientious objection.65 Legal theory, more 
than case law, has sought to clarify the concept of freedom of conscience.66 
Chiassoni has argued convincingly that freedom of conscience is “the legal 
projection of individuals’ moral autonomy” and, as such, is at the very foun-
dation of liberal democratic States.67 Freedom of conscience is thus protected, 
first of all, by the delimitation, for every individual, of a private sphere of 
autonomy. The greater this unregulated sphere of legal permission, the greater 
                                                      
62 Notwithstanding the growing role which is attributed to religion in public life (and which is 
in my opinion caused by xenophobic over-visibility of Islam-related questions and demands), 
the data suggests that Europeans’ consciences, their understanding of themselves and their 
relationships in society, are ever less ruled by religious norms or dictates. See, for example: 
ECmHR 12 December 1966, 2299/64, Grandrath v. Germany (dec.); ECmHR 2 April 1973, 
5591/72, G.Z. v. Austria (dec.); ECmHR 7 March 1977, 7565/76, Conscientious Objectors 
v. Denmark (dec.); ECmHR 11 October 1984, 10410/83, N. v. Sweden (dec.); ECmHR 7 
March 1996, 20972/92, Raninen v. Finland (dec.). On the other hand, human rights and 
related values play an important role in determining behaviour which was shaped by religious 
norms in the past. See: European Commission (2012), The values of Europeans, Standard 
Eurobarometer 77 spring 2012, Luxembourg: European Commission. 
63 For example: Pretty, cit., examined under Article 8, similar to ECtHR 23 June 1993, 
12875/87, Hoffmann v. Austria, and ECtHR 16 December 2003, 64927/01, Palau-Martinez 
v. France. Also, under Article 10: ECtHR 12 July 2001, 29032/95, Feldek v. Slovakia, or 
Article 11: ECtHR 10 July 1998, 26695/95, Sidiropoulos and Others v. Greece, ECtHR 29 
April 1999, 25088/94, 28331/95 and 28443/95, Chassagnou and Others v. France, and 
ECtHR 17 February 2004, 39748/98, Maestri v. Italy.  
64 Eweida, cit., joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges Vučinič and De Gaetano. 
65  Chiassoni 2011, 55. 
66  Renucci 2005; Chiassoni 2011. 
67  Chiassoni 2011, 50. 
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plurality of views on behaviour will be admitted. Chiassoni reminds, though, 
that in a liberal democracy these behaviours cannot be imposed on others, they 
are admitted only in the individuals’ reserved sphere of autonomy. Indeed, the 
case law of the Convention organs shows the development towards this more 
liberal understanding of freedom of conscience, obliging the States not to 
interfere and permitting thus greater space for diversity of individual choices. 
 However, theoretical – as well as jurisprudential – difficulties with freedom 
of conscience become less clear when individuals’ consciences clash with what 
is sometimes conceived of as a form of “collective conscience”.68 On the one 
hand, the law brings with it the pretence of being generally obeyed. In fact, to 
admit that any individual conscience might be the basis for exemptions from 
compliance with the law would turn it into an ensemble of suggestions.69 
General obedience to the law is, from the perspective of the legal system, a 
closure norm. In fact, not only a differing opinion but also ignorance does not 
excuse the individual from complying with the law (Ignorantia juris non 
excusat). Yet, from a moral and a political point of view, there is no general 
obligation to obey the law (), and thus it has been argued that a general right to 
conscientious objection might act as a safety relief valve in liberal democratic 
States. 
 In the cases under examination, there is the additional particularity that 
applicants would not be representative of a minority worldview seeking a 
counter-majority guaranteed from their individual freedom; on the contrary, 
their conscience is an expression of the fundamental values of the system and 
what they are objecting to is the limitation of human rights and human dignity 
operated by the law on the basis of other political aims, not all of them legitimate 
for the purpose of limiting human rights (border security, labour market 
stability, electoral calculations).  
7.5 Conclusions 
It is common parlance that Europe is suffering a “migration crisis” which, 
combined with the financial crisis and the terrorist attacks in European cities, 
have created an emergency, a tragic situation which needs order and drastic 
decisions to return to enjoying peace, security and rights. Independently of how 
much of all this is empirically true, it is certain, however, that it is a discourse 
which has produced real effects: European political discourse and policies have 
offered ever more frequently trade-offs between rights and security.  
                                                      
68  Zucca 2013. 
69 This point has been made by Courts or governments themselves when called upon an 
eventual right to conscientious objection. E.g., the English Government in Pretty, quoting Dr 
Johnson, argued that: “[f]irst, laws are not made for particular cases but for men in general. 
Second, to permit a law to be modified at discretion is to leave the community without law.” 
(Pretty, cit., 29). 
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 The legislation examined in this chapter is an example of this. The 
Facilitation Directive has directed the Member States to approach and treat 
questions of irregular migration from a perspective which blatantly ignores 
human rights. The human rights of irregular migrants, which are rendered more 
vulnerable by the legal and social isolation to which they are earmarked; but 
also – and this has been the focus of this chapter – the human rights of those 
who, out of religious obligation or conscience requirement, refuse to treat 
irregular migrants as if they were criminals and collaborate in their social 
isolation. 
 I have tested the protection (and the limits thereof) that Article 9 ECHR 
could offer to those who engage in conduct which violates national provisions 
transposing Articles 1(1) and 1(2) of the Directive, in two distinct cases: when 
the conduct is commanded by religious texts or teachings and can, therefore, be 
understood as a religious practice; and when complying with the law would 
violate the conscience of the transgressor, especially when that conscience is 
formed by notions of human dignity and human rights. 
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 Chapter 8 Belief and Conscience 
Can Europe do without a specific guarantee for 
religion? 
Jim Murdoch 
8.1 Introduction 
The affirmation of freedom of thought, conscience and religion in constitutional 
charters and human rights instruments is commonplace,1 the sentiment that 
individual conscience and belief must be recognised as binding legal norms at 
domestic and at international level reflecting the need by States to be seen to be 
displaying a commitment to upholding the values of pluralism and tolerance. 
Denial of the freedom of thought, conscience and religion involves denial of 
recognition of an inherent element of personal autonomy as well as an attack 
upon a central aspect of an individual’s identity as a member of a community 
defined by religious affiliation. Legal recognition of these rights through 
ratification of treaty obligations or through domestic constitutional charter 
constitutes a public affirmation by a State of its recognition of these freedoms 
as a hallmark of liberal democracy.2  
 Legal recognition in turn implies some element of acceptance of adjudication 
via the domestic courts or supervision by an international mechanism. This 
                                                      
1 For international human rights standards, see e.g., International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Art. 18, provides that ‘everyone has the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion. This right includes freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief 
of his or her choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in 
public or private, to manifest his or her religion or belief in worship, observance, practice 
and teaching. No one can be subject to coercion which would impair his or her freedom to 
have or to adopt a religion or belief of his or her choice. Freedom to manifest one’s religion 
or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary 
to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
others.’ This also provides that States must respect for the liberty of parents and, when 
applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in 
conformity with their own convictions. See also: International Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, Art. 14; and American Convention on Human Rights, Art. 12. For discussion of 
domestic provisions, see: Iliopoulos-Strangas (ed) (2005), Constitution and Religion; Uitz 
(2007), Freedom of Religion in European Constitutional and International Case Law; 
Martinez-Torrón & Durham (eds) (2010), Religion and the Secular State: National Reports; 
Ferrari & Pastorelli (2012), Religion in Public Spaces; Dingemans (2013), The Protections 
for Religious Rights: Law and Practice. 
2 ECtHR 25 May 1993, 14307/88, Kokkinakis v Greece, para 31. 
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chapter addresses the question of whether international judicial consideration of 
domestic protection for freedom of thought, conscience and religion has 
enhanced the flourishing of permitted religious freedom, but it does so from the 
narrow standpoint of the regional system of protection for human rights in 
Europe. In short, what specifically has been the outcome of the inclusion of 
Article 9 of the European Convention of Human Rights in practical terms, when 
viewed through the prism of the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights? The argument to be made is that freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion is not indispensable where the overall system for human rights 
protection is highly-developed as it is on this continent. The argument is 
specifically not that religious interests may be better protected as aspects of 
group rights rather than as individual rights (although other European human 
rights instruments and agencies of the Council of Europe proceed upon the basis 
of religious freedom as a critical aspect of the protection of minorities),3 but 
rather that religious freedom is essentially a concept embracing a number of 
discrete elements, each of which can be – and to a large extent already is - 
adequately protected through other legal provisions.  
 Any thesis that freedom of thought, conscience and religion is essentially 
superfluous is rightly controversial. At a time when notions of tolerance and 
equality are under strain across many parts of the globe including Europe, the 
contemporary relevance of an unambiguous legal guarantee appears self-
evident, not least as any proposal to weaken the normative value of the 
protection of thought, conscience and religion could send an inappropriate 
message in countries in which intolerance is rising both to members of 
minorities and to those individuals, groups and political parties seeking to 
advance that intolerance. Freedom of religious belief has proven in recent years 
                                                      
3 The European system for the protection of human rights is much wider than merely judicial 
protection via the Strasbourg Court: see e.g. Reed & Murdoch (2017), 4th ed., Human Rights 
Law, cap 2. See in particular the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities, Preamble: a pluralist and genuinely democratic society should not only respect 
the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of each person belonging to a national 
minority, but also create appropriate conditions enabling them to express, preserve and 
develop this identity. The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI)’s 
mandate is to combat racism, xenophobia, antisemitism and intolerance by combating 
discrimination and prejudice on grounds of race, colour, language, religion, nationality and 
national or ethnic origin. For other Council of Europe standards, see e.g. PACE Resolution 
2076 (2015) on ‘Freedom of religion and living together in a democratic society’. The EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, Art. 10 protects freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
using the formulation found in the ECHR. Note also that the case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights (‘the Strasbourg Court’) is not entirely devoid of recognition of denial of 
collective religious toleration as a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights: 
the ECHR, Art. 9 may also be engaged in inter-state cases, and here ‘group rights’ may be 
more evident: e.g. ECtHR 10 May 2001, 25781/94, Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], paras 245–246 
at para 245 (restrictions placed on the freedom of movement of Greek Cypriots in northern 
Turkey ‘considerably curtailed their ability to observe their religious beliefs, in particular 
their access to places of worship outside their villages and their participation in other aspects 
of religious life’: violation of Art. 9). 
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to be a somewhat fragile concept, and human rights charters and domestic 
constitutional guarantees proclaim eternal values that are not necessarily self-
evident to all. Nor is the growing sense of a Europe of waning religious faith, of 
a continent in which religious observance is fading fast and where disapproval 
of organised religion by emboldened secular fundamentalists is increasingly 
vocal, a reason to reject the principle of freedom of conscience and belief. 
Reform of domestic law and policy that appears to favour a particular faith in 
States not specifically founded upon the principle of laicite does not in itself 
attack the principle that individuals are entitled to freedom of religion. 
Questioning the inter-connectivity in many domestic arrangements between a 
dominant religion and national arrangements4 may indeed promote the value of 
pluralism in the longer-term. Rather, the thesis is that in a mature legal system 
providing real protection for human rights in general, a specific conscience and 
belief guarantee may have little if any practical outcome. 
8.2 Freedom of thought, conscience and belief and 
Strasbourg case law 
The formulation of the text of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights calls for some comment. It reads as follows:  
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his 
religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community 
with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion 
or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.  
2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be 
subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and 
are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
public safety, for the protection of public order, health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others. 5 
Put in another way, Article 9 involves the rights to hold philosophical or 
religious convictions, to change these beliefs, and to manifest them individually 
or in common with others.6 There is, though, a subtle difference between the 
first two aspects of the freedom and the third. The text of Article 9 is normally 
taken to indicate that the right to hold and to change ideas is absolute (the so-
                                                      
4 For a recent audit of the place of religion in Scots domestic law, see: Brown, Green & Mair 
(2016), Religion in Scots Law. 
5 This textual formulation is replicated in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, Art. 10. 
6 ECtHR 25 May 1993, 14307/88, Kokkinakis v Greece, para 31. 
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called ‘forum internum’) in light of paragraph (2)’s recognition that only 
manifestations of belief may be subject to justifiable interference (that is, 
provided the State can establish that the interference was proportionate, for a 
recognised end, and in accordance with domestic law, there will be no violation 
of the provision).  
 Use of Article 9 by litigants has been surprisingly limited. By the end of 
2016, violations of Article 9 had been established in only 65 instances, a figure 
constituting around 0.4% of the cases in which at least one violation has 
occurred. Further, only comparatively recently has the Court begun to engage 
significantly with the guarantee, for more than half of the Court’s judgments in 
which a violation of Article 9 has been established have only been delivered 
since 2009. It is not just the paucity of judgments in this area that is remarkable: 
judgments in which a violation of Article 9 has been established concern only 
16 of the 47 Member States of the Council of Europe, and moreover, only six 
of these States have had more than one adverse judgment made against them. 
Indeed, the preponderance of adverse judgments involving Article 9 - just over 
60% - concern only four countries.7 Religious tolerance – judged at least in 
relation to the number of judgments involving Article 9 – appears high. While 
religious pluralism seems a feature in most European States (or possibly 
reflective of an increasingly secular European society), these statistics do not 
tell the whole story, for many aspects of religious freedom have fallen to be 
considered under related Convention guarantees. Paradoxically, it may well be 
the absence of a significant body of Article 9 case law that has led to this 
situation. Were there to have been the opportunity for the Court to have 
considered more cases concerning interferences with manifestation of religious 
belief and at an earlier stage in the development of the Court’s jurisprudence, 
doubtless Article 9 would have been developed with greater vigour. Instead, 
case law under Article 8 and Articles 10 and 11 have filled the gap by expanding 
into the area of the exercise of religious freedom. It is not so much that these 
related guarantees have in time crowded out the ability of Article 9 to establish 
its own distinct presence, but rather it has been recognised that there may be real 
value in approaching challenges to State action (or inaction, where a positive 
obligation arises) through the prism of principles of general applicability rather 
than applying specific solutions in cases involving conscience and belief.  
 Article 9 provides that ‘manifestations’ of belief may take place in a range 
of circumstances: that is, in private while alone; in private with others; or in 
public, alone or with others. The textual formulation of Article 9 thus maps onto 
the essential elements of what it means to have a belief: we can hold (and revise 
our own) beliefs, we can express belief, and we can try to live our lives in 
accordance with our beliefs; we can attempt to try to change others’ beliefs 
through persuasion; we may gain succour and encouragement for our own 
                                                      
7 There were 13 adverse judgments in respect of Greece; 11 in respect of Turkey; 9 in respect 
of Russia; and 7 in respect of Bulgaria: European Court Annual Report 2016 (2017), p. 204-
205.  
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beliefs through shared deliberation, study and worship. These aspects of 
‘manifestations’ of belief are protected by Article 9. None is an absolute right, 
but as discussed, the rights to hold and to change belief appear to be so. 
However, these crucial aspects of what it means to hold religious belief, and to 
put religious faith or individual conscience into practice (in private or in public, 
alone or with others) can arguably equally be accommodated elsewhere. In 
particular, individual and collective manifestation could be disposed of in 
respect of Article 8’s respect for ‘private and family life’, Article 10 guarantees 
for free speech, or Article 11’s requirement of freedom assembly and 
association.  
 Before examining the extent to which this has occurred in actual judgments 
of the Strasbourg Court, it is necessary to note that the Court itself has observed 
that there is a close inter-relationship between Article 9 and Articles 10 and 11. 
These three provisions concern a range of civil and political rights that are linked 
not only in textual formulation but also in substantive content. They also serve 
to protect a series of related values. Freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion, freedom of expression, and freedom of assembly and association are 
viewed by the Strasbourg Court as inter-dependent and as crucial for the 
protection of democratic life. There is also a further dimension to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion: it is an integral aspect of personal autonomy, 
a matter also at the heart of Article 8’s requirement for protection of private and 
family life. In short, thought, conscience and belief are closely interconnected 
with the exercise of collective political discourse through expression and 
protest, and in turn, an individual’s ability to engage in meeting and measured 
deliberation may help shape personal attitude and belief, that is, individual self-
determination. 
 The links between Article 9 and these other provisions have been recognised 
at an early stage in the development of the Court’s jurisprudence,8 but also 
clearly pose a problem for the Strasbourg Court in that identification of the lex 
specialis has not always been straightforward on account of overlap in the scope 
of these complementary guarantees. The Court’s case law suggests there are 
three alternative approaches that are adopted. First, the Court may consider one 
provision (and not necessarily Article 9) as the lex specialis at the outset; 
secondly, it may dispose of a case by examining the facts under only one Article 
when it can be concluded that the merits of the application can be addressed 
adequately in this way (and thus while the case may be admissible under one or 
more additional Articles, the Court will simply conclude that there is no need to 
determine any additional merits);9 and thirdly, since the ECHR is to be read as 
                                                      
8 The question can be addressed through the link between Arts. 9-11 that was acknowledged 
in early jurisprudence: ECtHR 13 August 1981, 7601/76 & 7806/77, Young, James & 
Webster v. United Kingdom, para 57: ‘the protection of personal opinion afforded by Articles 
9 and 10 in the shape of freedom of thought, conscience and religion and of freedom of 
expression is also one of the purposes of freedom of association as guaranteed by Article 11’.  
9 ECtHR 13 July 2012, 16354/06, Mouvement raëlien suisse v. Switzerland [GC], paras 79-80 
(not necessary to consider religious advertisement under Art. 9). 
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a whole, the Court may read the substantive content of a particular guarantee ‘in 
the light of’ another provision.10 Each approach has its own advantages, but 
none of this is conducive to consistent jurisprudence. Further, it cannot be 
readily said that whichever approach is adopted is likely to have much impact 
upon the eventual conclusion. 
 Would anything more be achieved other than greater consistency in case law 
by jettisoning Article 9? The most obvious risk is that something could be lost, 
as this could undermine the supposedly-absolute nature of the forum internum, 
the only aspect of the scope of Articles 8-11 that appears absolute. While there 
is no explicit reference in the text to the prohibition of indoctrination or coercion 
to hold or to adopt a religion or belief (other than implicitly through the 
reference to the duty to take into account parental convictions in the provision 
of state education in Article 2 of Protocol no 1), requiring an individual to act 
against their conscience or beliefs does clearly fall within the scope of Article 
9, for protection of the forum internum is inextricably linked to the negative 
aspect of freedom to manifest one’s beliefs, that is, the individual’s right not to 
be obliged to manifest religious beliefs and not to be obliged to act in such a 
way as to enable conclusions to be drawn regarding whether an individual holds 
– or does not hold – such beliefs.11 In short, the State cannot require an 
individual to disclose personal beliefs, except perhaps in a highly restricted set 
of circumstances where access to a privilege (as opposed to a right) is being 
sought.12 Article 9 is thus of significance in defining this critical aspect of belief. 
                                                      
10 ECtHR 13 August 1981, 7601/76 & 7806/77, Young, James & Webster v. United Kingdom, 
para 66 (disposal under Art. 11 rather than in terms of Arts. 9 or 10); ECtHR 25 May 1993, 
14307/88, Kokkinakis v. Greece, para 54 (dissemination of religious beliefs considered under 
Art. 9 rather than Art. 10); ECtHR 10 June 2010, 302/02, Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow v 
Russia, paras 106–160 and 170–182 (violation of Art. 9 in the light of Art. 11; and violation 
of Art. 11 in the light of Art. 9).  
11 ECtHR 18 February 1999, 24645/94, Buscarini a.o. v. San Marino [GC], paras 34–41 at para 
39 (individuals who had been elected to parliament had been required to take a religious oath 
on the Bible (‘I swear on the Holy Gospels ever to be faithful to and obey the Constitution 
of the Republic.’) as a condition of their appointment to office: violation, the Court rejecting 
the argument that the form of words used was essentially of historical and social rather than 
religious significance and agreeing with the Commission that it ‘would be contradictory to 
make the exercise of a mandate intended to represent different views of society within 
Parliament subject to a prior declaration of commitment to a particular set of beliefs’); 
ECtHR 21 February 2008, 19516/06, Alexandridis v Greece, paras 35–41 (requirement for 
solemn declaration instead of oath involved an obligation to reveal in part religious beliefs, 
the procedure reflecting a presumption that lawyers were Orthodox Christians: the fact that 
the applicant had had to reveal to the court that he was not such constituted an interference 
with the freedom not to have to manifest his religious beliefs); and ECtHR 3 June 2010, 
42837/06, Dimitras a.o. v. Greece, paras 79–88 (requirement to disclose that an individual 
was not an Orthodox Christian and in certain cases was Jewish or an atheist to avoid having 
to take a religious oath in criminal proceedings: violation). 
12 ECtHR 13 April 2006, 55170/00, Kosteski v. FYRO Macedonia, paras 37–40 at para 39 
(penalisation for failing to attend the place of work on the day of a religious holiday: if this 
involved an interference with Art. 9, it was justified the applicant’s freedom of religion, this 
was not disproportionate, the Court observed that ‘while the notion of the State sitting in 
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Here, though, other alternative protection is arguably readily available. In 
particular, Article 8 now extends to issues concerning how individuals seek to 
live out their lives in accordance with personal beliefs in treating matters such 
as belief in assisted suicide as an aspect of personal autonomy falling within the 
ambit of Article 8.13 Approaching a case as a matter of ‘personal autonomy’ 
rather than ‘religious belief’ has also the advantage of effectively neutralising 
the need to investigate whether the claimed basis for the religious faith does 
indeed demand of adherents a particular course of action in respect of lifestyle 
choices and thus removing the risk that the forum internum may be invaded 
through invasive questioning.14 Belief, and the consequences of belief for any 
individual, may thus be better considered as issues of self-determination that 
constitute aspects of private life. Alternatively, even if Article 8 proves to be 
inadequate in this task, Article 10 could provide protection if there is an 
obligation to affirm to others a commitment to beliefs that are contrary to 
conscience.15 To be sure, Articles 8 and 10 lack the suggestion of absolute 
protection for the holding and changing of beliefs, a matter of some important 
symbolism, but it may be difficult to envisage circumstances in which the State 
could ever establish a compelling reason for requiring an individual to disclose 
their personal beliefs to others. It is also possible without too much conceptual 
difficulty to revisit early cases disposed of under Article 9 and to relocate the 
issues raised (for example, the imposition of religious oaths upon members of 
the legislature as a precondition for sitting in the legislature16 could now be 
examined under Article 3 of Protocol no 1, while a requirement to attend 
religious ceremonies could be considered under Article 1117).  
                                                      
judgment on the state of a citizen’s inner and personal beliefs is abhorrent and may smack 
unhappily of past infamous persecutions’, it had not been inappropriate for the authorities to 
seek to ascertain whether the applicant properly could take advantage of legislation allowing 
Muslims to take holiday on particular days as otherwise unauthorised absences could be 
treated as disciplinary matters). 
13 ECtHR 29 April 2002, 2346/02, Pretty v. United Kingdom, para 82. See also the Scottish 
domestic case of Whaley v. Lord Advocate 2008 SC (HL) 107 (Art. 9 not engaged by an 
interference with hunting). The refusal to recognise marriage with an underage girl as 
permitted by Islamic law was deemed not to involve an interference with manifestation of 
belief falling within the scope of Art. 9 but rather as a matter concerning the right to marry 
under Art. 12: ECtHR 1 July 1986, 11579/85, Khan v United Kingdom.  
14 ECtHR 29 June 2007, 15472/02, Folgerø a.o. v. Norway [GC], paras 85–102, where the 
Grand Chamber by a bare majority ruled that the introduction of new arrangements for the 
teaching of religion and philosophy in primary schools had failed to respect the rights of 
parents as required by Art. 2 of Prot. no 1.  
15 ECtHR 8 June 1999, 39511/98, McGuinness v. United Kingdom (dec), (elected 
representatives required to take an oath of allegiance to the monarch; application declared 
inadmissible under Art. 10 since the oath could be viewed simply as an affirmation of loyalty 
to the UK’s constitutional principles). 
16 ECtHR 18 February 1999, 24645/94, Buscarini a.o. v. San Marino [GC], para 34. 
17 ECtHR 18 December 1996, 21787/93, Valsamis v Greece, paras 21–37 (no interference with 
Art. 9 rights. See the dissenting opinion in the Commission of the President, Stefan Trechsel. 
 CHAPTER 8 BELIEF AND CONSCIENCE 
 
158 
 Relocation or relabelling cases involving interferences with religious 
practice by treating the religious element as merely incidental to the facts rather 
than as the primary determinant is even more straightforward where the facts 
suggest ‘manifestations’ of belief rather than disclosure of belief. The wearing 
of religious clothing in public18 could be treated as symbolic speech and 
disposed of under Article 10, and a similar approach could apply in relation to 
restrictions on proselytism.19 A requirement for the registration of religious faith 
in identity documents could be seen as constituting an interference with private 
life Article 8,20 as could the disposal of human remains constituting an integral 
aspect of religious practice (as already may occur where the question has arisen 
rather as a matter of family life).21 Collective manifestation of belief (where the 
tendency is currently to dispose of the issues under Article 9 read in conjunction 
with Article 1122 or - where the issue concerns refusal to re-register a religion - 
under Article 11 read in the light of Article 9)23 are readily matters that could be 
addressed solely by reference to Article 11.  
                                                      
18 ECtHR 23 February 2010, 41135/98, Ahmet Arslan a.o. v. Turkey, paras 44–52 (conviction 
for wearing religious clothing in public: violation). 
19 ECtHR 25 May 1993, 14307/88, Kokkinakis v Greece, paras 31–33. 
20 ECtHR 2 February 2010, 21924/05, Sinan Işik v. Turkey, paras 37–53 (identity cards carried 
a ‘religion’ data field but which could be left blank: violation, as a decision to have a card 
with the religion field left blank inevitably carried specific connotations). 
21 ECtHR 10 March 1981, 8741/79, X. v. Germany (com.), (but matter can fall within the scope 
of Art. 8); ECtHR 13 September 2005, 42639/04, Jones v United Kingdom (dec), (refusal to 
allow photograph on a memorial stone did not prevent manifestation of the applicant’s 
religious beliefs). ECtHR 10 July 2001, 41754/98, Johannische Kirche & Peters v. Germany 
(dec), (‘restriction of the right to manifest one’s religion …in so far as the manner of burying 
the dead and cemetery layout represents an essential aspect of the religious practice of the 
first applicant and its members’); ECtHR 6 November 2008, 38450/05, Sabanchiyeva a.o. v. 
Russia (dec), (refusal to return bodies of alleged terrorists killed by law-enforcement 
personnel: admissible under Arts. 3, 8 and 9, taken alone and in conjunction with Arts. 13 
and 14); and cf ECtHR 6 June 2013, 38450/05, Sabanchiyeva a.o. v. Russia (matter disposed 
of under Art. 8). 
22 ECtHR 12 June 2014, 33203/08, Biblical Centre of the Chuvash Republic v. Russia, para 54 
(a Pentecostal biblical centre was closed by judicial decision on health and safety grounds, 
unauthorised issuing of study diplomas and failure to obtain prior approval for its operation); 
ECtHR 10 June 2010, 302/02, Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow v Russia, paras 170–182 
(refusal to re-register a religious association and its dissolution without relevant and 
sufficient grounds as many court findings had not been substantiated and were not grounded 
on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts, or involved normal manifestations that 
were common to other religious practices and freely chosen by the adherents in the context 
of their personal autonomy; the grounds for the dissolution included alleged ‘brainwashing’, 
‘mind control’, undue influence on members’ families and upon minors, incitement to refusal 
to serve in the military or to participate in national celebrations, to suicide or to refusal of 
medical treatment). See also: ECtHR 14 June 2007, 77703/01, Svyato-Mykhaïlivska Parafiya 
v. Ukraine, paras 137-152 (refusal to grant the status of a legal entity to an association of 
religious believers: violation of Art. 9 in the light of Arts. 11 and 6).  
23 ECtHR 5 October 2006, 72881/01, Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, paras 
81–98; and Church of Scientology Moscow v Russia (5 April 2007), paras 94–98.  
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 The proposition is easier made in relation to particular aspects of the 
operation of religious organisations. Thus the deprivation of a religious 
organisation’s material resources, for example, has been held not to fall within 
the scope of Article 9, but rather to give rise to issues under the protection of 
property in terms of Article 1 of Protocol no 1,24 and imposition of burdens on 
owners of property to act in a manner inconsistent with freedom of conscience 
may likewise be disposed of under this alternative guarantee.25 Similarly, refusal 
to grant an individual an exemption from the payment of a church tax on the 
ground of non-registration was considered in terms of the right to property taken 
in conjunction with the prohibition on discrimination in the enjoyment of 
Convention guarantees rather than as a matter of conscience or religion.26 Fair 
hearing guarantees under Article 6 may also be of relevance in protecting the 
civil rights of a religious organisation in relation to property rights.27 In short, a 
wide range of issues closely associated with the practice of religious belief or 
conscience can also be (and already is) disposed of under other guarantees.28  
 The argument can also be advanced that the disposal of complaints alleging 
interferences under principles of general applicability is preferable to treating 
the case as calling for specific (or enhanced) protection for any religious 
dimension that happens to arise. There is still, however, the not inconsiderable 
risk that to do so further could weaken the normative impact of the principle 
that religious belief is a crucial value, or that personal autonomy arguments may 
be insufficiently compelling in particular instances, with the result that 
conscience and belief may be downgraded. However, application of Article 14 
which protects the enjoyment of the exercise of substantive Convention 
                                                      
24 ECtHR 9 December 1994, 13092/87, The Holy Monasteries v. Greece, paras 74–75 (Prot. 1, 
Art. 1), and cf paras 86–88 (no breach of Art. 9). But cf ECtHR 21 September 2010, 8916/05, 
Association of Jehovah’s Witnesses v. France (dec), (refusal to grant association of Jehovah’s 
Witnesses tax (exemption available to religious organisations following classification as a 
‘sect’ and resulting in €45 million tax liability: admissible under Art. 9). 
25 See also: ECtHR 26 June 20112, 9300/07, Herrmann v. Germany [GC], paras 81-94, 
(obligation imposed upon landowners opposed on ethical grounds to hunting to tolerate 
hunting on their property constituted a disproportionate burden: violation of Prot. 1, Art. 1). 
26 ECtHR 23 October 1990, 11581/85, Darby v Sweden, paras 30–34. 
27 ECtHR 19 November 2013, 26270/04, Bogdan Vodă Greek-Catholic Parish v. Romania, 
paras 42-50 (non-enforcement of final judgment in favour of religious organisation regarding 
use of church). 
28 Thus, freedom of conscience issues may also arise under Art. 3’s prohibition of inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment (ECtHR 24 January 2006, 39437/98, Ülke v. Turkey). 
Religious beliefs may also arise in the context of respect for family life in terms of Art. 8 in 
relation to deportation (ECtHR 28 February 2006, 27034/05, Z. & T. v. United Kingdom 
(dec), (Pakistani Christians facing deportation to Pakistan: while the Court would not rule 
out the possibility that exceptionally Art. 9 may be engaged in expulsion cases, it was 
difficult to envisage such circumstances which in any event would not engage Art. 3 
responsibility); see also: ECtHR 20 June 2002, 50963/99, Al-Nashif a.o. v. Bulgaria, 
(deportation on account of having taught Islamic religion without proper authorisation: in 
view of finding that deportation would constitute a violation of Art. 8, no need to consider 
Art. 9.). 
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guarantees from discrimination inter alia based upon religious discrimination 
may redress this. Discrimination upon religious grounds is not far removed from 
discrimination on grounds of race; both are considered by international 
standards as equally abhorrent.29 While Article 14 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights refers to discriminatory treatment in general and irrespective 
of the ground, the Strasbourg Court has identified a number of high-risk 
categories of discriminatory treatment (such as sex, sexual orientation and 
illegitimacy). To this list, discrimination on the grounds of race or ethnic origin 
has been added with the result that ‘very weighty reasons’ must be adduced by 
the State to justify this30. Indeed, where a non-discriminatory rule is applied in 
a discriminatory manner, there may indeed be no need on the part of an applicant 
to establish any intention to discriminate.31 The responsibility upon State bodies 
to avoid the imposition of discrimination on the basis of religious belief may 
indeed include the imposition of an obligation to treat differently persons whose 
situations are significantly different on the grounds of belief.32 Further, national 
authorities are under a duty to remain neutral when exercising any regulatory 
power in the sphere of religious freedom: the obligation to remain impartial in 
their relations with different religions, denominations and beliefs may also 
extend to situations not strictly falling within the scope of Article 9 but where 
the unequal treatment of religious faiths has arisen through the conferment of 
                                                      
29 The UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination 
Based on Religion or Belief (1981), Art. 3, thus considers that ‘discrimination between 
human beings on grounds of religion or belief constitutes an affront to human dignity and a 
disavowal of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations’. See also 1990 Document 
of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE which 
‘clearly and unequivocally condemns totalitarianism, racial and ethnic hatred, anti-Semitism, 
xenophobia and discrimination against anyone as well as persecution on religious and 
ideological grounds’.  
30 ECtHR 13 November 2007, 57325/00, DH and Others v. Czech Republic [GC], at para 196. 
31 ECtHR 13 November 2007, 57325/00, DH and Others v. Czech Republic [GC], at para 178: 
‘the level of persuasion necessary for reaching a particular conclusion and, in this connection, 
the distribution of the burden of proof are intrinsically linked to the specificity of the facts, 
the nature of the allegation made and the Convention right at stake’. See also at para 91: ‘a 
difference in treatment may take the form of disproportionately prejudicial effects of a 
general policy or measure which, although couched in neutral terms, discriminates against a 
group’. 
32 ECtHR 6 April 2000, 34369/97, Thlimmenos v. Greece [GC], paras 39–49 at para 47 (a 
person who had been refused admission as a chartered accountant because of a criminal 
conviction arising from his refusal to wear military uniform owing to his religious beliefs as 
a Jehovah’s Witness. While access to a profession is not covered by the ECHR, the complaint 
concerned the lack of distinction between convictions based upon religious beliefs and other 
convictions for criminal offences. In effect, the complaint alleged discrimination on the basis 
of the exercise of freedom of religion. While states could legitimately exclude certain classes 
of offenders from various professions, any conviction for refusing to wear military uniform 
on the basis of religious convictions could not suggest dishonesty or moral turpitude. The 
disqualification did not therefore have a legitimate objective, and was in the nature of an 
additional and disproportionate sanction). 
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certain rights upon some, but not all, religions33 (although a difference in 
treatment between religious groups on account of official recognition of a 
specific legal status resulting in the conferment of privileges is not in itself 
incompatible with the Convention as long as a framework establishing criteria 
for conferring legal personality is in place and also providing that each religious 
group has a fair opportunity to apply for this status).34 Application of Article 14 
in such instances has certainly taken place in conjunction with Article 9, 35 but 
again Article 14 could readily be employed in conjunction with related 
guarantees so as to provide protection for religious faith. This has already 
occurred, for example, in relation to employment cases,36 in child custody 
disputes in which religious faith has played a part in determinations,37 and in 
access to justice cases.38 Article 14 is readily-available to help address 
discriminatory treatment based on religious faith.  
                                                      
33 ECtHR 9 December 2010, 7798/08, Savez crkava ‘Riječ života’ a.o. v. Croatia, paras 55–59 
and 85– 93 (unequal allocation of criteria for rights to have religious marriages recognised 
as equal to those of civil marriages and to allow religious education in public schools: 
violation of Art. 14 in conjunction with Art. 9, for while these rights could not be derived 
from the ECHR, discriminatory measures were inappropriate). 
34 ECtHR 10 December 2009, 33001/03, Koppi v Austria, para 33; see also: ECtHR 31 July 
2008, 40825/98, Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas a.o. v. Austria, paras 87–99 
(substantial time taken to determine question of recognition of Jehovah’s Witnesses: 
violation of Art. 14 with Art. 9)). ECtHR 4 March 2014, 7552/09, The Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-Day Saints v. United Kingdom, paras 30–36 (refusal of a request for exemption 
from local rates as it was considered that Mormon temples did not qualify as ‘places of public 
religious worship’ since access was restricted to its most devout followers alone: no violation 
of Art. 14 in conjunction with Art. 9 as the measure was not disproportionate given that its 
other places of worship that were open to the public were exempted and the temples benefited 
from an 80% reduction, and in any case this legislative approach applied to all religious 
groups. 
35 In respect of exemption from military service for those discharging leadership 
responsibilities in a religious community: ECtHR 19 March 2009, 28648/03, Lang v Austria, 
paras 22–32 (failure to exempt a Jehovah’s Witness who served as an elder for his religious 
community through providing pastoral care and conducting religious services: violation of 
Art. 14 taken with Art. 9); or in respect of failure to recognise exemption from compulsory 
courses of education: ECtHR 15 June 2010, 7710/02, Grzelak v. Poland, paras 84–101 
(failure of education authorities to organise a class in ethics and to give a pupil a mark in his 
school report, leading to harassment and discrimination for not following religious education 
classes: violation of Art. 14 taken with Art. 9).  
36 In relation to dismissal from employment cf: ECtHR 20 May 1999, 25390/94, Rekvényi v. 
Hungary, paras 63–68 (no violation of Art. 14 taken with Arts. 10 or 11).  
37 ECtHR 23 June 1993, 12875/87, Hoffman v. Austria, paras 43–47 (the applicant had been 
denied custody of her child because of her involvement with the Jehovah’s Witnesses. The 
Court held that it was unacceptable for a domestic court to base a decision on the ground of 
a difference in religion. Although the point at issue was essentially one of religion, the Court 
considered it under Art. 14 in conjunction with Art. 8 as it concerned the determination of 
child custody, an aspect of family life. As it had already considered the matter under Arts. 8 
and 14, the Court held that there was no need to consider the point under Art. 9). 
38 In ECtHR 16 December 1997, 25528/94, Canea Catholic Church v. Greece, the Court had 
to consider a situation where the applicant church could not take legal proceedings in order 
to protect its property rights, although the Orthodox Church and the Jewish Community were 
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8.3 The proper ‘balancing of competing interests’ in cases 
involving a religious element 
Cases in which claims based upon religious belief conflict with other human 
rights guarantees are by no means frequent, but there are suggestions emerging 
from case law that a principle of general applicability should be applied in such 
instances rather than attempting to accord religious belief some exalted status. 
In Karaahmed v Bulgaria, for example, the Court examined the authorities’ 
reactions to violent anti-Muslim demonstration by a political party outside a 
mosque during a religious service. The judgment refers to ‘competing 
provisions’ (here, the rights to expression and to peaceful assembly on the one 
side and to freedom of religion on the other), but it is made clear that no one 
Convention guarantee takes precedent: rather, domestic authorities are expected 
to carry out an assessment based upon a sensitive awareness of the values and 
importance of each freedom. This is because ‘[t]he Convention does not 
establish any a priori hierarchy between these rights: as a matter of principle, 
they deserve equal respect.’39  
 The eventual outcome was never in doubt. The protest had taken place in an 
atmosphere of menace, and there had also been a positive obligation on the 
authorities to provide protection against demonstrators engaged in public 
disorder (in line with established jurisprudence concerning positive obligations 
on police officers in such circumstances). The expectation as to how the 
interests of the worshipers were to be weighed against those of the 
demonstrators was straightforward: balancing must take place ‘in a manner 
which recognises the importance of these rights in a society based on pluralism, 
tolerance and broad-mindedness.’  
 This idea is simply a variation of the ‘calculus of felicity’, and could be 
styled ‘pluralist utilitarianism’ – the greatest degree of tolerance and 
broadmindedness being proposed as the most appropriate means of adjudicating 
whether the interference was ‘necessary in a democratic society’. This approach 
has been recognised in other cases involving conflicting guarantees, and where 
the interests of a religious adherent conflict with the communal interest of 
society as a whole rather than with other groups of adherents. In Bayatan v 
Armenia, for example, a case recognising the right of exemption from military 
service on the basis of belief, the Court observed: 
The Court further reiterates that pluralism, tolerance and 
broadmindedness are hallmarks of a “democratic society”. 
                                                      
able to do so. The Court found that there could be no objective and reasonable justification 
for this discriminatory treatment and that there was a violation of Art. 14 taken in conjunction 
with Art. 6(1) (ECtHR 16 December 1997, 25528/94, Canea Catholic Church v. Greece, 
paras 44–47). 
39 ECtHR 24 February 2015, 30587/13, Karaahmed v. Bulgaria, paras 91-96 at para 92.  
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Although individual interests must on occasion be sub-
ordinated to those of a group, democracy does not simply 
mean that the views of a majority must always prevail: a 
balance must be achieved which ensures the fair and proper 
treatment of people from minorities and avoids any abuse of 
a dominant position (…). Thus, respect on the part of the 
State towards the beliefs of a minority religious group like 
the applicant’s by providing them with the opportunity to 
serve society as dictated by their conscience might, far from 
creating unjust inequalities or discrimination as claimed by 
the Government, rather ensure cohesive and stable 
pluralism and promote religious harmony and tolerance in 
society.40 
Other case law takes a similar approach, including situations in which the 
interests of counter-demonstrators motivated by religious faith (or at least, by 
religious leadership) have given way to the interests of those challenging 
orthodoxy in societal arrangements, an orthodoxy entrenched by intolerance of 
deviancy purporting to be based upon religious belief.41 A guiding principle thus 
emerges: follow the path of tolerance; maximise pluralism; apply the test of 
broadmindedness. This also applies where the message being challenged itself 
proclaims intolerance, whether the message is purportedly-religious or not. 
Religious intolerance may be attacked through freedom of expression; and 
freedom of manifestation of belief that involves undermining the values of 
pluralism and tolerance of others’ beliefs (whether religious or otherwise) may 
be subject to interference.  
 In any event, there is an important inbuilt restriction upon the scope of 
Article 9 protection, a restriction also applying under Article 2 of Protocol no 1 
in relation to the duty to take into account parental convictions in the education 
of children. Put simply, only thought, belief or philosophical convictions that 
are worthy of respect should attract protection.42 ‘Belief’ under Article 9 is much 
more than mere opinion, and beliefs must first ‘attain a certain level of cogency, 
seriousness, cohesion and importance’ and secondly also crucially be able to be 
considered compatible with respect for human dignity. Thus the essential scope 
of Article 9 is restricted to acceptable ‘belief’, that is, as tested against the 
somewhat nebulous test of being deemed worthy of protection in European 
                                                      
40 ECtHR 7 July 2011, 23459/03, Bayatyan v. Armenia [GC], at para 126. 
41 ECtHR 21 October 2010, 4916/07, Alekseyev v. Russia, paras 71–88 (repeated refusals to 
permit ‘gay pride’ parades on public order grounds following receipt of petitions opposing 
the marches and the making of statements by local officials indicating no such parade would 
ever be permitted: violation of Art. 11 on account of decisions based upon the basis of 
prevailing moral values of the majority and in the absence of measures to assess public safety 
risks or of the prosecution of those making threats of violence, the purpose of the parades 
being to promote respect for human rights). 
42 ECtHR 25 February 1982, 7511/76, Campbell & Cosans v. United Kingdom, para 36. 
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democratic society.43 This approach certainly rejects the more absolutist 
approach adopted in the USA under the First Amendment.44 Critically, it accepts 
that restrictions upon religious speech that are potentially harmful to society 
may be justified.45  
 There may be thus an occasional but inescapable need to examine matters of 
religious doctrine to judge the extent to which the particular belief sought to be 
advanced is worthy of support in a democratic society.46 But is this any more 
difficult than defining ‘religion’?47 Where there is a doubt, an applicant may be 
expected to attempt to establish that a particular ‘religion’ indeed exists,48 and 
while what may be considered mainstream religions and minority variants of 
such faiths are readily accepted as falling within the scope of the provision as 
are religious movements of recent origin,49 circumstances may exist in which it 
                                                      
43 This is taken from Prot. 1, Art. 2 case law: ECtHR 25 February 1982, 7511/76, Campbell & 
Cosans v. United Kingdom, para 36 (re Prot. 1 Art. 2); and ECtHR 7 July 2011, 23459/03, 
Bayatyan v. Armenia [GC], para 110; ECtHR 15 January 2013, 48420/10, Eweida a.o. v. 
United Kingdom, para 81 (re Art. 9). See too ECtHR 29 March 1993, 19459/92, F.P. v. 
Germany (com. dec.) (Art. 9 ‘is essentially destined to protect religions, or theories on 
philosophical or ideological universal values’); and ECtHR 31 July 2001, 41340/98, Refah 
Partisi (the Welfare Party) a.o. v. Turkey [GC] (prohibition on a political party which sought 
to introduce Islamic law contrary to the state’s secular constitution upheld, in part since the 
values of such a legal system were contrary to those of the Convention). 
44 Most obviously, and notoriously, illustrated in Snyder v. Phelps 562 US 443 (2011). 
concerning the activities of the so-called Westboro Baptist Church. Tolerance is a crucial 
aspect of the scope and values inherent in Art. 10: e.g. ECtHR 7 December 1976, 5493/72, 
Handyside v. United Kingdom, para 49 (expression was crucial for promotion of ‘pluralism, 
toleration and broadmindedness’). 
45 ECtHR 13 July 2012, 16354/06, Mouvement raëlien suisse v. Switzerland [GC], paras 52–
77, discussed at footnote 46. 
46 ECtHR 13 July 2012, 16354/06, Mouvement raëlien suisse v. Switzerland [GC], paras 52–77 
(no unconditional or unlimited right to the use of public space through advertising which, as 
commercial speech, is covered by a wide margin of appreciation sufficient to cover a range 
of interests including the protection of morals, traffic safety and preservation of the 
landscape; no violation, the association also being able to disseminate ideas through other 
means and the interference limited to public displays of posters). 
47 ECtHR 6 November 2008, 58911/00, Leela Förderkreis a.o. v. Germany, para 81 (Osha 
meditation centres, seminars, work projects, etc. for spiritual development and 
enlightenment), cf: Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick (2014), Law of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (3rd ed.), p. 593: ‘… any definition of “religion” would need to be flexible 
enough to satisfy a broad cross-section of world faiths, as well as sufficiently precise for 
practical application in specific cases. Such a balance would be practically impossible to 
strike.’ 
48 ECtHR 4 October 1977, 7291/75, X. v. United Kingdom, (question whether the Wicca 
movement qualified left open); and see also: ECtHR 14 July 1987, 12587/86, Chappell v. 
United Kingdom. 
49 ECtHR 8 March 1994, 20490/92, ISKCON a.o. v. United Kingdom (Krishna); ECtHR 2 
February 2010, 21924/05, Sinan Işýk v. Turkey, (Alevism). Druidism and its variants are also 
recognised: ECtHR 14 July 1987, 12587/86, Chappell v. United Kingdom; and cf: ECtHR 19 
October 1998, 31416/96, Pendragon v. United Kingdom (dec) (denial of access to 
Stonehenge for summer solstice celebrations: disposed of under Art. 11 read in light of Arts. 
9 and 10); ECtHR 27 June 2000, 27417/95, Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France [GC] 
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will be impossible to avoid adjudicating upon whether particular beliefs are 
central to a particular faith.50 This is so despite the recognition that it is ‘clearly 
not the Court’s task to decide in abstracto whether or not a body of beliefs and 
related practices constitutes a “religion”’.51 Judicial competence in theology is 
limited. But application of the ‘cogency of belief’ test is not always easy and 
also runs the risk of intruding into the forum internum. Restricting protected 
‘belief’ to ‘worthy’ belief also inevitably calls for a value-judgment. This may 
result in the Court appearing to condone views that may not be entirely 
compatible with tolerance. Thus sincerely-held views on marriage and 
sexuality, i.e. views that are increasingly out of kilter with more relaxed and 
broadminded societal attitudes and indeed with the Court’s own characterisation 
of discrimination based upon sexuality as a high-risk area, may nevertheless fall 
within the scope of Article 9.52 There is presumably no principled reason why 
naturism should also not qualify as a protected belief,53 since pacifism, atheism 
and veganism54 and a political ideology such as communism55 have been 
deemed to pass the test. Arguably, though, it is much better for the Court to try 
to avoid all such questions. It has indeed often attempted to do this, again by 
‘relocating’ issues through determination of an alternative lex specialis. Thus, 
interferences with thought and conscience in respect of political beliefs will 
normally be treated as giving rise to issues arising within the scope of Article 
10’s guarantee of freedom of expression or the right of association under Article 
11.56 This could be taken further by revisiting existing case law. Ensuring 
                                                      
(minority branch of Judaism); ECtHR 15 October 1981, 8652/79, X. v. Austria, (the Moon 
Sect); ECtHR 19 March 1981, 8118/77, Omkarananda and the Divine Light Zentrum v. 
Switzerland. See further: Gunn (2003), ‘The Complexity of Religion and the Definition of 
“Religion” in International Law’, 16 Harv Hum Rts Jo 189.  
50 ECtHR 31 January 2012, 35021/05, Kovaļkovs v Latvia (dec), (Hinduism). 
51 ECtHR 5 April 2007, 18147/02, Church of Scientology Moscow v. Russia, para 64; ECtHR 
1 October 2009, 76836/01, Kimlya a.o. v. Russia, paras 79–81 (domestic recognition of 
‘religious’ nature of activities, and thus Art. 9 applied). 
52 ECtHR 15 January 2013, 48420/10, Eweida a.o. v. United Kingdom, para 108. 
53 ECtHR 28 October 2014, 49327/11, Gough v. United Kingdom, (issue of convictions and 
sanctions imposed for public nudity disposed of under Arts. 8 and 10, but note. para 188: 
‘The applicant failed to make submissions as to the applicability of Article 9 to the case. On 
the basis of the material before it, the Court finds that he has not shown that his belief met 
the necessary requirements of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance to fall within 
the scope of Article 9 of the Convention’) 
54 ECtHR 16 May 1977, 7050/75, Arrowsmith v. United Kingdom, (pacifism); ECtHR 3 
December 1986, 10491/83, Angelini v. Sweden (atheism); 18187/91, ECtHR 10 February 
1993, 18187/91, W. v. United Kingdom, (dec), (veganism). 
55 562 US 443 (2011). 
56 ECtHR 11 October 1991, 16311/90, Hazar, Hazar & Acik v. Turkey, (offence of belonging 
to the Communist Party: admissible under ECHR, Art. 9). Cf Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick 
Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (1st edn, 1995) at p 357: ‘the line 
between a philosophy and a political programme may yet be hard to draw’. ECtHR 26 
September 1995, 17851/91, Vogt v. Germany. Cf: ECtHR 28 October 2014, 49327/11, 
Gough v. United Kingdom, paras 182-188) (not established that wish to walk naked in public 
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respect for a person’s sincerely-held views on the ‘sinful’ nature of homo-
sexuality that affect the discharge of employment responsibilities could be 
deemed an aspect of respect for private life under Article 8 and one calling for 
some reasonable accommodation where possible.57  
 Avoiding investigation of the content of beliefs is thus desirable: and it is 
invariably much easier to decide which set of competing interests promotes 
greater pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness. Discounting wherever 
possible the issue of religious faith also promotes neutral judicial deter-
minations. In Otto-Preminger-Institut v Austria, a seizure order had been made 
against a film that ridiculed particular beliefs of the Roman Catholic Church, 
the dominant religious faith. While accepting that those who manifest their 
religious convictions ‘must tolerate and accept the denial by others of their 
religious beliefs and even the propagation by others of doctrines hostile to their 
faith’, the Court considered that national authorities could consider it necessary 
to take action to protect believers against ‘provocative portrayals of objects of 
religious veneration’ where such constitute ‘malicious violation of the spirit of 
tolerance, which must also be a feature of democratic society’.58 There was no 
suggestion that outraged parishioners would engage in public disorder; rather, 
the Court’s judgment affirms the responsibilities associated with exercise of 
expression, not so much to cause offence but rather to prevent ridicule and 
promote hostile intolerance of others’ beliefs.59 The ‘pluralism-tolerance-
                                                      
on the basis of his belief that such behaviour was socially acceptable met cogency test; but 
issue determined under Arts. 8 and 10). 
57 ECtHR 15 January 2013, 48420/10, Eweida a.o. v. United Kingdom, para 188 (‘Given the 
importance in a democratic society of freedom of religion, the Court considers that, where 
an individual complains of a restriction on freedom of religion in the workplace, rather than 
holding that the possibility of changing job would negate any interference with the right, the 
better approach would be to weigh that possibility in the overall balance when considering 
whether or not the restriction was proportionate’, noting that this was the approach already 
adopted under Art. 8 or Art. 10 in case law.). 
58 ECtHR 20 September 1994, 13470/87, Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, para 47. A similar 
approach was adopted in: ECtHR 25 November 1996, 17419/90, Wingrove v. United 
Kingdom. See also: ECtHR 13 September 2005, 42571/98, I.A. v. Turkey, paras 21–32 
(prosecution for blasphemy for publication of work examining philosophical and theological 
issues: no violation).  
59 See: Martinez-Torron (2007), ‘Freedom of Expression versus Freedom of Religion in the 
European Court of Human Rights’, in: Sajo (ed), Censorial Sensitivities: Free Speech and 
Religion in a Fundamentalist World, p. 233–269; Temperman (2008), ‘Blasphemy, 
Defamation of Religions and Human Rights Law’, 26 NQHR 517; and Tulkens (2010), 
‘Conflicts between Fundamental Rights: Contrasting Views on Articles 9 and 10 of the 
ECHR’, in: Venice Commission, Science and Technique of Democracy 47: Blasphemy, 
Insult and Hatred: Finding Answers in a Democratic Society, p. 121–131. See also: 
Parliamentary Assembly Resolution Res 1510 (2006), prompted by the controversy 
surrounding the publication in Denmark of cartoons featuring the Prophet Mohammed (on 
which, see Boyle (2006), ‘The Danish Cartoons’, 24 NQHR 185; Nathwani ‘Religious 
Cartoons and Human Rights: a Critical Legal Analysis of the Case Law of the European 
Court of Human Rights on the Protection of Religious Feelings and its Implications in the 
Danish Affair concerning Cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad’ [2008] EHRLR 488; and 
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broadmindedness’ test is essentially neutral. It could help prevent domestic 
judicial bodies appearing to favour one religion (normally the dominant 
religion) over others, and the Strasbourg Court from erring.  
 For example, in Murphy v. Ireland, the refusal to allow the radio broadcast 
of a religious advertisement was challenged under both Article 9 and Article 10 
but disposed of by the Court under the latter guarantee as the interference was 
considered primarily to concern the regulation of the applicant’s means of 
expression and not manifestation of religious belief. This was not an 
inappropriate determination of the lex specialis. However, thereafter a wide 
margin of appreciation was recognised as the national authorities were seen as 
better placed than an international court to decide when action may be necessary 
to regulate freedom of expression in relation to matters liable to offend intimate 
personal convictions ‘since what is likely to cause substantial offence to persons 
of a particular religious persuasion will vary significantly from time to time and 
from place to place, especially in an era characterised by an ever growing array 
of faiths and denominations’. While this may be true, it does fail to recognise 
that the dominant religion has clearly been favoured to the detriment of another 
faith. The reasoning seems weak. Acceptance that the authorities had been 
justified in determining that the particular religious sensitivities in Irish society 
were such that the broadcasting of any religious advertising could cause offence 
was based upon the recognition by the domestic courts that religion had been a 
divisive issue in society, that Irish people holding religious beliefs tended to 
belong to one particular church, and that religious advertising from a different 
church might be considered offensive and open to the interpretation of 
proselytism. Certainly, it was of some relevance that the medium was broad-
casting, a means of communication which has ‘a more immediate, invasive and 
powerful impact’ than the press, the Court noting that the applicant could still 
have advertised via local and national newspapers and retained the same right 
as any other citizen to participate in programmes on religious matters, public 
meetings and other assemblies. This judgment hardly promotes the notion of 
pluralism and broadmindedness, and resentment on the part of television 
viewers is hardly the most compelling ground for interference with free speech 
even although an international judicial forum may feel that it should be 
particularly careful to refrain from interfering with domestic determinations on 
particularly sensitive issues.60  
 Is the suggested test sufficiently robust? The danger may be that merely 
offensive pro- or anti-religious speech may be banned. There arguably exists 
sufficient guidance in the jurisprudence to prevent such an outcome. Thus a 
sustained campaign of harassment by private individuals or organisations may 
                                                      
Cram ‘The Danish Cartoons, Offensive Expression, and Democratic Legitimacy’ in Hare and 
Weinstein (eds) Extreme Speech and Democracy (2009), pp 311–330). 
60 ECtHR 10 July 2003, 44179/98, Murphy v. Ireland, paras 73–82. See further: Geddis (2004), 
‘You Can’t Say “God” on Radio: Freedom of Expression, Religious Advertising and the 
Broadcast Media after Murphy v. Ireland’, EHRLR 181. 
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engage state responsibility,61 but on the other hand it is legitimate that 
individuals are free to criticise religious groups, particularly if the criticism 
concerns the potentially harmful nature of their activities, and when made in a 
political forum in which issues of public interest are expected to be debated 
openly.62 Furthermore, it is possible to be strongly critical of office-holders 
within a religious body without denigrating the content of the faith itself.63 This 
approach can justify the revision of judgments that appear to be out of kilter 
with the ‘maximising of pluralism and broadmindedness’ principle.  
 A ‘pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness’ approach to determining 
conflicts between believers and non-believers has much to commend it. For 
example, in Lautsi and Others v. Italy, the implicit message in the Grand 
Chamber’s judgment was that outsiders should respect the dominant historic 
tradition and religious adherence in a State. Tolerance is a two-way process. 
Here, the requirement for the presence of crucifixes in classrooms, while 
conferring upon the majority religion in Italy a ‘preponderant visibility’, could 
not in itself denote a process of indoctrination as a crucifix is an essentially 
passive symbol whose influence cannot be deemed comparable to that of 
didactic speech or participation in religious activities, particularly as the 
curriculum did not include any compulsory teaching about Christianity and as 
there were clear attempts to provide an understanding of other faiths and 
promote tolerance of others’ beliefs.64  
                                                      
61 ECtHR 7 October 2014, 28490/02, Begheluri v. Georgia, para 160, (state responsibility to 
ensure the peaceful enjoyment of Art. 9 rights engaged where religious beliefs are opposed 
or denied in a manner which inhibits those who hold such beliefs from exercising their 
freedom to hold or express them). 
62 ECtHR 27 February 2001, 26958/95, Jerusalem v. Austria, paras 38–47. See also: ECtHR 2 
May 2006, 50692/99, Aydın Tatlav v. Turkey, paras 21–31 (strong criticism of religion, but 
not an abusive attack on the Muslim faith). 
63 ECtHR 31 October 2006, 72208/01, Klein v. Slovakia (31 October 2006), paras 45–55 
(conviction of journalist for defamation of a Catholic archbishop, the highest representative 
of the Roman Catholic Church in Slovakia, and thereby also for having disparaged a group 
of citizens for their Catholic faith through publication of an article critical of the archbishop’s 
attempts to prevent the distribution of a film on the grounds of its blasphemous nature and 
strong imagery of sexual connotation and allusions to the archbishop’s alleged co-operation 
with the former communist regime: violation of Art. 10 since the strongly-worded pejorative 
opinion published in a weekly with rather limited circulation and which the archbishop had 
pardoned had related exclusively to the archbishop and had not unduly interfered with the 
right of believers to express and exercise their religion, nor had it denigrated the content of 
their religious faith). Measured discussion of historical opinion on a matter of public interest 
free from malicious attack on religious belief similarly attracts protection under Art. 10: 
ECtHR 31 January 2006, 64016/00, Giniewski v. France, paras 43–56 (conviction for 
defamation of Christians, and particularly Roman Catholics, for publication of an article 
critical of a papal encyclical and the Roman Catholic Church’s role in the Holocaust: 
violation, as the article was written by a journalist and historian and concerned a matter of 
indisputable public interest, and did not seek to attack religious belief as such but confined 
itself to addressing a Pope’s position). 
64 ECtHR 18 March 2011, 30814/06, Lautsi v. Italy [GC], paras 62–77 at para 71 (no violation 
of Prot. 1, Art. 2), and see further: Landau (2007), ‘Reflections on the Right to Education: 
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 Application of the ‘pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness’ principle is 
also possible in the workplace as illustrated by the related cases in Eweida and 
Others v. United Kingdom, two of which concerned dismissal from employment 
on the basis of refusal to carry out employment responsibilities on account of 
deeply-held personal religious beliefs concerning homosexuality, and a third the 
refusal of a private employer to allow religious symbols to be worn with 
uniform. The first case was examined in terms of Article 14 in conjunction with 
Article 9, the Court considering that the state’s margin of appreciation in 
determining the relative weight to be given to the authority’s interests (that is, 
the provision of a public service without discrimination) in relation to the 
applicant’s right to freedom of conscience and belief had not been exceeded. In 
the second case, the applicant had voluntarily enrolled in a training programme 
in psycho-sexual counselling in the knowledge that the private-sector employer 
had an equal opportunities policy, and while a decision to enter into an 
employment contract involving responsibilities in conflict with freedom to 
manifest religious belief was not determinative, this was certainly a matter to be 
taken into account.65 In the third case, the Court indeed emphasised that the 
positive obligation arising under Article 9 upon state authorities to take steps to 
ensure that religious belief is respected by private employers calls for reasonable 
accommodation for that belief, particularly when this was already available to 
                                                      
the European Perspective’, in: Kohen (ed), Promoting Justice, Human Rights and Conflict 
Resolution through International Law: Liber Amicorum Lucius Caflisch (2007), p. 281–305. 
See also: ECtHR 7 December 2010, 37616/02, Köse and Others v Turkey (dec), (foreseeable 
prohibition on wearing of headscarf had been proportionate in view of constitutional 
principle of secularism and state’s obligations to impart knowledge in an objective, critical 
and pluralist manner: inadmissible); ECtHR 6 October 2009, 45216/07, Appel-Irrgang a.o. 
v. Germany (dec), (compulsory ethics classes of a secular nature in schools contrary to 
religious beliefs of parents: inadmissible as the state’s margin of appreciation had not been 
exceeded); ECtHR 13 September 2011, 319/08, Dojan a.o. v. Germany (dec), (primary 
school compulsory sex education delivered through mandatory theatre workshops to raise 
awareness of sexual abuse of children was consonant with the principles of pluralism and 
objectivity in meeting a curriculum based on current scientific and educational standards, 
while attendance at carnival celebrations was not compulsory: inadmissible). Cf: ECtHR 11 
September 2006, 35504/03, Konrad v. Germany (dec), (denial of right of home education to 
Christian parents who objected to private or state schooling on account of sex education, 
study of fairy tales, and inter-pupil violence: inadmissible as parents may not refuse the right 
of education to children on the basis of their convictions, and the state’s assumption that 
schooling helped integrate children into society and gain social experience was compatible 
with the promotion of pluralism and fell within a state’s margin of appreciation); ECtHR 7 
December 2004, 50732/99, Ciftci v. Turkey (dec), (statutory restrictions upon enrolment in 
Koranic study classes: inadmissible as the restriction was intended to prevent possible 
indoctrination of minors by ensuring that children wishing to receive religious instruction in 
Koranic study classes had attained a certain maturity through completion of primary school 
education). 
65 ECtHR 15 January 2013, 48420/10, Eweida a.o. v. United Kingdom, paras 102–110. 
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those of other faiths.66 Live and let live is the clear message. It is an appropriate 
one in a multicultural society.  
8.4 Conclusion 
Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights ultimately seeks to help 
ensure that societal stability is enhanced through recognising the rights of 
individuals to be different in thought, conscience and belief. The Court’s 
jurisprudence acknowledges the principle that diversity matters, and thus there 
may well be a need for limits to freedom of speech and assembly, of religious 
belief, and of the exercise of personal autonomy.  
 However, it has been argued that Article 9 may be superfluous insofar as the 
essential elements of individual and collective manifestations of belief, and the 
holding and changing of belief, may be readily protected by treating the issues 
as falling within the scope of other Convention guarantees. The suggestion that 
Article 9 is not necessary to protect freedom of thought, conscience and belief 
in light of case law developments involving these related guarantees is also 
strengthened when Article 14 considerations are applied. The suggestion is that 
the specific reference to freedom of religious belief in Article 9 serves little 
actual purpose in a system of human rights protection that is highly-developed. 
There may additionally be advantages in not specifically applying Article 9 in 
cases in which competing interests must be balanced: that is, that discounting 
any element of the exercise of religious belief in favour of the application of the 
principle that cases are better determined by the simple question of which side 
better advances pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness. This may lead to 
more consistent jurisprudence and avoid the Court assessing the relative value 
of particular faiths.  
 From a secular standpoint, the real value of religious freedom is the extent 
to which that religion can promote a vital aspect of the self-autonomy of 
adherents (their relationship with their perceived creator) and the notion that 
this quest for self-autonomy calls for mutual tolerance of the rights of others to 
seek their own answers to this eternal issue, and of the rights of religious bodies 
to propose (rather than impose) alternative answers. Fresh voices, but voices 
that respect the inherent right of each individual to be different, to find his own 
answer to the meaning of life and to what extent a spiritual dimension is to be 
an integral aspect of that person’s mind and soul, constitute the essence of 
pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness. 
                                                      
66 ECtHR 15 January 2013, 48420/10, Eweida a.o. v. United Kingdom, paras 94-95, (in absence 
of ‘evidence of any real encroachment on the interests of others’, failure by the domestic 
authorities to protect the right to manifest religious belief, in breach of the positive obligation 
under Art. 9). 
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 Chapter 9 Immigration Law versus  
Religious Freedom Law 
Conflicts and solutions in comparative administrative 
law 
Roberto Scarciglia 
9.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss some of the legal problems related to the 
exercise of freedom of religion and immigration from a comparative law point 
of view. In particular, we consider the contribution of administrative law in 
solving (or complicating) some of these problems in some recent experiences of 
EU countries and the United States. From this point of view, some secondary 
sources can influence the relationships between immigration and administrative 
law, and, among these, there are the executive orders issued by US Presidents. 
The paper focuses specifically on legal issues related to the exercise of freedom 
of religion in places of immigration detention.1  
                                                      
1 On 25 January 2017, US President Trump issued an executive order, which suspended the 
US Refugee Admissions (USRAP) for 120 days (Executive Order No. 13767, Border 
Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements). It delayed the entry, regardless of 
valid non-diplomatic visas of people from seven predominantly Muslim countries: Iraq, Iran, 
Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen for 90 days. Finally, it also suspended the entry of 
refugees from Syria indefinitely (Executive Order No. 13769, 2017-02281, Protecting the 
Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, revoked by Executive Order No. 
13769 of March 6, 2017, on Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the 
United States). See also the Executive Order No. 13767, 2017-02095, Border Security and 
Immigration Enforcement Improvements. A federal judge in Brooklyn, Ann M. Donnelly, 
came first to the aid of scores of refugees and others trapped at airports across the United 
States after this executive order: see Sheare, M.D., Kulish, N., Feuer, A., Judge Blocks 
Trump Order on Refugees Amid Chaos and Outcry Worldwide, The New York Times, Jan. 
28, 2017. A federal judge in Seattle on February, 3rd, 2017, temporarily blocked President 
Trump’s week-old immigration order from being enforced nationwide, reopening America’s 
door to visa holders from seven predominantly Muslim countries and dealing the 
administration a humbling defeat. After many other decisions on airport arrest cases, the San 
Francisco-based 9th US Circuit Court of Appeals declined, on February, 9th, 2017 to block a 
lower-court ruling that suspended the ban and allowed previously barred travellers to enter 
the U.S. After some contrary decisions for Trump’s Administration by federal judges in 
Hawaii and Maryland and before U.S. appeals courts in Virginia and California, the Supreme 
Court puts off a final decision on Trump's new travel ban on September 25, 2017 (E.O. No. 
13769 of March 6, 2017):  
 <www.washingtonpost.com., September 12, 2017>. 
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As West & Sussman point out:2  
executive orders are most often used to establish agencies 
in the executive branch, to alter administrative rules or 
actions, to modify the decision-making process, or to flesh 
out and enforce laws.  
This presidential order contains some profiles of arbitrariness especially for the 
extension of the ban to those who are already in possession of a visa. 
 Concerning immigration law, there are different points of view from which 
we can analyse this issue. However, the question is which viewing angle has to 
be chosen. Can we consider immigration law independently from all other areas 
of law? Alternatively, is immigration law more porous, absorbing features of 
other closely related areas of law? The relationship with other fields of law, it 
may seem, is evident when you consider the many legal problems that the 
immigration issue involves: from constitutional to international law, from 
criminal to administrative law, to mention only a few. Many scholars have 
explored the intersections between these different fields of law. The objective 
of this chapter is to ask what role administrative law plays in the resolution of 
conflicts and solutions for integration between different cultures. Migrants are 
now ongoing at the intersection of problems and opportunities, at the centre of 
clashes and confrontations, between values, cultures, traditions and economies 
of the various human communities. Events related to pseudo-religious terrorism 
(i.e. Isis, Al-Qaeda, Boko Aram, etc.) have overshadowed the jurist’s reflections 
on the forms of integration between religions and cultures of migrants with the 
host communities or in transit to other countries. Religion is a fundamental 
component of human being.  
The centrality and power of religious beliefs for the indi-
vidual and for the state (that intends to maximize control 
over the person by controlling its belief system) explain why 
religious practices are endorsed by the state.3  
In this regard, legal scholars such as Werner Menski, Patrick Glenn and Andrew 
Huxley have contributed to the development of studies on the interaction 
between law and religion.4 Despite this renewed focus on the cultural traditions 
of immigrants, developed in university classrooms, the reality looks different, 
like many measures restricting the rights of immigrants, and adopted by some 
European governments tend to prove.  
 We start with the number of migrants arriving in Europe in 2016. According 
to the data provided by the Italian Interior Ministry, the number of migrants that 
landed in Europe in 2016 is impressive, and covers mainly three countries: Italy 
                                                      
2 West & Sussman 1999, 80. 
3  Sajó and Uitz 2012, 912 
4  Menski 2000 & 2006; Glenn 2000 & 2004; Huxley 2002. 
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(181,436), Greece (173,477), and Spain (6,826). In the first part of 2016, there 
were more than half a million non-EU asylum seekers – mainly Syrians, 
Afghans, and Iraqis – with 61% of the cases lodged in Germany; and Italy, with 
over 49 thousand requests, was in second place in Europe. These numbers 
highlight the drama of the problem, if we consider further that a global economic 
relationship can produce state policies that “directly violate social and labor 
rights and indirectly produce social conflicts that lead to state violations of 
human rights”.5  
 Many European countries have declared a state of emergency, such as 
France, Macedonia, Greece, Hungary, and Austria, adopting extraordinary 
measures to deal with migration and terrorism. These types of decisions can be 
contrary to EU legislation and establish principles regarding human and social 
rights and can strip individuals of their legal identity. There are many criticisms 
at international level, which call for a necessary revision of principles and rules 
with the aim of protecting migrants and other vulnerable populations.6  
 The Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben defines the critical nature of this 
concept of emergency in his famous book The State of Exception.7 It constitutes 
a “point of imbalance between public law and political fact”.8 There is no doubt 
that this state dimension describes the augmentation of government powers 
during these times when sovereignty is perceived to be under threat. In states of 
emergency, governments suspend elements of the legal order and strip 
individuals of the rights that mark politicized life: “a quality of human existence 
that goes beyond the ‘bare life’ of biological subsistence”.9 Taking up again 
Agamben’s considerations, we can share his idea that in the form of the state of 
exception:  
the status necessitatis appears as an ambiguous and 
uncertain zone in which de facto proceedings, which are in 
themselves extra- or anti-juridical, pass over into law, and 
juridical norms blur with mere fact–that is, a threshold 
where fact and law seem to become undecidable.  
According to Mathiot, in the state of necessity, the judges elaborate a positive 
law of crisis.10 However, governments and public administrations also tend to 
interpret the gaps in public law to resolve conflicts: in this case, between locals 
and migrants, new and old migrants, between public administration and 
migrants and for problems concerning religious freedom. Therefore, it creates a 
trilateral relationship between these three subjects that requires careful 
                                                      
5  Brisk 2002, 10. 
6  Ramji-Nogales 2014, 701. 
7  Agamben 2005, 1. 
8  Saint-Bonnet 2001, 28. 
9  Ellermann 2009, 1. 
10  Mathiot 1956, 424. 
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balancing. Plenary powers delegated to one of these can preclude any judicial 
scrutiny of immigration decisions affecting arriving immigrants. 
 These migrants engage in processes of globalization of their religious beliefs 
and practices. According to Plüss, “[m]igrants may use their religion not only 
as a means to adapt to new surroundings but also as a means to differentiate 
themselves from these surroundings through stressing what they understand to 
be ‘the essence’ of their religion”.11 Although not always related to religious 
freedom, we can see this attitude in many decisions of the European Courts. For 
example, when they examine cases in which migrants are sometimes in the 
hands of the administration, and their rights remain trapped in legal limbo.12  
 The same could be said for other non-European courts: when they judge such 
issues as clothing, food, sport, prison life or education, when an administrative 
decision-maker has violated a fundamental right, and a court must choose to 
apply the standards of constitutional law – such as a proportionality text – or the 
standards of administrative law, such as reasonableness. 
 Consequently, through the decisions of the constitutional/supreme and 
administrative courts, we can investigate the current role of administrative law, 
and whether the global emergencies, like the dramatic phenomenon of actual 
migrations, are transforming this field of law. This chapter proceeds as follows. 
I begin by briefly describing the intersection of immigration and administrative 
law, delving into the question, is “immigration law administrative law?” Then I 
discuss how administrative procedures can affect the religious freedom of 
migrants, and how the administrative courts review a public decision, which has 
violated a fundamental right of a migrant, applying the standards of admini-
strative law. Finally, I will describe the effects of a possible administrative 
characterization of freedom and due process for migrants. 
9.2 Intersection of immigration law and administrative law 
Some scholars argue that legal immigration problems, in essence, fall within 
administrative law. In the opinion of Jill Family, “[a]s a branch of administrative 
law, immigration law is about the direct regulation of human beings. In 
immigration law, administrative law doctrines are applied to determine some of 
the most fundamental and basic human concerns: where an individual will live 
and work, and whether that individual will live with family or will be separated 
from a spouse and children”.13  
 From this point of view, I would like to define the intersections of immi-
gration law and administrative law. The concept of intersection of sets can help 
clarify the relationship between these two fields of law. Let us take into 
                                                      
11  Plüss 2009, 494. 
12  See: Savino 2016; ECHR 1 September 2015, 16483/12, Khlaifia a.o. v. Italy; CJEU 7 June 
2016, C-47/15, Affum. 
13  Family 2015, 89. 
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consideration two sets: e.g. two different fields in a legal system, denoted as A 
and B. For example, we consider Immigration Law (A) and Administrative Law 
(B), e.g., with different rules:  
• those of field A {r, r1, r2, ···, rn} (which belong to set A), and  
• those of field B {x, x1, x2, ···, xn} (which belong to set B).  
 Suppose that:  
• (a) r, r1, r2, ···, rn ∈ A;  
• (b) r, r1, r2, ···, rn ∉ B;  
• (c) x, x1, x2, ···, xn ∈ σ B;  
• (d) x, x₁, x2, ···, xn ∉ A”.  
It is possible to identify one or more element in the two sets (e.g., a rule, a 
procedure, or a legal format, common to both sets), which could form part of an 
intersection between the two sets (I = A ∩ B), and may contain other elements 
common to A and B. Consequently, it seems necessary to identify those 
elements or components of A (immigration law) that may be part of the set B 
(administrative law). 
 The first of the elements is given by the sources of immigration law and the 
extent to which the sources coincide with administrative law. From a 
comparative point of view, we can examine some problems in immigration law 
related to the use of legislative and non-legislative rules, defining, at least in 
part, the essential content of immigration law as administrative law. From this 
point of view, it is not surprising that migrants most often are detained, during 
the verification of their identity, in migration centres, or prisons, and admini-
strative law rules predominantly govern them.14 This reflection postulates the 
existence of special administration supremacy exercising its power over 
recipient prisoners.15 Some legal scholars converge on this position when 
referring to “penal-administrative law” or “administrative penal law”.16 It 
allows state or administrative bodies to impose sanctions, which have the 
character of, or at least are similar to punishment and epitomizes penal 
regulations outside the penal code.17 In the following pages, I will try to provide 
some examples from the experience of the United States and France regarding 
the relationship between religion and detention in prisons or other similar 
places.  
 These examples may help to show that similar problems may find different 
solutions in Western legal systems. 
                                                      
14  Nespoli 1981 p. 35. 
15  Ranelletti 1911, p. 452. 
16  see Cassese, 2016, p. 13. 
17  Goldschmidt 1902, P. 71. 
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9.2.1  Legislative rules, immigration and administrative law 
In general, the sources of immigration law are based – as well as on 
constitutional, EU and international law – on primary and secondary domestic 
legislation. However, it may be that measures of administrative law may 
regulate – or at the same time deny – the concrete realization of a right 
recognized by hierarchically higher-level sources.  
 What do the national laws that deal with immigration contain? I will 
highlight a few examples of recent legislation which by varying degrees, has 
been affected by the climate that the terrorist attacks in Europe have produced.18 
The same also happened in the United States after the terrorist attack of 
September 11 on the Twin Towers. The federal government’s response to 
September 11 also demonstrates the close relationship between immigration law 
and civil rights in the United States. Non-citizens historically have been the 
most vulnerable to civil rights deprivations, in large part because the law 
permits, and perhaps even encourages, extreme governmental conduct with 
minimal protection for the rights of non-citizens.19 And, it is not accidental that 
Mr. Trump’s executive order No. 13769, 2017-02281, is entitled “Protecting 
the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States”. 
 The laws of the EU countries have different contents that cannot be analyzed 
in this chapter. Among the more recent ones, we can note the French law on 
rights and freedoms of aliens, published on March 7, 2016 (Loi relative au droit 
des étrangers). For some profiles, this law represents an important step in 
ensuring the rights of immigrants. Before examining some of its contents, we 
can consider that many parts of the measure, both on procedural grounds and 
through the courts, introduced or amended rules governed by administrative 
law. In this case, the intersection is very wide and demonstrates that both the 
administration and the government can increasingly turn to administrative law 
doctrines to shield their immigration decisions from judicial scrutiny.  
 On the other hand, the administration can choose to entrust to the judges the 
choice of detention or expulsion. For example, Article 33 of this law, concerning 
illegal immigrants, states:  
The alien may request the President of the French Admini-
strative Court to annul the obligation to leave the French 
territory.  
Article 33 thus removes the previous administrative detention during which the 
French prefect could decide to keep a clandestine in detention, while organizing 
his/her departure.  
 The new French law contains specific provisions relating to admission and 
residence of foreigners, on the issue of a multi-year residence permit, to illegal 
                                                      
18  E.g. Paris 1995, 2011 & 2015; Utøya, Norvay 2011; Tolosa 2012; London 2013; Bruxelles, 
2014. 
19  Akram & Johnson 2002, 1. 
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aliens, and administrative disputes – the administrative courts have extensive 
powers – in cases of applications for asylum. The application of this provision 
cannot be separated from the main sources of French administrative law.20 
Furthermore, before the entry into force of the law of 2016, the French 
administrative courts had enforced the Return Directive21 , in accordance with 
the principle of direct application of a European Directive where the same is 
compatible with the legal system by virtue of the particular binding force of the 
EU Treaty.  
The new law does not refer to freedom of religion. But it is still within 
administrative law that we can find a connecting element between the right to 
immigration and religious freedom. In French administrative law, the Code des 
relations entre le public et l’ administration, which came into force on January 
1, 2016, introduced significant changes that, to some extent, may affect the 
rights of immigrants, including those relating to the exercise of religious 
freedom.22 Article L100-2 expressly provides that: “[t]he administration acts in 
the public interest and respect for the principle of legality. It is bound by the 
obligation of neutrality and respect for the principle of secularism (French: 
laicité). It complies with the principle of equality and guarantees fair treatment.” 
If “secularism” is a general rule governing the action of public administration, 
it is necessary to identify the fields, and the limits, that the (administrative) 
judge attaches to this principle through legal interpretation. 
 It has been previously noted that immigration law is part of administrative 
law. Based on this consideration, all provisions relating to immigration – and 
the measures which dictate the public authorities in this matter – should be 
compatible with the laws on administrative procedure, unless the law provides 
otherwise. Similarly, the applicability of constitutional principles, whether 
about freedom and rights, or whether they relate to public administration cannot 
be ruled out. From this point of view, we refer primarily to the US experience 
with regard to its Administrative Procedure Act (APA), surrounding agency use 
of these rules through the perspective of immigration law, and also to the laws 
of these models - European and North-American - which are adopted in many 
countries of the world. 
                                                      
20  See the Code de l'entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile  
 <www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte =LEGITEXT000006070158>; the Law 
n° 79-587 du 11 juillet 1979 modifiée relative à la motivation des actes administratifs et à 
l'amélioration des relations entre l'administration et le public; the Law n° 91-647 du 10 
juillet 1991 relative à l’aide juridique; the Law n°2000-321, 12 April 2000, relative aux 
droits des citoyens dans leurs relations avec les administrations; the Code of administrative 
justice,  
 <www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte= LEGITEXT0000 31366350>. 
21  Directive 2008/115/EC of 16 December 2008. 
22  CAA de Bordeaux, 4ème chambre (formation à 3), 25/02/2016, 15BX02697 
<www.legifrance.gouv.fr>. 
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9.2.2  Non-legislative rules  
There are significant immigration law issues that are governed by non-
legislative rules. According to Family:  
studying immigration non-legislative rules exemplifies how 
general principles of administrative law manifest in 
immigration law. It also shows how attempts to reform the 
use of non-legislative rules in immigration law must take 
into consideration the challenges that all agencies face 
regarding notice-and-comment rulemaking and also must 
acknowledge a debate that is much larger than immigration 
law itself.23 
I refer to the role of federal administrative agencies in immigration decisions. 
We know that these agencies are not a part of the Legislative Branch and when 
the US Congress delegates power to agencies through a statute, this delegation 
includes the authority to create all kinds of rules, according to the 
Administrative Procedure Act.24 On this point, it must be said that distinguishing 
between no legislative and legislative rules is one of the most complex tasks in 
administrative law.25 It is difficult to decide whether an agency has properly 
used the policy statement or interpretive rule exemptions. In some cases, a 
plenary power delegated to agencies could preclude any judicial scrutiny of 
immigration decisions affecting arriving immigrants (Cox 2007, 1671). 
Confusion about the source of immigration power creates substantial 
uncertainty about the distribution of that authority between Congress and the 
executive. 
 Attention should also be paid to administrative circulars. In the course of its 
duties, the administration interprets statutes or regulations, which are imprecise 
or unclear. Administrative circulars are binding upon civil servants, but not 
upon citizens, and can create a parallel system of law. Administrative circulars 
often regulate immigration.26 In some cases, sources related to detention and 
repatriation are governed by a “dumb law”,27 as, for example, secret agreements 
governing simplified expulsion procedures followed by the Italian government 
and agreed with Tunisia.28 
                                                      
23  Family 2012, 566. 
24  APA, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (4) (2006). 
25  US Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, Am. Mining Cong v. Mine Safety & 
Health Administration, 995 F.2D 1106, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1993).  
26  Gjergji 2013. 
27  Sacco 2015. 
28  Savino 2015, 1. 
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9.2.3  The principle of secularism 
The relationship between the principle of secularism and the private beliefs of 
immigrants feeds a permanent debate in France on the limits that the same 
principle poses to freedom of religion. The sociologist Gunther Teubner coined 
the concept of “legal irritant” concerning the fact that “the result of 
transplantation can be anything” and, consequently, “we should not speak of a 
legal transplant but a legal irritant”.29 If we consider that in France, the vast 
majority of immigrants are Muslims, “[f]or many of them the confrontation with 
Western norms and lifestyles and the ensuing experience of the contingency of 
one’s beliefs and ways of life is deeply disturbing.” In many cases, Islamic 
communities in Europe or the USA “not only remain unaffected by Western 
modernization, but rather reject it explicitly, and draw the justification for this 
attitude from their religious beliefs. They are accustomed to a state that 
proclaims itself as an Islamic state, meaning that no clear distinction is made 
between religion, politics, and law”.30  
The interpretation of the principle of “secularism” – or “laïcité” in France – 
by judges and legal scholars can better explain these limits. 
We should point out that the principle of secularism emerged in the French legal 
system with precise characteristics more than a century ago. Although through 
the years it has undergone significant changes, secularism is still a legal and 
constitutional element that distinguishes French law from that of other European 
countries and the United States. Cox points out that “[t]he history of im-
migration jurisprudence is a history of obsession with judicial deference. The 
foundational doctrine of constitutional immigration law—the ‘plenary power’ 
doctrine—is centrally concerned with such deference”.31 From this point of 
view, immigration law has long been concerned with separation of powers 
problems, and this doctrine requires that courts give great deference to political 
branch decisions about immigration policy and enforcement. 
In France, the Council of State defends the principle of “laïcité” (or secu-
larism). It states, “Freedom of expression, guaranteed by Constitution, cannot 
allow them to wear signs of religious affiliation. It would constitute an act of 
pressure, provocation, proselytism or propaganda, on other public service users, 
disrupt teaching activities, or disturb the order in the establishment or the proper 
functioning of the administrative action. The reason is clear, whereas, in the 
same way, the wearing of certain religious symbols may be legally prohibited 
for the sake of security.32 However, this principle requires equality of all citizens 
before the law, without distinction as to religion and the respect for all beliefs. 
This same principle requires that the Republic guarantees the free exercise of 
worship; whereas, accordingly, the possibility of derogating from the obligation 
                                                      
29  Teubner 1998, 61. 
30  Grimm 2009, 2370. 
31  Cox 2008, 1671. 
32  CAA de Paris, 6ème chambre 6/12/2016, 15PA03527 <arianeinternet.conseil-etat.fr>. 
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of stunning for the practice of ritual slaughter does not infringe the principle of 
secularism”.33  
The French Council of State defines the limits of the principle, specifically 
concerning detention in prison, and later briefly reviews the US Court decisions. 
The Court states that the administration must “respect the right of any person to 
continue when imprisoned, for the exercise of the religion of their choice, must 
give accreditation to a sufficient number of chaplains, as soon as such request 
is formulated.” The only conditions are the presence of security requirements 
and the need to preserve the good order of the prison. Moreover, “whereas it 
must likewise, to the extent the premises permit and only limited for reasons of 
good order and security, allow the organization of worship in the institutions; 
whereas the facilitation alone of ordinary law visits of representatives of the 
religion cannot meet these obligations.”34 
9.3 Religious freedom and administrative procedure 
Classically, administrative decision-makers need only strike a proportionate 
balance between constitutional values and statutory objectives, a flexible, non-
formalistic analysis. Still, if there are global factors – such as e.g. war, terrorism, 
and immigration – these create complex problems for national governments.  
 As has been pointed out by some scholars, no one is directly suggesting 
repeal of Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
or the guarantees of religious freedom in most constitutions. Rather, there is a 
tipping point phenomenon and a pattern of erosion by exceptions. These 
derogations are in the name of other rights and other state interests, of trans-
formed equality norms, or deriving from a lost perspective on the importance of 
freedom of religion.35  
 A striking feature of the crisis is its incremental character in public behaviour 
and decisions on the issues relating to immigrants. From this point of view, these 
decisions could be “arbitrary, unreasoned, irrational, inconsistent and unin-
formed” (Cox 2007, 1680) derogating from existing administrative procedures 
and statutory due process protection. Among the vices of an administrative act, 
we can include the violation of principles, e.g. reasonableness, proportionality 
or the duty to give reasons. For example, in remembering the tragic historical 
episodes of mass deportation for religious reasons, we must ensure that the 
prohibition of the collective expulsions of migrants is interpreted strictly.  
 The ratio of the ban is to protect foreigners belonging to a religious group 
from arbitrary use of the administrative power of expulsion. The prohibition of 
collective expulsion becomes an enhancement tool for due process, through the 
                                                      
33 Conseil d’État, Appeal n. 361441, reading of 5 July 2013 <arianeinternet.conseil-etat.fr>. 
34  Conseil d’État, Appeal nn. 351115, 351116, 351152, 351153, 351220, 354484, 354485, 
354507, 354508, reading of 16 October 2013, at http://arianeinternet.conseil-etat.fr. 
35  See Cole Durham 2011, 1. 
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application of the adversarial principle and the duty to give reasons. The 
immigration field lends itself to simplifying and introducing faster procedures 
for economic reasons, contravening these canons. The identification of migrants 
is not sufficient to ensure compliance with the principle of due process, without 
participation in the administrative procedure and a particular reason to justify 
repatriation. 
9.4 Conflicts and solutions: the role of administrative law 
The previous observations highlight some of the problems related to the 
religious freedom of migrants and conflicts with the administrative authorities, 
which often violate fundamental rights through acts not corresponding to the 
normal dynamics of the administrative procedure. The plenary powers 
sometimes attributed to the administration for exceptional situations or the need 
to guarantee security – or the absence of appeal rules – produce criticism of the 
rejection of immigrants at sea or unjustified time limits. 
 In my opinion, domestic legislation and EU regulatory measures should 
develop common principles of immigration law, reconciling them with the 
general discipline of administrative law. In particular, the laws on administrative 
procedure should allow administrative discretion and not just impose binding 
acts that do not allow adequate participation in these proceedings. From this 
point of view, comparative law can play an especially, important, role. 
The provisions related to religious freedom in detention centres constitute a test 
for administrative law. As we have noted, identification, first reception, 
detention centres, and prisons characterize the lives of migrants. How should 
courts review administrative decisions in violation of this fundamental right? 
9.4.1 Religious Freedom in Detention Centres 
One of the most important issues affecting the lives of migrants is their 
detention. From the start, their journey means being locked up in cramped 
spaces, both on land and at sea, the inability to maintain good personal hygiene 
and often existing in inhuman conditions, which, in many cases, lead to their 
death. These tragedies are there for all to see. Even if they manage to reach a 
ship, or to cross a frontier, there are forms of confinement in detention centres 
or internment in prison. 
In most European countries, the custody of migrants for migration related 
reasons is defined as “administrative detention”. It is a measure that does not 
formally constitute a punishment and does not require conviction of a crime.36 
Nevertheless, although many scholars use the term “administrative detention” 
to designate incarceration for the purpose of immigration control, in many 
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member states the precise boundary between detention as an administrative or 
penal measure is not so clear cut.  
That is partly due to the interaction between criminal proceedings on the one 
hand and administrative procedures governing detention and expulsion on the 
other. In addition, some member states do not make a clear distinction between 
those detention facilities that form part of the penal system and those that are 
reserved for individuals falling within immigration proceedings. Thus, where 
individual member states, such as the UK, restrict immigrant freedom to “deten-
tion and removal centres”, in other countries including France, Germany, and 
Greece, migrants are regularly incarcerated in penitentiary institutions, prisons 
and police custody.37  
 What is the guarantee that religious freedom is respected in places of 
detention? How can a prison administrator or a judge determine the balance 
between the principle of security of the state and religious freedom? Above all, 
how is it possible without denying this second principle? When a subject is in a 
limiting legal situation or is deprived of liberty, he or she is often the recipient 
of administrative measures which are broadly discretionary. Against these 
measures, he or she can only access national or supranational courts, as happens 
with the European courts.  
Firstly, I will try to focus on a few but significant cases decided by the US 
courts. In Holt v. Hobbs, a prisoner (Holt) motivated by his Muslim faith 
requested an exception to the Director of the Arkansas Department of 
Correction (Hobbs) prohibiting inmates from growing beards, except for 
quarter-inch beards for approved dermatological reasons. After refusal by the 
prison administration, Holt appealed to the federal district court, and the warden 
of Holt’s prison claimed that prisoners could use a short beard to introduce 
contraband into prisons and possibly avoid identification if they escaped, by 
shaving off the beard. The district judge and the US Court for the Eighth Circuit 
had upheld the claim by the prison authorities that in this case the need for 
security prevailed, rather than the exercise of religious freedom. The US 
Supreme Court had jurisdiction over the matter and to decide the case in the 
light of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) 
governing the exercise of religious freedom of people held in public institu-
tions.38  
 Holt came before the Supreme Court in a time of increasing interest in the 
Muslim prison population. As some scholars had argued, “[t]he ‘War on Terror’ 
has converted American prisons into battlegrounds, pitting prison officials 
against ‘radical Islam’” (Beydoun). On January 20, 2015, the United States 
Supreme Court ruled that the Arkansas Department of Correction’s grooming 
policy restricting a Muslim inmate from growing a half-inch beard violated the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act.39 In many cases, the 
                                                      
37  Cornelisse, 2010. 
38  Public Law 106-274 (2000). 
39  Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 1 (2015). 
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courts believed prison administration to be beyond their jurisdiction, and thus, 
seldom questioned let alone overruled the administrative decisions of prison 
officials.  
 However, these precedents reproduce the issue of whether in cases involving 
religious freedom – the Free Exercise Clause – the judges must apply the strict 
scrutiny test, or the principle in the case of Division v. Smith, according to which 
no one can be exempted from general laws even for religious reasons.40 These 
different approaches are present in several decisions but always relate to 
freedom of religion.41 
In O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz42, the US Supreme Court, confirming the 
parameters of the previous decision in Turner v. Safley43, defined the conditions 
that the prison administration had to respect in its decision to avoid violating the 
rights guaranteed under the US Constitution (Turner factors). The Court 
established four factors:  
(1) Whether there is a rational connection between the prison regulation 
and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it; 
(2)  Whether an alternative means of exercising the right exists in spite of 
what the prison has done; 
(3) Whether striking down the prison action would have a significant 
ripple effect on fellow inmates or staff; 
(4) Whether there are alternatives available to the prison, or whether the 
regulation appears instead to be ‘exaggerated response’ to the problem 
it is intended to address. 
These administrative rules produced the effect of denying a prisoner of the 
Muslim faith (Shabazz) amendment of the prison regulations to enable him to 
observe Jumu’ah Friday prayer. The Court also took a restrictive approach in 
Thornburgh v. Abbott by excluding publications mailed to inmates that were 
considered “detrimental to the security, good order, or discipline of the 
institution or [that] might facilitate criminal activity”.44 Nevertheless, the 1993 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act placed a new burden on correctional 
institutions.45 In particular, the RLUIPA establishes the illegitimacy of admini-
strative measures that produce a “substantial burden”, and that is, a severe 
limitation to exercising religious freedom if the limit is not motivated by an 
overriding public interest (compelling governmental interest) and there is 
another less detrimental way to satisfy this interest. One could cite many 
judgments by US courts in which a kind of metus is still visible against the 
prison authorities, although in many ways the prison is the acid test of 
administrative law that deals with the rights of immigrants and their integration. 
                                                      
40 Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
41  Blischak 1988, p. 456 
42 O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 494 U.S. 342 (1990). 
43 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) 
44 Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989). 
45 Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (November 16, 1993). 
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 The most recent cases oscillate between these two positions (strict scrutiny 
test and Turner factors). On the one hand, it recognizes that Islamic prisoners 
are entitled to wear the kufi and let their beards grow, subject to the exercise of 
religious freedom, although Texas penitentiary regulations prohibit this.46 On 
the other hand, they have been denied the right to smoke a pipe during their 
religious ceremonies or to let their hair grow.47  
 Also with regard to respect for Ramadan, it was decided that a Muslim 
prisoner was entitled to receive the evening meal after sunset, since a prison 
administration's refusal would oblige him to dine before sunset, thus violating 
his religious precepts.48 Again, a Muslim prisoner had the right to abstain from 
working in the prison kitchen whenever they prepared or cooked pork chops.49 
9.5 Conclusions: Towards the administrativization of 
freedom and due process for migrants?  
In concluding this chapter, I will try to answer some of the questions previously 
raised. One of the main issues indicated is that immigration law is part of 
administrative law. That is the conclusion reached by some legal scholars, both 
European and American, whereby most of the immigration rules are covered by 
administrative law. Principles, procedures, and administrative justice form the 
backbone, as the experiences of European countries and the United States 
indicate. On the theoretical level, the framework provided by constitutional law, 
and international conventions on human rights, in addition to these penalty 
provisions falling under penal discipline, appears in the background. 
 Administrations have increasingly turned to administrative law doctrines to 
shield its immigration decisions from judicial scrutiny. Trump’s executive order 
for an immigration ban – which does not spare the elderly, children, religious 
Christians, scientists, students, entrepreneurs – leads us to reflect on the exercise 
of discretion at the highest level of the administration, which, without respect 
for the Constitution, could have unpredictable side effects. On the European 
side, on the contrary, the idea that European administrative law is developing, 
in the light of the basic constitutional principles of the European Union, 
postulates behaviour opposite to the American model: exclusion v. integration. 
Thereby it can mitigate religious conflicts and create an atmosphere of mutual 
consideration. However, balancing does not save the legislator or the judge from 
deciding which right or interest shall ultimately prevail in which situation.  
                                                      
46 US District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Rasheed Ali v. Stephens, No. 14-41165 
(May 2, 2016). 
47 US Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit, Davis Goodman v. Davis, No. 14-40339 (June 14, 2016). 
48 US Court of Appeals, 2th Circuit, Williams v. Correctional Officers, No. 15-692 (May 16, 
2016). 
49  US District Court, Arkansas, Eastern Division, Bragg v. Smith, No. 2-16CV00022 (May 18, 
2016). 
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 This means that religious freedom may be on the losing side regardless of 
the importance of a religious requirement for the believer. There are situations 
in which the only alternatives are adapting to the secular norm, or emigration.50 
As demonstrated, however, recent political choices (e.g. the United States, 
Hungary) on the balance between the rights of immigrants and the exercise of 
religious freedom is increasingly in the hands of the judges, who will be called 
upon – as demonstrated by the case of Trump’s executive order – to intervene 
with emergency measures. 
 With regard to comparative law, we can say that the right to immigration can 
be, in large part, framed within a particular part of administrative law. However, 
one of the principles and procedures that underlie a common core can be found 
– in the present historical moment characterized by Trump’s executive orders – 
by comparing the experiences of European Union states. Principles, 
administrative procedures and appeal procedures can, in fact, find a common 
basis for general measures on immigration binding on the EU member states. If 
one thinks about American executive orders, one can also share the view that 
administrative law is currently regarded as a tool, which is not an instrument of 
the government, to protect people from the government’s actions.51 
 If administrative law has its prerequisites in the Constitution, the same 
cannot always be said for government measures. Immigration has always been 
an asset to the regions and receiving states. Religion has often provided the 
spiritual resources necessary for emigration and resistance in the face of 
adversity, and the dramatic and inhuman hardships endured by migrants. 
Respect for religious freedom makes the integration and coexistence of different 
cultural traditions stronger and lasting. The dialogue between courts in different 
countries can implement forms of integration based on these values. These 
courts can play a strategic role - at least in Europe - to promote social and 
institutional changes in migration policies.  
 Comparative law can show that a common faith in law among different 
cultures constitutes:  
an essential element of a world civil religion. […] It offers 
hope for establishing world channels of cooperation and 
resolving world conflicts when less formal and more 
amicable means fail.52 
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Chapter 10 Christian Perspectives and Practices 
on Refugee Protection 
Amaya Valcarcel 
10.1 Introduction 
At this moment in human history, marked by great 
movements of migration, identity is not a secondary issue. 
Those who migrate are forced to change some of their most 
distinctive characteristics and, whether they like or not, 
even those who welcome them are also forced to change. 
How can we experience these changes not as obstacles to 
genuine development, but rather as opportunities for 
genuine human, social and spiritual growth, a growth which 
respects and promotes those values which make us ever 
more humane and help us to live a balanced relationship 
with God, others and creation?1 
This chapter strives to answer the above question by looking through the lens of 
those who have been hosted as forcibly displaced persons and of those who have 
hosted them, as well as from the perspective of those who bring communities 
together and jointly advocate on behalf of forced migrants. Particular reference 
is made to faith-based motivations and aspirations from both the host and the 
person hosted. 
10.2 Our world today 
War and persecution have driven more people from their homes than at any time 
since World War II, with over 65 million forcibly displaced persons worldwide, 
including 40 million internally displaced persons, 21 million refugees, and 3 
million asylum-seekers. Children represent a disproportionate number of dis-
placed persons, accounting for nearly half of the displaced population, amoun-
ting to 28 million children in total. An additional 20 million child migrants have 
fled their homes for a variety of reasons including extreme poverty or gang 
violence. In 2016, around 45 per cent of all child refugees under UNHCR 
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protection came from Syria and Afghanistan, where child exploitation is 
endemic, but there are thousands of other displaced children at risk of human 
rights abuses throughout the world (UNHCR, 2015). Globally, children on the 
move are at risk of forced military recruitment in Eritrea, of sexual abuse in 
Democratic Republic of Congo, of human or organ trafficking in Sudan or of 
exploitative labour in Lebanon. 
 There are also 10 million stateless people who have been denied a nationality 
and access to basic rights such as education, healthcare, employment and 
freedom of movement. In our world, nearly 34,000 people are forcibly displaced 
every day as a result of conflict or persecution.2 While for some migration is a 
positive experience, it is increasingly clear that a lack of human rights-based 
systems of migration governance at all levels (global, regional and national) is 
creating a human rights crisis for migrants. Millions of migrants and refugees 
are being deprived of their basic rights, and the world is depriving itself of the 
full benefits of what refugees and migrants have to offer.  
 Since the end of the 19th century we have seen more and more deterrent 
systems for migrants and the externalisation of borders. The complex 
interrelationship between migration and human rights – including the right to 
freedom of religion – is multifaceted, and found at all stages in the migratory 
cycle: in the country of origin, during transit, and in the country of destination. 
The criminal profits of the arms and ammunition industry, of human trafficking 
and smuggling, and political and judicial discrimination against migrants, are 
amongst the greatest evils of our contemporary world. More than one million 
refugees arrived in Europe on smuggler boats in 2016, a fourfold increase from 
2015, and record numbers also applied for asylum.3 Yet, around 86 per cent of 
the world’s refugees are hosted in developing countries. Eight countries host 
more than half the world’s refugees and they are struggling to meet the 
challenge.  
10.3 The contribution from Catholic Social Teaching to 
widen refugee protection  
The starting point of Catholic reflection on any social issue, whether it concerns 
security, the economy, governance, work and pay, or politics, is that it is about 
human beings. We need to begin our reflection by focusing on the human beings 
affected, not on abstractions about the economy or security.  
 The first, and core principle, which is grounded not only in Christian faith 
but also in many other religious and philosophical traditions, is that each human 
being is of unique value and is precious. Catholics ground that value in the fact 
that God loves each of us personally and infinitely. Because each human being 
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is of unique value, no one may be treated as an object or as a means to some 
larger end.  
 People who flee from persecution and cannot return to their homeland must 
have many needs met if they are to live with dignity. They need, for example, 
food, shelter, medical care, freedom of association, access to education and the 
possibility to begin a life’s project through work and assured residence. These 
things, denied in their place of origin, flesh out the meaning of protection.  
 The central question to ask is whether we have a moral responsibility to offer 
protection to people who ask it of us.  If we accept the premise that all human 
beings are mutually responsible for one another, especially for those in most 
need, the prima facie conclusion is that we are indeed responsible for them and 
are held to treat them with respect for their human dignity.  
 This conclusion presupposes that societies and governments have the same 
obligations to strangers in need as do individuals.  In the Catholic understanding, 
the State is an expression of the solidarity of citizens with one another. It is 
responsible for so organizing society that it cares for the flourishing of all 
citizens, particularly the most marginalized, when other groups are incapable of 
doing so.  
10.4 Who is a refugee? The definition according to 
International Law and the Catholic definition of a 
refugee 
10.4.1 The 1951 Refugee Convention 
Refugees have always existed, but the right to asylum and the legal category of 
‘refugee’ was set out by the United Nations in its 1951 Convention and was 
originally bound in time and space, as it was created to address the plight of 
Holocaust victims, other refugees from the Second World War and new refugees 
from Central and Eastern Europe who faced discriminatory persecution by their 
own governments. The 1951 Convention defines a refugee as someone who has 
been persecuted, or has a reasonable fear of persecution, because of race, 
religion, ethnicity, membership in a particular social group or political views.  
 Though narrow in its scope, the Convention arose out of a much broader 
recognition that where States are unable to offer de facto or de jure protection 
to their citizens, the international community has an obligation to offer 
protection. But in practice, the definition does not capture the totality of 
circumstances under which people are forced to cross an international border 
and are unable to return as a result of an existential threat faced at home.  
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10.4.2 People the Convention fails to protect. De facto refugees and the 
response of the Catholic Church 
Increasingly, large numbers of people are leaving their country of origin for 
reasons that fall neither within the 1951 Convention definition nor within the 
category of voluntary, economic migrant. The International Federation of the 
Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) has made reference to people 
moving as a result of severe economic and social distress. The combination of 
livelihood collapse, environmental disaster, and State failure increasingly 
contributes to non-refugees leaving their country of origin. 
 Even the wider definition set in the 1969 Convention governing the specific 
aspects of refugee problems in Africa by the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU) needs to be revisited almost 50 years after its coming into force. That 
the Convention was not perfect and that it had its shortcomings must have been 
quite clear at the time of its adoption. Even so, it has not undergone any 
amendment and remains the same document that it was in 1969 even if the times 
have changed considerably and there have been calls for its review for some 
time.4 The same has happened with the 1984 and Cartagena Declaration on 
Refugees, with a Latin American scope.  
 In 1992, the Catholic Church expanded its understanding of the term 
'refugee' to include 'de facto refugees', encompassing victims of armed conflicts, 
erroneous economic policy or natural disasters, as well as internally displaced 
persons.5 The Vatican document “Refugees: A Challenge to Solidarity” offered 
a new definition of refugee: 
In the categories of the International Convention are not 
included the victims of armed conflicts, erroneous economic 
policy or natural disasters. For humanitarian reasons, there 
is today a growing tendency to recognize such people as de 
facto refugees, given the involuntary nature of their 
migration. In the case of the so-called economic migrants, 
justice and equity demand that appropriate distinctions be 
made.  Those who flee economic conditions that threaten 
their lives and physical safety must be treated differently 
from those who emigrate simply to improve their position. 
10.4.3 Refugee status determination 
Determining who gains official refugee status has become more and more 
complex.  A person who is recognised as a refugee in Africa may be no more 
than an asylum-seeker in Europe. The OAU Convention includes protection for 
those fleeing generalized violence, which would be less relevant outside the 
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African context. The same happens with the Cartagena Declaration for Latin 
America.  
 In Europe, inconsistencies plague asylum systems. The same case presented 
in Britain, Italy, Germany and France could yield four different results. Asylum 
systems in countries like Italy are overwhelmed, and some nations are tightening 
their requirements. The same case could be presented to four different 
commissions in Italy, again with four different results. The key issue is that 
certain cases do not fall under the right categories. Traditionally, people who 
leave a country because of poverty are deemed “economic migrants” and do not 
qualify for asylum. But new factors, intertwined with poverty, are pushing 
people to leave, like weak governance or a lawlessness that invites impunity. In 
addition, the challenge of climate change and environmental displacement is 
likely to make a comprehensive framework for addressing de facto refugees 
increasingly necessary. 
10.4.4 Survival migrants 
Some academics refer to this broader category of refugees – leaving out 
internally displaced persons – as “survival migrants”: people fleeing an 
existential threat to which they have no domestic remedy. Such was the case of 
the around two million Zimbabweans who fled to countries in Southern Africa 
between 2005 and 2009 for a combination of inter-related reasons: mass 
livelihood collapse, state failure and environmental catastrophe. For many, 
emigration represented the only available survival strategy. Yet there was a 
refugee recognition rate of less than 10% in South Africa. This case is not only 
unresolved, but also not isolated. For example, in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, a similar nexus of livelihood collapse, environmental crisis and State 
failure are making survival migration an increasingly likely strategy for 
significant proportions of the population. The same happens with the Somalis, 
Haitians, Afghans and Iraqis.6 
 The consequences of this definition vacuum are serious: these groups of 
people have been rendered invisible to the international community as a result 
of being neither refugees nor voluntary, economic migrants, resulting in the 
absence of a coherent normative framework or institutional response to address 
their plight. 
10.4.5 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) 
The 1992 Church definition includes in its scope those who flee persecution and 
conflicts but have not crossed an international border – the 40 million IDPs of 
today’s world: 
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A great number of people are forcibly uprooted from their 
homes without crossing national frontiers. In fact, during 
revolutions and counter-revolutions, the civilian population 
is often caught in the cross-fire of guerrilla and government 
forces fighting each other for ideological reasons or for the 
ownership of land and national resources. For humani-
tarian reasons, these displaced people should be considered 
as refugees in the same way as those formally recognised by 
the 1951 Convention because they are victims of the same 
type of violence.  
The international community has addressed the IDP issue establishing Guiding 
Principles at the global level, which lead to the negotiation of treaties at the 
regional level, such as the 2010 Kampala Convention on IDPs. The institutional 
response has been the application of the ‘cluster’ approach agreed in the Inter-
Agency Standing Committee (IASC): different agencies have responsibility for 
different aspects of the needs of IDPs. The cluster arrangements have made it 
easier to identify where there are gaps in the overall humanitarian response, 
notably regarding the protection of women and children. Working in 
coordination has reduced duplication of efforts, has encouraged more 
harmonized standards of delivery and has enabled stronger advocacy. But it 
remains perhaps too internationally focused, with local actors and national 
capacities insufficiently tapped or developed. This does not always encourage 
the necessary government ownership. 
 The world of displaced persons is rapidly changing. Many new forms of dis-
placement, many new experiences of vulnerability and suffering have emerged. 
How can organizations serving the forcibly displaced promote both the spirit 
and the structures of freedom to respond with agility to these new calls upon 
compassion? How can we build something more lasting, which strengthens the 
humanity of those for whom we work? 
10.5 Rights denied and other protection challenges ahead 
The world, for many millions, remains a very insecure place.  
10.5.1 Refoulement  
Refoulement incidents of high visibility have occurred in a number of regions 
of the world, including in Europe, Eastern Africa and Asia. Take just the case 
of the small group of Uighur men, women and children fleeing the aftermath of 
the worst ethnic violence in decades in China. They sought asylum in Cambodia, 
where the UNHCR issued “persons of concern” letters on their behalf. In 
December 2009, Cambodia forcibly repatriated them just as the Chinese vice 
president, Xi Jinping, arrived on a visit to Phnom Penh to announce a $1.2 
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billion aid package to Cambodia.7 The willingness to flout international refugee 
law and to ignore the entreaties of refugees not to be sent back to their home 
countries has become the mark of friendly bilateral relations between States. 
Thailand sends back Hmong refugees, a group with a history of persecution at 
the hands of the Lao government dating back to the 1960s, citing a secret 
bilateral agreement with the Lao government’s assurances of their safe 
treatment. In September 2016, the European Union reached an agreement with 
Afghanistan to send back home tens of thousands of Afghan migrants who had 
reached Europe.8 
10.5.2 Statelessness 
An estimated 10 million people around the world – probably an underestimation 
– are struggling to get along without a nationality. This means, in practice, a 
daily struggle for legitimacy, to establish a legal residence, to find work, to 
access medical assistance and education for their children. At the current rate of 
three ratifications every 12 months to one or other of the Statelessness 
Conventions, we may be looking at another 50 years before we can talk about a 
truly global assumption of responsibility to reduce the statelessness problem. A 
September 2016 report published by the UNHCR, addresses new risks of 
statelessness in the Middle East and North Africa, and examines how conditions 
in Syria are blocking access to nationality. 
10.5.3 Detention  
Detention of asylum-seekers continues to create great individual hardship in 
many countries. The duration can be exceedingly long, the conditions 
unjustifiably harsh and the possibilities for legal oversight or review very 
limited. Research reveals that most detainees are likely to suffer from severe 
depression, anxiety, crippling stress, insomnia, loss of appetite and deterioration 
of their well-being.9 In some countries there are more due process safeguards 
for criminals than for asylum-seekers. Alternatives to detention – such as the 
community centres for women and children that the Jesuit Refugee Service 
(JRS) is fostering in Australia and Belgium– can set a precedent.  
10.5.4 The new boat people 
Another challenge for refugee protection is the arrival of undocumented 
migrants by boat, which exacerbates the problem of so-called “irregular 
secondary movements”. The Pacific, the Mediterranean and the Caribbean are 
the scene where “boat people” are regularly intercepted, turned around, ignored 
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by passing ships, shot at, or denied landing. When they manage to access a 
territory and asylum processes, a large percentage of asylum-seekers who come 
by boat are actually found to be refugees. 
 About 350,000 migrants and refugees arrived in the European Union in 2016, 
a sharp decline from 2015 when more than 1 million people arrived, according 
to Frontex, the EU border control agency. About 180,000 people arrived via 
Turkey and the eastern Mediterranean, while 170,000 reached the continent 
across the central Mediterranean route from Libya and Egypt. A deal between 
the EU and Turkey reduced the number of refugees and migrants coming from 
the east, but migration from northern Africa by boat rose 30 per cent. Boat 
arrivals can provoke fears and high emotions in citizens, which governments 
may find difficult to manage. But closing borders and trying to prevent 
movement is not the answer. Evidence suggests that tough sea policies have not 
solved, just changed – and indeed complicated – the dynamics of irregular 
movement. 
10.5.5 Dangerous routes 
According to the International Organization of Migration (IOM), 7,500 
migrants and asylum seekers died en route to safer lands in 2016, notably in 
Central America. That is an average of 20 deaths each day. These are reported 
deaths, but many more people have died alone, in the deserts and in the oceans. 
Migrants and refugees travel in a clandestine way, without papers, in small and 
dangerous boats, which quite often sink without a trace and nobody actually 
knows about them. The nature of the crisis makes it difficult for any organisation 
or government to keep an accurate count of the dead and missing. 4,812 people 
are said to have died in the Mediterranean in 2016 – a record number. 
10.5.6  Security and counter-terrorism 
Refugee policies in many States are now tinted by security concerns, which can 
imply literally closing the border to refugees. Legislation is being changed 
expressly to restrict access to asylum procedures and to reinforce detention 
regimes. Criminalising the search for asylum has serious protection 
consequences for refugees, and breeds its own problems for States, including 
racism and xenophobia.  
 The influx of more than one million migrants into Germany in 2015 and 
2016, mainly Muslims fleeing countries such as Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, 
hardened public views on immigration, weakened support for Chancellor 
Angela Merkel and fuelled xenophobia. 59 attacks on refugee shelters were 
recorded in Berlin in 2015 and 48 in 2016. After the truck attack on a crowded 
Berlin Christmas market in December 2016, refugees in Germany pleaded with 
their host nation to avoid placing migrants under a blanket of suspicion, after 
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police commandos raided their shelter.10 “My message to the Germans is: Don’t 
suspect everybody, don't generalise. We have nothing to do with this crime”, 
said Ammar Wazzaz, a 45-year-old refugee from the Syrian city of Idlib. Yaser, 
a 32-year-old refugee from Syria, said he became dejected when he read about 
the attack on Facebook. “We fled this kind of terrorism and it is following us 
here”, he said. 
10.6 The role of faith and faith communities in refugee 
protection  
As Antonio Guterres, former UNHCR High Commissioner and currently UN 
Secretary-General, once stated:  
for the vast majority of uprooted people there are few things 
as powerful as their faiths in helping them cope with fear, 
loss, separation and destitution. Faith is also central to 
hope and resilience. Ignoring faith would be to ignore its 
potential for preserving dignity and for providing solutions 
to the people we care for.11 
Western humanitarianism has been largely shaped by secular values, and has 
tended to overlook or downplay the influence of faith outside the realm of 
private belief. While religion has declined in industrialized countries, the vast 
majority of people affected by conflicts, disasters and displacement are people 
of faith. For many, their religious beliefs and values play a major role in their 
lives, helping to shape the way they understand the world and their role and 
place within it, providing a moral compass as to what is right and wrong, and 
helping them cope in times of crisis (Thomson, 2014).  
 A refugee from a Catholic background explains: “Faith plays an important 
role for displaced persons as we seek answers to the many questions that we 
have regarding the pain and suffering that we have gone through. For most of 
us, our faith in God is what keeps us going in the midst of the many challenges 
that we face. Our faith is constantly tested. In his letter to the Hebrews (chapter 
11, verse 1), Saint Paul defines faith as ‘the assurance of what we hope for and 
the certainty of what we do not see.’ This faith is what give us the hope for light 
at the end of the tunnel in which many displaced persons find themselves.”12 
 Faith may encourage acts of compassion, tolerance and respect for human 
dignity, while inspiring social justice, reconciliation and conflict resolution. 
Faith leaders, faith-based organizations (FBOs) and local faith communities 
play a major role in the protection of people affected by conflict, disaster and 
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displacement. Humanitarians, however, have only recently begun to fully 
appreciate the depth, scope and variety of protection work being done by faith 
actors and the complex interrelationships between faith and protection.  
 Working with religious leaders is an essential element of serving local 
communities. It is equally important to understand the religious life of local 
communities and how belief influences decision-making. Because of their local 
ties and widespread presence, the reach of local FBOs in crisis-affected and host 
communities often extends well beyond that of humanitarian actors and even 
State authorities, whose legitimacy in complex and insecure operating 
environments is often called into question. Local faith leaders and FBOs are 
usually deeply embedded in – and generally respected by – local communities, 
and are intimately attuned to local cultural nuances and social and political 
dynamics. They also tend to inspire a high level of trust within their community, 
giving them great influence over local norms, culture and behaviour – all of 
which is vital for community-based protection work. The scope and size of some 
of these communities, along with their influence and connectedness, often gives 
them considerable leverage with State authorities and non-State actors. The 
long-term engagement of faith actors with local communities and government 
authorities also allows their protection initiatives to take root and sustain efforts 
to address root causes, change patterns of behaviour or advocate for changes in 
law and policy.13 
 Schools, churches, temples and mosques are frequently used as safe shelters 
and for coordinating response efforts. Their presence before, during and after 
disasters and conflicts, during the difficult journeys most refugees undertake, 
and in the country of asylum, means that they are well placed to provide 
protection. Their role as first responders and witness to refugees’ plights is often 
critical. A humanitarian worker in Syria explains:  
When a family arrives to a village or a neighbourhood, the 
whole community asks itself: ‘What can we do for this 
particular family in need?’ Later on, local grassroots 
organizations, mosques, parishes, visit them and organize 
themselves to help them. This is how organizations make 
contact with displaced people, through families and local 
communities, including religious communities. As in 
Northern Iraq, groups associated with the church and 
mosques have been on the frontlines, providing a practical 
response and extending their help beyond their primary 
beneficiaries – Christian or Muslim.14 
FBOs’ organizational structures and networks, though often disrupted, provide 
a ready-made local response capacity. Faith leaders and FBOs can also draw on 
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their social capital to launch new protection initiatives, gain community support 
and mobilize volunteers. Faith constituencies also reach well beyond the 
affected community and so are well placed to deal with refugee and host 
community tensions, combat xenophobia and racism, mobilize support from the 
wider society, and address the causes of insecurity that require wider social and 
political change.  
 Where religion is used as a tool to incite conflict and polarize communities, 
FBOs also potentially have a unique ability to work with and through their faith 
communities to counteract extremist views, and reconcile the differences and 
tensions that fuel conflict and drive displacement.  
 A good practice is the Interfaith Peace Platform in the Central African 
Republic, which brings together religious leaders of the three denominations 
(Catholic, Evangelical and Muslim) to promote inter-community dialogue. 
Created in 2014, it aims to set up over 20 community peace committees in the 
capital, Bangui, and in the prefectures, to promote dialogue between fractured 
communities, reconciliation initiatives and dialogue with the authorities.15 
10.7 The principle of impartiality in the Christian tradition 
of hospitality 
Common questions for people working in FBOs are: “Do you only help 
Christians? Do you only help Muslims?” A cornerstone of humanitarian law, 
the principle of impartiality, put into practice, especially by faith-based 
organizations, can be a source of reconciliation, a sign towards a different way 
of thinking, even in the midst of war. In Syria, the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS), 
whose mission it is to accompany, serve and advocate for refugees worldwide, 
works with teams of young Syrians, from Muslim and Christian backgrounds, 
providing aid to those most in need, regardless of religion. In Aleppo, the JRS 
offers 10,000 meals every day under the noise of the mortars. Isn’t this already 
a powerful sign of reconciliation in the country? In Damascus and Homs, the 
JRS takes care of children affected by war.  
 We have much to learn about the principle of impartiality, reflected in 
hospitality towards people in need in the Christian tradition. The current refugee 
crisis in Europe presents us with an opportunity to regain Western values of very 
basic humanity, by welcoming refugees. In doing so, we stand to rediscover 
traditional values that we have lost. Refugees have something to teach us. As 
Pope Francis said to a group of refugees at the JRS’ Centro Astalli in Rome:  
Though treated as a burden, a problem, a cost, you are 
really a gift. For every one of you can be a bridge that unites 
distant peoples, that makes possible the encounter between 
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diverse cultures and religions, a way to rediscover our 
common humanity.16 
Hospitality and welcome are a model of locally-led protection. But they require 
individual change. Pope Francis invites Christians and non-Christians alike to 
accept the challenge:  
Too many times have we failed to welcome you! Forgive the 
narrow mindedness and indifference of our societies who 
fear the change in life and mentality that your presence 
requires.17 
10.8 Experiences and Views 
Based on the above context of religious social teaching regarding obligations 
towards forced migrants, I would like to draw attention to three experiences 
which can shed light on the rights of forced migrants, including the right to 
religious freedom.  
10.8.1 Hospitality towards refugees by religious communities 
Pope Francis spoke of the responsibility to welcome in the summer of 2015, 
when he invited parishes and faith communities to sponsor one or two refugee 
families. Not all 60 million forcibly displaced – one or two families. Pope 
Francis’ visit to Lesvos was remarkable not only as a sign to European leaders 
to honour their international obligations, but also by bringing three Syrian 
families back to Rome with him:  He modelled protection in deeds, not words. 
 Organizations with national offices that have roots in the community, and 
religious institutions behind them, may be well positioned to what seems to be 
a protection priority: to identify the most vulnerable, who often fall through the 
cracks of bigger international programmes likely to become more and more 
confined to capacity-building, research, monitoring and evaluation, rather than 
direct service. 
 The humanitarian corridor project launched by the Community of 
Sant’Egidio, the Federation of Evangelical Churches and the Waldensian Table 
offers a practical model to European governments. Humanitarian corridors 
allow the safe arrival in Italy of vulnerable Syrian refugees from Lebanon, 
avoiding the dangerous boat journeys across the Mediterranean and exploitation 
by human traffickers. Thanks to an agreement with the Italian government, 
about a thousand vulnerable people (victims of persecution, torture and 
violence, families with children, elderly, sick and disabled people) have arrived 
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in Italy via these corridors. Pope Francis described this project as “a concrete 
sign of commitment for peace and life that unites solidarity with security”. This 
ecumenical pilot project – which is self-financed by the organisations that 
launched it – could become an EU-led project, with governments replicating 
and scaling up resettlement of the most vulnerable refugees throughout Europe 
and beyond.18 
 We learn about hospitality from other faiths too, collaborating on concrete 
projects. In Kafar Zabad, a village in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley bordering Syria, 
the local Mufti offered the JRS the use of a small school near the mosque for 
Syrian refugee children. The JRS is running a programme to equip the children 
with the language skills and other knowledge needed to join Lebanese schools. 
Communities of hospitality have been created by the Jesuit Refugee Service in 
Italy through a network of parishes and religious communities offering shelter 
to refugees who are in a semi-autonomous situation. In 2016, 28 religious 
communities hosted 95 refugees.  
10.8.2 The personal experience of Antony Mukui19 
One of the refugees hosted by a religious community in Italy is Antony Mukui, 
a refugee who kindly agreed to share his experience:  
My family and I fled Kenya in January 2014 due to per-
secution that left my cousin dead and one of my friends in 
hospital. So, we made the decision to leave the country that 
we had called home for all our lives. 
When we arrived in Italy on 21st January 2014, the Franciscans hosted us in 
their college San Lorenzo da Brindisi where they house foreign students who 
study in Rome. We have been living with them since then. They helped us not 
only by offering us a roof but also a place to heal our inner wounds by providing 
us with spiritual counselling and by allowing us to be part of their family. We 
eat meals together, share discussions, play football, or watch a game together. 
They are always ready to offer a special mass for us whenever we need it. 
 The Church, through its various congregations, has been called to help in 
what Pope Francis has called a conversion of attitudes. In his message on the 
2014 World Day of Migrants and Refugees, Pope Francis said:  
Infrequently, the arrival of migrants, displaced persons, 
asylum-seekers and refugees gives rise to suspicion and 
hostility. There is a fear that society will become less secure, 
that identity and culture will be lost, that competition for 
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jobs will become stiffer and even that criminal activity will 
increase.20 
With the rise of far-right parties all over Europe, the Church is called on to take 
a proactive role in shaping this debate. Opening up religious houses for refugees 
will build credibility and can go a long way in fighting some of the prejudices 
against migrants. We believe that if religious houses open their doors other 
Christians will in turn follow with courage this example, opening their homes 
to refugees. As Pope Francis reminds us, the Church must be able first to see 
and then help others to see that migrants do not represent a problem to be solved 
but that they are brothers and sisters who need help and should therefore be 
welcomed and loved. Displaced persons have many needs such as housing, food 
or education. However, in my experience as a refugee, what refugees need most 
is love and compassion, which enables them to restore the dignity that has been 
taken away from them by conflict and sudden displacement. They need to feel 
that they are human beings so that they can heal their wounds and rebuild their 
lives again, and hopefully heal others that are likewise wounded.  
 Is it enough to offer us refugees a place to sleep and a dinner? It is likewise 
important to listen to us and share our aspirations. Faith plays an important role 
for displaced persons as we seek answers to the many questions that we have 
regarding the pain and suffering that we have gone through. For most of us, our 
faith in God is what keeps us going, in the midst of the many challenges that we 
face our faith is constantly tested, and therefore welcoming refugees into your 
religious homes will help them strengthen this important part of their life. This 
love and compassion is what I believe all refugees deserve. It is not an easy 
decision to take someone into your home and make them part of your family, to 
let them into your “private space”, but like my family has proven, it is possible 
to overcome the challenges. In the 10 months that we have lived with the 
Franciscans I have seen the attitudes of the brothers change from one of fear and 
suspicion to one of love, affection and brotherhood. I now feel part of that 
fraternity of brothers. 
 I encourage all of you to look at your brothers and sisters in need and take a 
leap of faith just like the Franciscans took a chance with us and show love and 
compassion to your fellow man.21 
10.8.3 Church asylum: The Christian tradition of sanctuary in Germany 
The early Christian church adopted the principle of a religious right of asylum, 
protecting those accused of crime from legal action and from exile. Various 
rules were developed for what the person had to do to qualify for protection. 
                                                      
20  <w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/messages/migration/documents/papa-
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21  Antony Mukui, Address to Religious Congregations gathered in the international office of 
the Jesuit Refugee Service, Rome, October 2014. 
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 Nowadays, Church asylum, or sanctuary, is a practice to support, counsel 
and give shelter to refugees who are threatened with deportation to inhumane 
living conditions, torture or even death. Giving church asylum is a specific form 
of benevolence that has a centuries-long tradition. What is known in Germany 
as ‘church asylum’ has mostly been inspired by the American Sanctuary 
Movement and by movements in other European countries, leading to the 
Charter of Groningen in 1987 and eventually to a common Charter of the New 
Sanctuary Movement in Europe in 201022. Excerpts from the Charter read:  
As members of churches, parishes, cloisters, communities 
and solidarity groups are called to accept responsibility and 
to take sides, not only with the refugees and asylum seekers 
living among us, but also with those stranded on Europe’s 
outer borders, whom we do not get to see. The right to 
asylum is worthless, if those seeking protection are denied 
entry.  
Therefore, we pledge: 
 
• to use every opportunity to help refugees in need;  
• where deportation looms and human dignity and lives are threatened, to 
grant refugees sanctuary in our churches until an acceptable solution is 
found for them. Not to shrink back, should open confrontation with civil 
authorities become necessary; 
• to publicize persistently in order to raise social consciousness of the 
scandalous practices by which refugees are repulsed at Europe’s outer 
borders and harassed within, such as deportation detention and 
discrimination in almost all areas of life; 
• to strive for policies of asylum and immigration which are oriented on 
human dignity and human rights, and this at all levels, from the local to the 
European level; 
• to help make refugees feel welcome and be able to participate with equal 
rights in our society; 
• to promote this self-commitment and its goals in our churches and among 
our fellow Christians;  
• to seek cooperation with like-minded people, whatever faith community or 
world view they adhere to;  
• to form European and worldwide networks and work together in solidarity 
to fulfil these commitments.  
In 1983 a Berlin parish granted church asylum to three Palestinian families 
threatened with deportation to Lebanon during the civil war there, and since 
                                                      
22  Charta of the New Sanctuary Movement in Europe, Resolution of the Annual Meeting of the 
German Ecumenical Committee on Church Asylum, Inc. Berlin, October 2010 
<www.kirchenasyl.de/wp-content/uploads/ 2013/12/Charta-english1.pdf>. 
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then church asylum has been established all over Germany and is practised in 
the Protestant as well as the Catholic Church. Both churches have taken a stand 
for refugees and their rights in numerous public statements and have used 
church asylum as an instrument to protect refugees and support them in claiming 
their rights.23 
 A snapshot: Sherzad, Kovan and Peshtiwan, Yazidis from Iraq, aged 19, 20 
and 21, travelled overland from Turkey to Bulgaria and on to Germany. Many 
of their travel companions were injured on the border between Bulgaria and 
Serbia, when Bulgarian police opened fire on the refugees who refused to stop. 
The young men each paid between 9,000 and 11,000 euro upfront to smugglers 
in Iraq who ‘organised’ their trip to Germany. Travelling separately, all were 
caught en route, and their fingerprints gave them away. Says Kovan:  
Bulgarian police stopped me at the border with Serbia. For 
two days, I stayed in a camp, where I was beaten and not 
fed. Then I was taken to prison. I stayed eight days. I was 
threatened that if I did not give my fingerprints, I would stay 
a long time. 
A few months after reaching Germany, Kovan received one day’s notice of his 
deportation to Bulgaria. A volunteer at the shelter where Kovan was staying 
advised him to seek church asylum immediately. Much the same happened to 
the other two. 
 It was Dieter Müller SJ of the Jesuit Refugee Service in Germany who 
referred the Yazidis to the parish of St Joseph in Tutzing, an affluent town just 
outside Munich. They would stay on the parish premises until their deportation 
order expired, up to six months. Fr Dieter said some 600 refugees sought 
protection in churches across Germany in 2015, invoking the Christian tradition 
of sanctuary. He disputes the government’s disgruntled claim that church 
asylum is illegal, although he admits it “stretches the law” for a good cause, “to 
ensure a fair application of the asylum procedure”. 
 Timely practical support, like that extended by Fr Dieter and Fr Peter 
Brummer, parish priest in Tutzing, can make or break the future of individuals. 
There are many Europeans who are eager to lend support in one way or other – 
the flip side of Europe’s much-publicized reluctance to welcome refugees. Fr 
Peter granted sanctuary to ten refugees facing deportation during 2015. His first 
experience of church asylum dates back 20 years, when he welcomed a Kurdish 
family that Germany wanted to deport to Turkey. Fr Peter recalls that the state 
prosecutor invited him for a meeting back then:  
He asked me why I was doing this. I opened the Bible and 
told him to read inside for my answer. We had a very good 
conversation. 
                                                      
23  Neufert 2014. 
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For Fr Peter and his parish council, “there is no doubt we have to do this”, to 
welcome and to protect refugees. The encounter impresses him deeply. “You 
have to meet each other face to face, to hear the story. As we listened, the more 
we learned, the more our conviction grew.” He adds:  
You have to follow your conscience, there are situations 
when you have to say yes or no; no chance to compromise.  
Refugees gamble literally everything in a bid to gain life. They do so knowing 
that death is also on the cards. But matters of life and death should not depend 
on luck alone. Solidarity can do much to even out the odds.24 
10.8.4 Hospitality led by individuals and families in Europe  
Since 2009, the Jesuit Refugee Service in France has developed the Welcome 
Network, a programme for individuals and families to welcome refugees into 
their homes. JRS Europe is now developing this project throughout the 
continent, inviting European citizens to open their homes.25 
 In offering hospitality, much of the success depends on efforts to involve 
others. The Welcome Network underscores this reality. What started as a small 
seed of hospitality has grown rapidly, spreading to 34 French cities. In Ille de 
France, the JRS coordinates 150 families hosting asylum seekers. At the end of 
2016, 1,200 families hosted 600 asylum seekers. JRS France works with 200 
supervisors. “I am discovering the joy of receiving, of knowing that, for a while, 
my guest will not be hungry or cold,” said volunteer Bernadette. “I am disco-
vering the grace of smiling when they welcome me every evening”, explains the 
refugee hosted by Bernadette.  
 An experience: French couple Jacques and Martine Mercier have been 
welcoming refugees into their home in Versailles, just outside Paris, for several 
years. They say that while living with refugees is incredibly rewarding, it is also 
a responsibility, requiring patience and understanding.26 Working on hospitality 
needs a strong advocacy component, to lobby for laws and policies that are more 
welcoming and just. Based on concrete experiences of hospitality in France, the 
JRS submitted proposals to the government for improved living conditions for 
asylum seekers. Marie, a Rwandan refugee who experienced both hospitality 
and hostility on her long journey towards protection, put it this way:  
When we talk about hospitality, origin, race and religion 
are of little importance. Hospitality is about compassion, 
                                                      
24  Jesuit Refugee Service 2016. 
25  Run by the Jesuit Refugee Service in France, the Welcome Network has offered hospitality 
since 2009 and today is a 150-strong network in 15 cities all over France. 
<www.jrsfrance.org/reseau-welcome/presentation>. 
26  Camilla Schick for BBC: <www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34472027>. 
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free from pity, and makes you feel at home, free and totally 
accepted. 
Another initiative is the I Get You campaign, the aim of which is to foster a 
culture of welcome in Europe, creating inclusive communities where everyone 
is valued. It was launched by the Jesuit Refugee Service-Europe in Belgium, 
Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Romania and Croatia, to 
identify community-building initiatives for local citizens and refugees. The 
campaign began with some questions: What are the best examples of 
community-building initiatives? How do they encourage mutual understanding 
and friendship? How do they counter racism and xenophobia? The research side 
of the project will enable analysis and comparison of initiatives across 
Europe.27 The following testimony by a German woman living in a small village 
in the Black Forest is an example of how individuals are developing sponta-
neous initiatives to accompany refugees in one way or the other:  
This year, I will spend Christmas at my parent’s place, 
together with my boyfriend and our friend Henry, an asylum 
seeker from the Gambia. In the isolated small town where 
we normally live, Henry has become our closest friend, so 
we had originally decided to stay in town with him for the 
feast days. As my parents, living in another city, very much 
wanted to have us over for Christmas, they invited Henry, 
too. Then they asked if he was trustworthy to have around 
the house, something they have never asked about any of my 
friends before. They were worried that he might misbehave, 
or steal. Although generally liberal-minded, my parents do 
not know a single refugee personally – and so they are 
afraid. My mother once said that she found the young 
African men shopping at the local supermarket looked a 
little frightening. It is true that their unfamiliar features can 
sometimes make their facial expressions harder to read for 
Europeans. Our friend Henry sometimes wears an 
expression that could be interpreted as sullen – but because 
I have got to know him well over the months, I know that this 
is just what his face sometimes looks like and that he might 
be laughing the next second. I am not afraid because I know 
him. I am not suspicious of a group of young black men in 
the park because they might be just as nice as Henry is. 
The region of Germany where I studied is the region 
currently behaving most aggressively towards immigrants. 
It is also one of the regions with the lowest percentage of 
                                                      
27  JRS Europe is based in Brussels and coordinates a network of JRS offices across 15 
European countries. Jrseurope.org 
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foreigners actually living there, compared to the national 
standard. People are afraid of who they do not know. 
My mother has called to ask what they could get Henry for 
Christmas and what he would like to eat, so I guess in her 
case, fear is already being transformed.”28 
What if every refugee was accompanied by an individual or a family in their 
host community? Through friendship and accompaniment of one or two 
refugees, our perspective of the “global refugee crisis” would change drama-
tically. Social transformation comes from individual and community responses 
that value personal interaction. This is a very practical way of protecting 
refugees.  
10.8.5 Inter-faith advocacy on behalf of forced migrants  
During 2016, the year of the Jubilee of Mercy, in conjunction with the Islamic 
pilgrimage to Mecca, and on the occasion of the UN International Day of Peace, 
Catholic and Muslim leaders united voices calling upon governments, religious 
institutions, and people of good-will to work together in tackling the root causes 
of forced migration. As an example, members of the Jesuit Refugee Service and 
the Religious Islamic Community of Italy (COREIS) called for responsibility-
sharing to provide protection for those fleeing from their homes, and to ensure 
good reception conditions and access, on arrival, to adequate and affordable 
services. Robust policies, they said, were needed to counter racist and 
xenophobic tendencies – diversity must be recognized as an opportunity and a 
gift, not a threat.  
 In their statement for International Day of Peace, 2016, both faith-based 
organisations expressed: “The Muslim tradition of protection and hospitality 
towards the wayfarer, the widow and the orphan is reinforced by the fact that 
the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, was himself a refugee who fled his 
home city for safety. Christians are told in their scriptures that every time they 
welcome a stranger, they make Christ welcome, and the story of the birth of 
Christ is one of persecution and flight for refuge in a foreign land.”29  
 Muslims and Christians strive for a peace that is “beyond all understanding”, 
an experience of intimacy with the mystery of God, and for fraternal harmony 
with their neighbours. Peace then is neither a vague abstraction nor an 
unrealistic ideal. It can be achieved when we all recognize that we share a 
common home, and that we are invited by God to work together for the common 
good.  The pilgrim, the refugee and the migrant are all searching, beyond hearth 
and home, for a place where they may encounter peace, be free of distress, and 
                                                      
28  Testimony provided by Julia Scharfenstein. Germany, November 2016. 
29  Excerpts from the inter-religious statement on behalf of forced migrants, Jesuit Refugee 
Service and the Religious Islamic Community of Italy (COREIS), 21 September 2016, 
<en.jrs.net/news_detail?TN=NEWS-20160919080016>. 
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enjoy hospitality.30 Initiatives such as this one, bringing together Muslim and 
Christian perspectives on behalf of welcoming refugees, are believed to be seeds 
for further protection and welcome.  
10.9 See their faces, listen to their stories  
Great traditions, such as the three monotheistic faiths of the Jews, Christians 
and Muslims, have paid attention to the life of the exile, the refugee, the 
foreigner, hospitality to strangers being a cornerstone practice in these 
traditions. Pope Francis calls us to something very basic: to see their faces, to 
listen to their stories and to do unto others as you would have them do unto you: 
Our world is facing a refugee crisis of a magnitude not seen 
since the Second World War. This presents us with great 
challenges and many hard decisions. On this continent, too, 
thousands of persons are led to travel north in search of a 
better life for themselves and for their loved ones, in search 
of greater opportunities. Is this not what we want for our 
own children? We must not be taken aback by their 
numbers, but rather view them as persons, seeing their faces 
and listening to their stories, trying to respond as best we 
can to their situation. To respond in a way which is always 
humane, just and fraternal. We need to avoid a common 
temptation nowadays: to discard whatever proves trouble-
some. Let us remember the Golden Rule: Do unto others as 
you would have them do unto you (Mt 7:12). This Rule 
points us in a clear direction. Let us treat others with the 
same passion and compassion with which we want to be 
treated. Let us seek for others the same possibilities which 
we seek for ourselves. Let us help others to grow, as we 
would like to be helped ourselves. In a word, if we want 
security, let us give security; if we want life, let us give life; 
if we want opportunities, let us provide opportunities.31 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
30  Ibid. 
31  Pope Francis 2015. 
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 Chapter 11 When Denmark Criminalised Kindness 
Lisbeth Zornig Andersen 
11.1 Introduction 
I didn’t grow up in an orderly middle-class family with cosy Sunday lunches, 
people laughing and talking. I was brought up in a shabby cottage outside a 
remote Danish village, with cold water and a lavatory in the back garden. Hot 
dogs were a special treat on Sundays. My mum and stepdad were always drunk 
and didn’t work – they lived off benefits. It was not the sort of environment that 
teaches you universal moral values and ethics. 
 And yet, I learned – mostly from my three brothers – that people look after 
one another. We help each other. Even if we don’t have much, even if we wear 
hand-me-downs to school and dig up raw potatoes for dinner, we still help each 
other. It’s when life is tough and your back is to the wall that we matter the most 
to each other. 
 When I was introduced to the Bible and Christian teachings as a teenager – 
nobody ever took me to church as a child – I learned the story about the good 
Samaritan. I knew what that meant already. Where I grew up, if you saw 
somebody walking along the road and you were fortunate enough to have a car, 
you stopped and offered them a lift. That was normal – it’s what we all did. 
 My brothers were removed from our family home one at a time and put into 
institutions. All three turned to crime and drug abuse. Two are dead, much too 
young; the third has AIDS. They never had a real chance at life. Not really. The 
abuse and the beatings they took at home – they protected me from that – 
crippled their hearts, their minds and their souls. 
 For some reason, I managed to escape and make it through school. I 
graduated from the University of Copenhagen as an economist, and got a job at 
Danske Bank, the largest bank in Denmark. At school, I was lucky enough to 
meet good people, who understood how to coach the aggressive and emotionally 
disturbed young girl that I was – believe me, it was no easy task. At one 
institution for especially difficult girls, I met Karen, who saw through my anger 
and loathing, and was patient enough that I eventually came to trust her. She 
became my mentor. Today, thirty-four years later, she still is. She was the 
person who pushed me on to university – I would never have thought it possible 
without her. 
 Some years ago, I received an invitation from the Danish Social Minister. It 
was strange – I had never been invited to coffee with a member of the 
government before, but of course I said yes. The minister wanted to know if I 
 CHAPTER 11 WHEN DENMARK CRIMINALISED KINDNESS 
 
220 
would chair the Children’s Council in Denmark, the equivalent of the Children’s 
Ombudsman in other countries. I was astounded – I didn’t even know what the 
Children’s Council was at the time. So, I called Karen. She wasn’t surprised at 
all. ‘Well, I actually thought you’d be perfect as the next CEO of Denmark’s 
Radio and Television (the Danish BBC),’ she told me, ‘But Children’s 
Ombudsman, that’s pretty good too.’ 
 Karen always believed that I could do anything. She’s a follower of 
the developmental psychologist Urie Bronfenbrenner, who writes: ‘In order to 
develop normally, a child requires progressively more complex joint activity 
with one or more adults who have an irrational emotional relationship with the 
child. What do I mean by “irrational emotional relationship”? Well, somebody’s 
got to be crazy about that kid.’ I think that’s Bronfenbrenner’s way of saying 
‘love’. Which is a difficult thing to implement in a professional institution where 
many children would never have experienced it at home. But Karen managed it 
for me. 
11.2 Helping others  
And so, I became the chair of Denmark’s Children’s Council. It was a chance 
to make a difference, and took me from an anonymous business career to 
debating social policy in the national media. I launched a campaign to improve 
the conditions for socially challenged children in Denmark; wrote a book about 
my childhood, to share what it’s like on the dark side of the welfare society; and 
even ended up in a documentary: My Childhood in Hell. In short, I threw myself 
into the job, and loved every minute of it. 
 After three years I decided to establish my own company non-profit, The 
House of Zornig, dedicated to developing better ways to help troubled families 
– not just the children, but parents, too. And that’s what I still do today. I don’t 
want any more children to end up like my brothers. I don’t want anyone to have 
to live through what I did.  
 Part of my work is giving presentations around the country, talking about my 
own experiences, trying to inspire people to do what Karen did for me, and 
promoting more effective social initiatives. On Monday, 7 September 2015, I 
was in southern Denmark, close to where I grew up, making one of these presen-
tations. That was the day the great wave of refugees hit Denmark. Thousands of 
people fleeing the war in Syria had made their way through Europe, many of 
them heading for Sweden, where the Prime Minister at the time was welcoming 
them. I heard on the news that hundreds of refugees had entered Danish territory 
from Puttgarten in Germany on the ferry to Rødbyhavn, and were now walking 
towards Sweden. It’s a long walk: about 160 kilometres. And it was a hot day. 
To get to Sweden, you need to go to Copenhagen, and cross over from there. I 
was headed towards Copenhagen already, and I had six empty seats in my car. 
So? 
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 I went to Rødbyhavn and was met with scenes that I’d never seen before in 
Denmark. There were refugees everywhere. Complete chaos. Adults, children, 
single mothers, teenagers, wary people with tired faces, most of them with just 
small plastic bags containing their belongings; some with nothing but the 
clothes they wore. Those faces. Not desperate but stern. Weary. Committed. I 
phoned Mikael, my husband, and said: ‘Listen, I’m going to offer some of them 
a lift.’ He said: ‘But of course you are. Bring them home, I’ll make coffee.’ 
 We weren’t sure if it was legal to offer the refugees a lift, so Mikael called 
the police to ask. They didn’t know, they said. Nobody seemed prepared for 
what was unfolding. At the scene, there were a lot of police. They didn’t stop 
the refugees from walking towards Sweden. So, I parked the car and spotted a 
group of six, among them two small girls who turned out to be five years old. 
Sweet children, but very quiet – I wondered what they had seen. 
 I asked them if they wanted a ride. They did. There was a policeman standing 
next to my car, and I asked him if he was going to stop me. He said no. While 
the refugees were climbing into the car a TV journalist came over and filmed 
us. I explained that I had empty seats, and that I was offering them a lift. And 
off we went. 
 We have a house in Solrød Strand, just south of Copenhagen, and I took the 
family there with me. The girls immediately fell asleep in the car – they had 
been traveling for forty days: on foot, by train and on bus. They had lost all their 
belongings when they crossed the Mediterranean to Greece, and had nothing left 
but the clothes on their back. They were from Damascus. One of them, Younes, 
had studied pharmacology at university. His brother was a physiotherapist. They 
were leading a normal life, working and studying, when the bombs started to 
fall and destroyed their home. Their father was already in Sweden with a 
brother, living in Helsingborg, and that’s where they were headed. 
 We got to Solrød Strand and Mikael was ready with coffee, soda and 
cinnamon buns. We talked and offered them a place to rest, dinner and a good 
night’s sleep. They politely declined – they just wanted to get to Sweden as 
quickly as possible. It had been a long journey and they were very close now. 
So my husband offered them a lift to the train station on the Danish side of the 
border. He bought them tickets to Helsingborg and made sure they got on the 
right train. A few hours later we got a call from their father. He was overjoyed, 
and grateful. 
 That was good. But we also felt bad. We had done so little, and yet it had 
meant so much to these six people. We could see on the news that hundreds of 
refugees were still on the roads, and more were coming. We thought about 
driving more people, but we realised that would just be a drop in the ocean. So 
we turned to Facebook and wrote about what we had done; we wrote about the 
family, ordinary people in desperate circumstances. And we asked other people 
to help. Our post was instantly shared by thousands – we later estimated that it 
had probably reached 300,000 people. Hundreds of cars headed towards 
Rødbyhavn to help. Our Facebook page was flooded by requests. ‘I’m going – 
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where are they?’; ‘We have SUVs, where do we pick them up?’; ‘I have housing 
and food, bring them here’; ‘I have a boat, I can take fifty to Sweden’. Even a 
former Government minister called. He said he’d like to pay for busses to go 
and pick up refugees, which would be more efficient. Mikael called a bus 
company and asked if he could rent a number of busses. ‘Are they for refugees?’ 
the man in charge asked. Mikael said yes, expecting a no. ‘You can have my 
busses, there’s no charge,’ he said. That was wonderful, but we had no bus 
drivers. So, we asked for volunteers on Facebook, and immediately we had more 
drivers than busses. 
11.3 Consequences 
All that happened on the Monday. The next day the police issued a statement 
declaring that giving rides to refugees was illegal. That scrapped the bus idea. 
Many people continued to drive south to offer people lifts, regardless. The 
consensus was that we do not accept that refugees from a war, people in distress, 
have to walk on the highways in Denmark and sleep in the open, when so many 
of us have cars and beds. Some used the term civil disobedience, infuriated by 
the statement from the police. On Wednesday, the police again changed their 
position. Now, it was no longer illegal – now people offering lifts were merely 
‘leaning towards breaching the law’. And at the same time the police allowed 
the refugees they had detained in Rødbyhavn, to travel freely. All were let go 
and picked up by waiting cars to be driven towards Copenhagen. After that, 
refugees were allowed to travel freely through Denmark to Sweden, where they 
were welcomed – until it became too much and they closed their borders. 
 Things calmed down. Instead of offering the refugees a lift, hundreds of 
civilian volunteers manned the train stations from Hamburg in Germany to 
Malmö in Sweden to keep the refugees safe, and make sure they had tickets for 
Sweden. Thousands of people were donating money, time, clothes and food for 
what came to be known as operation Safe Corridor. 
 Along the way, the footage of the refugees climbing into my car made the 
news. I was interviewed and invited to a debate with a member of the Dansk 
Folkeparti, who are vehemently anti-immigration. I was accused of shamelessly 
publicising myself on Facebook and on TV. Another politician asked how I 
could know whether the people I helped were carrying bombs. My Facebook 
page was flooded with hate mail. I was called a traitor, an idiot and a Muslim-
lover. People sent pictures of guns, or obscene scenarios of what they would 
like ten African men to do to me. 
 This was in September. The following month my husband and I were 
contacted by the police. They were investigating us on the charge of people 
smuggling, and wanted us to come in for questioning. Actually, I think the 
correct term is interrogation. I turned up at the police station and answered a lot 
of questions about what I had done. It was a strange experience, to be 
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interrogated by the police. It turned out that about fifteen people had filed 
complaints against me – five or six had filed complaints against my husband. 
One had even been in our garden and peeked through the windows of the living 
room to be certain ours was the house where refugees had been sheltered. The 
police did not initiate the investigation by themselves, they did it because of the 
number of complaints from Danish citizens. 
 In judicial terms our crime consisted of aiding, transporting and harboring 
persons without valid travel documents. That’s the lift and the coffee. I had to 
ask what ‘valid travel documents’ meant. They explained that it is a valid 
passport and a valid visa. I was not aware of the law, and the idea of asking the 
family for valid travel documents never entered my mind. I have never asked 
anybody for valid travel documents before when offering them a lift. And when 
we had asked the police at the time – both by phone and at the site – none of 
them had mentioned anything about valid travel documents. Even if they had 
presented Syrian passports to me, I wouldn’t have been able to judge whether 
they were valid or not. 
 Time passed. We visited the Syrian family in Helsingborg just before 
Christmas. They were doing well and learning Swedish fast in order to 
commence their studies and find jobs. My husband connected them to a Swedish 
family who were happy to provide support and help them learn the language. 
On our visit, they served lots of wonderful Arabic food – and a plate of 
cinnamon buns. We thought that was sweet and funny. But best of all, for the 
first time I saw the girls smile. 
11.4 In court 
On 11 March, we had our day in court. The prosecutor was unable to locate the 
policeman my husband talked to, while the policeman I talked to did not 
recollect our conversation. The prosecutor suggested a combined fine of DKK 
45,000 (about £4,000), or fourteen days in prison. Our lawyer stressed that what 
we had done was motivated by humanitarian reasons and that the circumstances 
were extraordinary – the police had not known what to do and the Government 
was quiet on the subject. It took the judge about twenty minutes to consider 
before he passed his verdict, which was in accordance with the prosecutor’s 
suggestion. 
 I was angry. Outside, the media was waiting, and I told them I was angry. 
Angry about being criminalized for acting with simple human decency. ‘We are 
not people smugglers,’ I told them. ‘We are ordinary people helping fellow 
human beings in distress.’ Many other people were angry – astonished, even – 
and journalists from all over the world were soon in touch: the Guardian, 
the Independent, the BBC, Reuters, Associated Press, Al Jazeera, the Washing-
ton Post, El Pais, El Mundo – Swedish, Finnish, Norwegian, German, Dutch 
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and Canadian media outlets all wanted to tell the story of the Danish court order 
that criminalized ordinary human decency. 
 We were not surprised by their interest. The judgement challenged universal 
human values, the simple drive to help people in distress. Most of us, regardless 
of religion, are brought up with a set of values that underlines the importance of 
doing just this. Even I, growing up in a socially dysfunctional home on the 
wrong side of the tracks, had learned that. This is what we teach our children. 
 When a Danish court punishes people for helping refugees, it contradicts our 
core human values. This is especially poignant in a country known for its 
universal welfare system, designed to help everyone in need. I never knew that 
decency, generosity, charity – whatever you choose to call it – was reserved for 
people with valid travel documents. 
 What message does the judgment send to our children? Just hours after the 
court order was passed, a young man called us about some hungry refugees he 
had met on the street in Copenhagen. Fearing legal repercussions, he didn’t 
know whether he should help them or not. That’s what the judgment teaches our 
children. We used to teach them that helping Jews flee to Sweden during World 
War II was a heroic effort. How things have changed. 
11.5 Higher Courts 
We appealed the judgment, and the case went to the Danish High Court. Our 
anger was shared by many people. A Danish jazz musician, Benjamin Koppel, 
set up a fundraiser to cover the fine. Contributions poured in. Within a few days 
people had donated more than DKK 160,000 (£15,000), far exceeding the target. 
Most of the donations were small, but there were many of them. We saw this as 
a public demonstration against the court order – our opponents, however, 
attacked the fund, claiming that is was illegal. They reported us to the tax 
authorities. I have never met so much hatred as I have in this period – for helping 
refugees. The fund was all in good order. We decided to use the money to help 
pay the fines of others who have been persecuted for doing the same thing we 
did. There are hundreds – some are young students, some pensioners, some have 
large families and little to spare. Any surplus is donated to unaccompanied child 
refugees. 
 Surprisingly, there was almost no political reaction to our case. One 
parliamentarian on the far left did criticize the judgment, but otherwise nobody 
commented. The question of changing the law, or challenging it, was not raised. 
But anti-Muslim sentiments are very strong in Denmark today, and people vote 
accordingly. Kindness towards Muslims scares away voters, so there is no room 
for kindness in government. On the contrary, measure after measure is being 
taken to make the life of the refugees as miserable as possible. People are housed 
in tents, even in winter, even though better accommodation is available. The 
refugees are searched for valuables when they enter Denmark, and met with 
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ludicrous demands when applying for asylum, reunion with their families or 
permanent citizenship. The Danish government has published ads in Middle 
Eastern newspapers warning refugees to stay away from our country. To me it 
seems that we have sacrificed the human decency Danish society is built on. 
 To put our court order in perspective, a Danish man who spat on refugees 
passing below a motorway bridge received a fine of DKK 5,000 (£450). While 
it should be recognized that our legal system still finds it a criminal offense to 
abuse people in distress – hooray for small victories – it also shows that spitting 
on refugees is a milder offense than helping them. On 21 September 2016, the 
Danish High Court ruled on our appeal. The verdict was upheld. We now know 
that it is a criminal offence to help refugees in distress on Danish highways, 
even if it’s just a lift down the road or a cup of coffee, no matter what the 
circumstances. 
 We tried to take our case to the Danish Supreme Court. However, appeals 
against a high courts’ decision are subject to permission from the Appeals Per-
mission Board. This Board turned us down. They considered our case not to be 
principal enough. 
 Our last resort was the European Court of Human Rights. Sadly, the 
Strasbourg Court declared our application inadmissible in the summer of 2017. 
11.6 What is next? 
We must continue discussing the refugee situation, and how our society and the 
countries around Europe should react to the human disaster currently unfolding 
in Syria. How many people are we able to help, and where, and how, should we 
help them? This is a debate with many questions and seemingly few answers. 
Refusing to help the people standing right in front of us, needing care and 
assistance, corrupts our moral values and perceptions about decency and 
common humanity. It is a dangerous path to choose. It breeds a cynicism that 
may well poison the remnants of solidarity in Denmark, and actually unravel 
the social fabric that some of our opponents, in a misguided way, are actually 
trying to protect. Right now, too many people are quietly looking on while our 
core values are being undermined, because defending them may prove too 
expensive in terms of public opinion. I thought we were better than that. Really, 
I did. 
 The Danish state church is Protestant, and we call ourselves Christians. We 
tell our children the story about the good Samaritan who did not turn his back. 
We demand that immigrants in our country learn, and adopt, our Danish values. 
So how are they expected to understand that in Denmark we punish people for 
compassion? 
 My husband and I could not have acted differently. It would have been a 
betrayal of everything we hold dear and believe in, including what we teach our 
children. 

 Chapter 12 Piety or ulterior motive 
Legal assessment of belief authenticity of Pastafarians  
and converted asylum seekers 
Derk Venema 
12.1 Introduction 
How do Dutch government institutions judge whether someone really has the 
religion they say they have? In this contribution, I will compare two cases. The 
first case concerns Pastafarians (members of the Church of the Flying Spaghetti 
Monster, FSM) who wish to appear in their ID photo wearing their religious 
headgear, the colander. The other case involves asylum seekers who claim the 
right to asylum based on their conversion to a faith whose adherents are 
persecuted in their country of origin. The Pastafarian case also has implications 
for the more general question of how governments (should) treat religions that 
are new, unknown, weird or small, in short ‘NUWS’ religions, making this case 
also relevant for the theme of migration and religious freedom, because 
immigrants sometimes bring NUWS religions with them.  
 In both cases, private individuals file an application to gain certain rights or 
privileges based on their religion. To achieve this, they need recognition of their 
religious status from the authorities. In both cases, too, the authorities are 
suspicious and reluctant: the conversions and the FSM religion are often deemed 
not credible, because they are suspected of being devised as mere instruments 
to acquire a residence permit and to publicly express criticism of religion. These 
goals are viewed as the ‘real’ ulterior motives. 
 After a brief look at the role of religion in society, especially in the 
Netherlands, I will discuss the attitudes and actions of civil servants handling 
ID renewals for Pastafarians and interviewing converted asylum seekers and 
judges in court cases about both topics. In my concluding remarks, I will make 
some policy suggestions. 
12.2 Religion and society  
Religion, like morality is not so much a spiritual instrument for countering bio-
logical urges, but itself a product of biological evolution.1 In a Darwinian 
                                                      
1  Dawkins 1992, Boyer 2001, Wilson 2002. 
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process of group selection, the human brain acquired the capacity to produce 
artefacts, language and ideas, which led to the formation of many different 
cultures. Those cultures developed further in an evolutionary process of their 
own, in interaction with the biological evolution of the human species (gene-
culture coevolution)2. 
 From that perspective, the main functions of religion are promoting in-group 
cooperation and procreation, and maintaining group identity. To perform that 
function, religions need to be sufficiently adaptive to changing circumstances. 
Over the centuries, some religions have done this very successfully, some have 
died out, and new ones are constantly being born, whether branching off from a 
‘parent’ religion (e.g., the many forms of Protestantism), composed from 
elements of several different religions (syncretisms or patchwork religions like 
Sufism or Unitarianism) or newly ‘invented’, often inspired by existing reli-
gions (like Rastafari, Scientology, UFO-religions, neo-pagan and new age 
religions).  
 In the Netherlands, the adaptability of the traditional religions (Catholicism 
and various factions of Protestantism) to modern society has been diminishing 
rapidly for half a century and new religious or spiritual movements have filled 
only a very small part of the gap.3 Due to immigration since the 1960s, Islam 
has established itself in the Netherlands as the religion of about 5% of the 
inhabitants.4  
 Since the Second World War, different kinds of spiritual movements have 
appeared in the Western world that deviate considerably from traditional forms 
of religion. Some are inspired by literary of cinematographic fiction, like the 
Church of All Worlds (1962), Jediism (2000) and Matrixism (2004), some by 
science fiction, like Scientology (1955), and some have other roots in 
(post)modern culture, like Discordianism (1963), the Church of the Sub-Genius 
(1970s), Kopimism (2012) and the Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster 
(FSM) or Pastafarianism (2005). All feature at least the elements ‘new’ and 
‘weird’ of NUWS religions. These movements are variously called ‘parody 
religions’, ‘fake cults’, ‘invented religions’ or ‘hyper-real religions’. Of those 
mentioned, only Pastafarianism has gained a substantial following in The 
Netherlands. 
 Denying them the status of religion might at first glance seem logical, as they 
have been constructed very recently and appear satirical or dishonest or having 
a purpose very different from traditional religions. This conclusion would be 
premature, however, because, although there are many competing functionalist 
and essentialist definitions, there is nothing near a generally agreed upon 
scientific definition of religion. Defining religion has even become somewhat 
                                                      
2  Richerson & Boyd 2005, Mesoudi 2011. 
3  Bernts & Berghuis 2016. 
4  Schmeets 2016. 
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of a power struggle.5 A very general definition by properties could be: a com-
position of myths, rituals, holy texts, a concept of history and a vision of the 
future.6 Moreover, it is impossible to distinguish the religiousness of adherents 
to new and weird religions from the religiosity of people who identify as 
Christians or Muslims. And satirical elements or origins do not necessarily 
disqualify a movement as a religion.7 Because of the difficulties in defining 
religion, the Dutch government (and other Western governments) usually adopt 
very broad concepts of religion.8  
 Although the social and societal role of organised religion has diminished 
very much, religious freedom is still held in high regard by politicians and 
lawyers. Not many endorse the pleas of some jurists who propose deleting 
freedom of religion from constitutions and treaties because of its purported 
redundancy. Nonetheless, in many countries, non-religious ‘beliefs’ (Article 9 
European Convention on Human Rights) or ‘world views’ are now protected on 
a par with religion, indicating that the difference between religious and non-
religious belief systems or opinions is no longer thought of as absolute. In any 
event, deep personal ethical convictions (religious or not) are still generally 
considered an important matter, and not the government’s business. Expressions 
of those convictions in actions such as performing rites and stating religious 
views are often better protected or more facilitated than actions of members of 
non-religious associations or the expression of non-religious opinions.  
12.3 Rule application in people processing organisations 
Many procedures involving civilians and civil service institutions can be 
described as ‘people processing’. The way these procedures are conducted is 
determined by two important institutional characteristics: the institutions have 
a monopoly on the service rendered, and, as they are not commercial, they do 
not have anything to lose from unsatisfied ‘customers’, at least not directly. This 
means that clients do not have alternative institutions from which to choose and 
that they are dependent on the benevolence of the civil servants. In this position, 
clients tend to accept the legitimacy of the civil servants handling their requests. 
Clients do not interact with the officials on the basis of a utilitarian calculation 
or trust, but rather out of fear.9 This makes it very important that those officials 
are instructed and encouraged to make reasonable decisions awarding due 
weight to the interests of the applicants. 
 The organisations relevant here, municipal civil affairs departments, courts 
of law and the Dutch Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND), are people 
                                                      
5  Possamai 2012. 
6  Hammer & Rothstein 2012. 
7  Cusack 2010. 
8  Bijsterveld & Vermeulen 2016; Broeksteeg 2016. 
9  Lipsky 2010, p. 54-57. 
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processing organisations. In these organisations, the officials dealing with 
applicants or plaintiffs have the possibility to create locally their own work 
routines and criteria within the limits of their competence. Although these 
varying routines and criteria are created in practice in response to the unclear fit 
between general legal rules and concrete cases, they may create legal uncer-
tainty themselves: civilian parties do not know these unpublished practical 
criteria that do not necessarily correspond to the official policy objectives of the 
service organisation, and may not always be observed by the people who created 
them.10 Although judges are more highly educated and trained specifically to 
apply general rules to particular (classes of) cases in uniform ways, they too 
struggle with this, resulting in the well-known phenomenon of differences in 
style and policy between different courts or between judges in the same court.  
 Political pressure and public opinion can be important factors in determining 
whether street-level bureaucrats in people processing organisations are more or 
less trusting of applicants/plaintiffs and consequently more or less inclined to 
approve the application of certain rules.11 The finding of Bardach & Kagan in 
their well-known work Going by the Book, that administrative agencies are 
inclined to enforce rules more legalistically and restrictively when the public 
perceives them as being too permissive and lax,12 is especially interesting with 
regard to decision making in asylum procedures.  
 Hearing similar stories repetitively in different asylum cases can cause civil 
servants to, ‘consciously or unconsciously, categorize applications into generic 
case profiles and make predetermined assumptions about their credibility and 
other issues’.13 Conversely, when being confronted with a new and strange 
religion for the first time, also tends to make decision makers suspicious rather 
than merely surprised, intrigued or amused, as will be shown hereafter. 
 There are two further important factors in the relationship between people 
processing organisations and their clients. The first is that they expect clients to 
act rationally and give complete, accurate, plausible, timely, detailed, articulate 
and consistent statements throughout the procedures, on penalty of losing on the 
grounds of non-credibility.14 These are also the standards developed by the 
International Association of Refugee Law Judges15 and by the European Court 
of Human Rights, the UNHCR and the Committee Against Torture.16 The other, 
related, factor is the fact that professionals – like municipal civil servants, 
Immigration Service interviewers and judges – are not better at lie detection 
than anybody else.17 Understandably, the UNHCR researchers who investigated 
the practice of credibility assessment in asylum procedures in the EU were 
                                                      
10  Doornbos 2011, p. 102-103. 
11  Kagan 2006. 
12  Bardach & Kagan 1982. 
13  UNHCR 2013, p. 40; Garlick 2013, p. 55-57. 
14  Doornbos 2006, p. 39-50. 
15  Barnes & Mackey 2013, p. 127-130. 
16  Baldinger 2015, p. 471-472. 
17  Doornbos 2006, p. 32-37 & p. 282-283. 
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surprised ‘to note that many decision-makers interviewed in this research have 
stated that the credibility assessment was not one they found particularly 
difficult and that it was a straightforward task’.18 
 All this needs to be taken into account when assessing the assessments 
administrative and court decision makers make about the credibility of 
applicants’ religion, in both the Spaghetti Monster and the asylum cases. 
12.4 The Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster 
In 2005, Bobby Henderson from Portland, Oregon, sent a letter to the Kansas 
Board of Education in reaction to their decision to oblige schools to teach 
intelligent design theory alongside evolution theory in biology class.19 He wrote 
that there were different versions of intelligent design, and that the version 
including an all-powerful flying bunch of spaghetti and meatballs should not be 
omitted. Henderson also included some mock-scientific evidence. 
Subsequently, he wrote the Gospel of the Flying Spaghetti Monster (2006), and 
later the Loose Canon appeared. The satire is most striking. Through the 
internet, the FSM became very popular and churches were founded in his name 
by Pastafarians all over the world; national branches can be found in most 
Western countries. In Pastafari heaven there are stripper factories and beer 
volcanos, just like in hell, only there the beer is lukewarm and the strippers have 
sexually transmittable diseases. Some important rituals are: wearing pirate 
clothing on certain occasions, wearing a colander on the head, and consuming 
pasta and beer on Fridays. The most important ethical standards are written in 
the eight I’d-really-rather-you-didn’ts, received by pirate Mosey on clay tablets 
on top of mount Salsa from the FSM himself:20 
 
1. I’d really rather you didn’t act like a sanctimonious holier-
than-thou ass when describing my noodly goodness. If some 
people don’t believe in me, that’s okay. Really, I’m not that 
vain. Besides, this isn’t about them so don’t change the 
subject. 
2. I’d really rather you didn’t use my existence as a means to 
oppress, subjugate, punish, eviscerate, and/or, you know, be 
mean to others. I don’t require sacrifices, and purity is for 
drinking water, not people. 
3. I’d really rather you didn’t judge people for the way they 
look, or how they dress, or the way they talk, or, well, just 
play nice, okay? Oh, and get this in your thick heads: 
woman = person. man = person. Samey – samey. One is not 
                                                      
18  UNHCR 2013, p. 33. 
19  See the official US website: <www.venganza.org>.  
20  Henderson 2006, p. 98-101. 
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better than the other, unless we’re talking about fashion and 
I’m sorry, but I gave that to women and some guys who 
know the difference between teal and fuchsia. 
4.  I’d really rather you didn’t indulge in conduct that offends 
yourself, or your willing, consenting partner of legal age 
and mental maturity. As for anyone who might object, I think 
the expression is go f*** yourself, unless they find that 
offensive in which case they can turn off the TV for once and 
go for a walk for a change. 
5. I’d really rather you didn’t challenge the bigoted, 
misogynist, hateful ideas of others on an empty stomach. 
Eat, then go after the b*******. 
6. I’d really rather you didn’t build multimillion-dollar 
churches/temples/mosques/shrines to my noodly goodness 
when the money could be better spent (take your pick): 
(1). Ending poverty 
(2). Curing diseases 
(3). Living in peace, loving with passion, and lowering the 
cost of cable 
I might be a complex-carbohydrate omniscient being, but I 
enjoy the simple things in life. I ought to know. I am the 
creator.  
7. I’d really rather you didn’t go around telling people I talk 
to you. You’re not that interesting. Get over yourself. And I 
told you to love your fellow man, can’t you take a hint? 
8.  I’d really rather you didn’t do unto others as you would 
have them do unto you if you are into, um, stuff that uses a 
lot of leather/lubricant/Las Vegas. If the other person is into 
it, however (pursuant to #4), then have at it, take pictures, 
and for the love of mike, wear a condom! Honestly, it’s a 
piece of rubber. If I didn’t want it to feel good when you did 
it I would have added spikes, or something. 
 
From this it is clear that Pastafarians have an ethic of friendliness, non-violence, 
tolerance, sobriety (in the intellectual sense), modesty, relativism, critical 
thinking, joy and humour. Wearing a colander in public is a veritable exercise 
in humility. The elements of parody or satire together with the critique of certain 
behaviour of members of other religions have caused many angry reactions from 
members of more traditional religions who feel mocked.21 
                                                      
21  <www.venganza.org/category/hate-mail>.  
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12.5 The Pastafarian colander cases 
Inspired by passages from the Gospel of the FSM and the Loose Canon, and 
possibly direct communication from His Noodliness, many Pastafarians wear 
colanders on their head: 
Then the FSM saw that the wickedness of Man was great on 
earth, and that every thought of the little midget was ruled 
by his stomach. Then the FSM said, “Fine, I’ll just cook for 
myself”, and He produced a great Colander of Goodness 
and He did collect water in an enormous pot, (…)’.22  
But as TV hadn't been invented yet, Penelope put the Holy 
Colander on her head and grabbed a handy pair of salad 
tongs. She decided to take a short nap under a meatball tree. 
Naps had been invented just last week and Penelope was 
nothing if not a trend setter.23  
Some wear them more regularly than others, but over the whole world, 
Pastafarians have applied for driver’s licences and other photo IDs, handing in 
photos in which they are wearing a colander.  
 
 
 <www.venganza.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/azlicense.jpg> 
 
Many applications have been successful, an unknown number have been 
rejected. I will discuss the arguments of the Dutch mayors (who formally issue 
IDs) and courts in question that are relevant for the freedom and equal treatment 
of religion. 
 
                                                      
22  Henderson 2006, p. 73-74. 
23  Loose Canon, Book of Penelope, Ch. 2, verse 7; Ch. 3, verse 7-8 
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 In the Dutch regulations for photos on IDs there is an exception to the rule 
that forbids headwear:24 
Deviating from section 2 [banning headwear], a photo 
[with headwear] can be accepted if the applicant has shown 
that there are religious or world view reasons against not 
covering the head.25 
This means that Pastafarians wishing to appear in the ID photo with their 
colander must convince the court to answer the following questions in the 
affirmative:  
(1) Is Pastafarianism a religion/world view, or not? and  
(2) Does the Pastafarian plaintiff have real religious reasons against not 
wearing the colander in the photograph?  
I will explain how four Dutch courts answered these questions in three court 
cases. Interestingly, the courts all used different approaches to the two 
questions, but reached the same final conclusion. In the latter two cases, against 
the mayors of Eindhoven and Nijmegen, I acted as legal counsel for the Pasta-
farian applicants. I am not a member of the FSM Church myself. 
12.5.1 Is Pastafarianism a religion or belief? 
In the first case, against the mayor of Emmen, the court neatly avoided judging 
on the content of Pastafarianism. Concerning the first question, the court merely 
stated that, ‘at the hearing, together with both parties, it has been determined 
that Pastafarianism is in any case a world view present in Dutch society’. 
Nevertheless, the Pastafarian plaintiff could not invoke the exception clause, 
because the court ruled negatively on the second question: the Pastafarian also 
let non-religious reasons determine when he wore his colander, taking it off 
when helping clients.26 He could thus not convince the court that the ‘religious 
reasons against not covering the head’ in the ID photo were pressing enough.  
 The criterion the ECtHR uses to determine whether something is a ‘religion 
or belief’ is that it must ‘attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion 
and importance’.27 Movements thus recognized as religions include: Hinduism, 
Scientology, pacifism, atheism, Buddhism, Druidism, Devine Light Zentrum, 
and the Osho Movement.28 In the case against the mayor of Eindhoven, the court 
used the second element, seriousness, to reach the conclusion that 
                                                      
24  Article 28(3) Paspoortuitvoeringsregeling Nederland 
25  Article 28(3) (Dutch) Paspoortuitvoeringsregeling: ‘In afwijking van het tweede lid kan een 
pasfoto worden geaccepteerd indien de aanvrager heeft aangetoond dat godsdienstige of 
levensbeschouwelijke redenen zich verzetten tegen het niet bedekken van het hoofd’. 
26  Rechtbank [Dutch District Court] Noord-Nederland 28 July 2016, ECLI:NL:RBMNE 
:2016:3626. 
27  ECtHR 25 February 1982, 7743/76 & 7511/76, Campbell & Cosans v. United Kingdom. 
28  White & Claire 2010, p. 404-405 and cited cases. 
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Pastafarianism, as a satirical form of religion criticism, was not itself a religion, 
citing the eight I’d-really-rather-you-didn’ts and Bobby Henderson’s letter to 
the Kansas Board of Education.29 The court’s reasoning was especially 
interesting because it might be used more widely to disqualify NUWS religions: 
the content of the religious beliefs was deemed not credible. The court 
specifically noted that the eight I’d-really-rather-you-didn’ts were, purportedly, 
many centuries old, yet they spoke of ‘lowering the cost of cable’. This approach 
is surprising, as courts normally observe ‘interpretative restraint’ regarding the 
content and expressions of religions.30 Furthermore, the court did not, as little 
as the ECtHR does, specify how high the ‘level of seriousness’ must be and how 
this was measured. The court also did not answer the plaintiff’s argument that 
the eight I’d-really-rather-you-didn’ts contained a very serious ethic. 
 If courts assessed all religions with this not very restrained method, 
traditional religions would also have to be disqualified, as the website of the 
FSM church explains:  
Elements of our religion are sometimes described as satire 
and there are many members who do not literally believe 
our scripture, but this isn’t unusual in religion. A lot of 
Christians don’t believe the Bible is literally true – but that 
doesn’t mean they aren’t True Christians. If you say 
Pastafarians must believe in a literal Flying Spaghetti 
Monster to be True Believers, then you can make a similar 
argument for Christians. There is a lot of outlandish stuff in 
the Bible that rational Christians choose to ignore.31   
If the mayor could show that the FSM was an elaborate expression of an opinion 
but not a religion or belief, he could make the valid point that an ID photo was 
not the place to ventilate opinions. Opinions do not fall under the category of 
‘religion or beliefs’ and are not protected by the freedom of religion (Art. 6 
Dutch Constitution), but by the freedom of speech (Art. 7 Dutch Constitution). 
In the scholarship of new religious movements, however, it has been argued that 
applying humour or having a joking founder does not disqualify the followers 
of a faith from being real believers.32 
 Finally, the silence of the plaintiff, who left the talking to his counsel, was 
interpreted as the inability to answer questions about his belief independently, 
and used as an additional argument for the lack of seriousness. 
                                                      
29  Rechtbank [Dutch District Court] Oost-Brabant, 15 February 2016, ECLI:NL:RBOBR 
:2017:762. 
30  Bijsterveld & Vermeulen 2016, par. 4. See also: Hof [Dutch Court of Appeal] Arnhem 11 
July 1984, NJ 1985/536 and CRvB 17 November 1994, AB 1995/322. 
31  <www.venganza.org/about>.  
32  Cusack 2010, p. 136-137. 
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12.5.2 Are there religious reasons for wearing the colander? 
This argument was used in the case against the mayor of Nijmegen. The two 
courts involved did not answer the first question: Is Pastafarianism a religion, 
or world view, or not? But concentrated instead on the second one: does the 
Pastafarian plaintiff have real religious reasons against not wearing the colander 
in the photograph? The habit of wearing a colander can be traced back to the 
passages from the Gospel of the FSM quoted above. There is no explicit order 
in any of the scriptures to wear a colander, but neither is there explicit obligation 
for women to wear a headscarf in the Quran either, the two surahs most cited in 
this context being: 
surah 24:30–31: 
And say to the believing women […] that they should draw 
their khimār over their breasts and not display their beauty 
except to their husband, their fathers, […] 
and surah 33:59: 
O Prophet! Enjoin your wives, your daughters, and the 
wives of true believers that they should cast their outer 
garments over their persons (when abroad): That is most 
convenient, that they may be distinguished and not be 
harassed. 
In a preliminary injunction hearing, in which the plaintiff asked for a remedy 
for the problem of not having a valid driver’s licence, the judge ruled that ‘the 
plaintiff hasn’t succeeded in showing that the Flying Spaghetti Monster forbids 
her to appear on an ID photo without a colander’.33 At the hearing, the judge 
said with regard to inconveniences like not having a valid driver’s licence 
anymore: ‘maybe that’s just the problem of a new religion’. 
 In the proceedings on the merits, the court demanded an explicit obligation 
in holy scriptures, and found none.34 According to the court, ‘Pastafarianism 
does not know any obligations or restrictions’. First, this presupposes a very 
specific and narrow interpretation of the exception clause which speaks only of 
‘religious reasons’, not of obligations or explicit commandments. And secondly, 
by interpreting religious rites and scriptures in this way, the court, just as in the 
Eindhoven case, did not observe interpretative restraint. The Netherlands 
Institute for Human Rights has repeatedly ruled that religious behaviour should 
be accepted as such when declared by the believer: that some Muslim women 
do not wear headscarves is no reason to doubt the religious obligation of those 
                                                      
33  Rechtbank [Dutch District Court] Gelderland, 17 January 2017, ECLI:NL:RBGEL 
:2017:275. 
34  Rechtbank [Dutch District Court] Overijssel, 25 July 2017, not yet published. 
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that do.35 The committee even mentioned the social pressure applied to women 
who wear head scarves, and seemed to suggest that that was the reason for 
permitting them to wear headscarves in ID photos. 
 These lines of argument by government institutions are the same as were 
used in a similar German case where a Pastafarian wished to appear on his ID 
card with pirate headgear.36 It reveals not only the common tendency to judge 
the authenticity of a religion by (consciously or not) comparing it to traditional 
religions,37 but also the zealousness to disqualify the FSM church. In this 
respect, a quasi-legal argument from the mayor of Eindhoven is interesting, 
because it had no legal basis and apparently was meant to confuse and 
discourage the applicant. It was argued that it was impossible for the applicant 
to get his license renewed because the expiry date was still so far away (two 
years). The court quickly brushed this aside.38 
12.5.3  No threat to the purpose of the regulation 
An important point to note is that wearing a colander in an ID photo does not 
impair the recognisability of the holder at all. So, the problem for IDs is not 
really that serious. Colanders can be worn in a way that more of the face is 
visible than with permitted types of hijab or turban.39 An interesting comparison 
can be made with the types of cases in which the behaviour of the suspect (these 
were criminal cases) did impair the goal of the relevant legislation which, 
moreover, had no exception clause. Nevertheless, several courts have ruled that 
an exception must be made on the grounds of freedom of religion.40 These cases 
concerned members of the Santo Daime Church, an amalgam of Catholicism 
and indigenous South American religion. In their sacred rituals, the believers 
drink the hallucinogenic Ayahuasca tea, which contains dimethyltryptamine. 
This drug is on the list of forbidden drugs together with heroin, cocaine and 
amphetamine. But because the drug is consumed in small quantities in a 
controlled setting, freedom of religion could prevail. In these cases the courts 
readily recognize the religion in question (maybe because it contains a heavy 
portion of Catholicism?), step over the dangers of breaking the law (public 
                                                      
35  College voor de Rechten van de Mens (Netherlands Institute for Human Rights): CRM 26 
May 2016, 2016-45, section 4.3; CRM 9 June 2015, 2015-67, section 3.3; CRM 16 October 
2014, 2014-125, section 3.6. 
36  Wakonigg & Rath 2017. 
37  Cusack 2010. 
38  Rechtbank [Dutch District Court] Oost-Brabant, 15 February 2016, ECLI:NL:RBOBR:2017 
:762. 
39  See examples: <www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/brochures/2014/02/18/fotomatrix-
2007>.  
40  Rechtbank [Dutch District Court] Amsterdam 21 May 2001, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2001: 
AB1739, AB 2001, 342, m.nt. Vermeulen; Rechtbank [Dutch District Court] Haarlem 26 
March 2009, ECLI:NL:RBHAA:2009:BH9844; Hof [Dutch Court of Appeal] Amsterdam 
24 February 2012, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2012:BV6888; Rechtbank [Dutch District Court] 
Noord-Holland 8 September 2016, ECLI:NL:RBNHO:2016:7557. 
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health risks) and create an exception to that law. In all three of these respects, 
accepting colander photos is less harmful to law and society.  
12.5.4 Real fake religions 
It is also instructive to compare the Church of the FSM with genuinely fake 
religions such as the Smokers’ Church, founded to find a way around the ban 
on smoking in cafes and the Sisters of Saint Walburga, who said they were a 
section of the Church of Satan, only to evade regular police checks in their 
brothel. These ‘religions’ were not accepted as such by government institutions 
in the Netherlands, witness a Supreme Court ruling on the Walburga Sisters,41 
a fine for a café run by a member of the Smokers’ Church,42 and a court ruling 
on a fellow inhaler in Belgium. The Ghent court even noted that appealing to a 
membership of the Smokers’ Church showed ‘arrogance and disdain’.43  
 Contrary to these fake churches, the FSM church was not founded with the 
purpose of evading certain laws, not even with the purpose of acquiring photo 
IDs with colander photos. It was the other way around: first, the holy headgear 
appeared, and subsequently the ID photo problem emerged. After discussing 
how refugees’ religious conversions are judged, I will consider some explana-
tions for the institutional hesitations in both cases. 
12.6 Vetting converts 
The way Dutch authorities view and treat Pastafarians applying for IDs with 
colander photos shows similarities with the treatment of asylum seekers who 
put forward their religious conversion (usually to Christianity) and subsequent 
risk of persecution in their home country as a basis for their right to asylum. In 
these cases, refugee status, and subsequently asylum, is awarded to those who 
succeed in convincing the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND), acting 
on behalf of the Dutch Minister for Migration, that they will probably be 
persecuted in their home country on the basis of religion.44 This means that an 
applicant must show either that he is a member of a religious group which is 
(known to be) persecuted, or that the authorities in his home country see him as 
a member of such a group. When conversion, and thus the creation of the 
persecution risk, takes place after arrival in the Netherlands, making the 
applicant a refugié sur place, the refugee has to show that the authorities in his 
                                                      
41  HR [Dutch Supreme Court] 31 October 1986, NJ 1987/173. 
42  <www.nu.nl/algemeen/1694329/rokerskerk-krijgt-eerste-boete.html>. 
43 <www.legalworld.be/legalworld/uploadedFiles/Rechtspraak/De_Juristenkrant>. 
44  Art. 3.2 Policy Guidelines on the Aliens Act; Art. 29(1a) Aliens Act; Art. 3.37(2) Aliens 
Regulation. 
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home country know, or will probably learn about the conversion.45 After discus-
sing the most important (case) law, I will give some examples of IND inter-
rogations. 
12.6.1 Refugee converts: law and case law 
The law does not demand that the alien proves the reality of his inner struggle 
and the sincerity of his new religious convictions – on the contrary: 
In assessing whether the alien’s fear of persecution in the 
sense of the Refugee Convention 1951 is founded, it is not 
relevant whether the alien in fact bears the racial, religious, 
national, social or political qualities causing the perse-
cution, if these qualities are attributed to him by the per-
secuting agent.46  
Nevertheless, the refugee’s true religiousness plays a crucial role in the 
questioning by the IND and in the credibility assessment of the refugee’s 
statements. The IND work instructions specify several ‘credibility indicators’ 
for assessing refugees’ statements. Relevant here are the indicators ‘degree of 
detail and specificity’ and ‘internal consistency’.47 This fits with the widely 
adhered standards mentioned earlier.48 In the interviews by the IND with regard 
to conversions a questionnaire is used containing questions that can be divided 
into four categories.49 The first is the motives for and process of the conversion, 
including a possible baptism. The Minister assumes that a bona fide conversion 
is always a ‘deliberate and well-considered choice’.50 Secondly, the applicant 
must explain the personal significance of his conversion or his new faith. Basic 
knowledge of his new religion is the third category, and, finally, when the 
convert attends church services, their location, times and the way they proceed 
are subjects of questioning. The Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the 
Council of State (ABRvS), the highest appeal court for asylum cases in the 
Netherlands, has accepted these aspects as relevant for the credibility question 
and has also accepted that the first category, motives for and process of 
conversion, is of crucial importance. 
 This practice is in line with the government’s policy, which has been adopted 
by the ABRvS. This court agreed with the Minister that it is ‘the refugee’s 
                                                      
45  Art. 3.2 Policy Guidelines on the Aliens Act; Art. 3.37b, Aliens Regulation. 
46  Art. 3.37(2) Aliens Regulation. A rare application of this rule is Rechtbank [District Court] 
Den Haag January 18, 2017, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2017:484, point 23.2.1. 
47  Werkinstructie 2014/10 (1 January 2015), par. 3.2.1.1 <ind.nl/Documents 
/WI_2014_10.pdf>.  
48  See above, notes 14-16 and accompanying text 
49  ABRvS [Dutch Council of State] 24 May 2013, 201109839/1/V2, 
ECLI:NL:RVS:2013CA:0955, point 3.2. 
50  ABRvS [Dutch Council of State] 24 May 2013, 201109839/1/V2, ECLI:NL:RVS:2013CA 
:0955, point 6. 
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responsibility to offer convincing statements to the Minister concerning his 
conversion and the process leading up to it.’ According to the appeal court, 
courts can therefore leave aside any expert evidence about the conversion, 
awarding overriding importance to the refugee’s statements.51 In a brochure, the 
IND explains that files often contain letters from clergy members declaring that 
the refugee has truly converted to Christianity and/or is active in the church. 
Nevertheless, the IND explains: ‘These letters are written with the best 
intentions, but are not always motivated by truth finding. We consider these 
letters in the decision making process, but never as a decisive factor’.52 What is 
not mentioned in this brochure, is other assessment reports on conversions 
sometimes submitted: by the Gave Foundation, advising various churches on 
converted asylum seekers in their congregation, by the Plaisier Commission, 
consisting of theologians of the Dutch Protestant Churches, and by professor of 
psychology of religion Joke van Saane.53 According to the Minister, all reports 
and letters are considered ‘seriously’ in the IND procedures,54 but in the light of 
the foregoing this does not give any guarantees.  
 What makes things worse, is that, based on the ABRvS case law, courts can 
dismiss any of the reports mentioned. The standard formula is as stated in the 
IND brochure: any ‘report can serve to support the alien’s conversion, but 
doesn’t diminish the refugee’s responsibility to offer convincing statements to 
the Minister concerning his conversion and the process leading up to it.’55 A 
district court went even further in its interpretation of this characterization of a 
report by professor Van Saane and disqualified it as an expert report altogether. 
This  means that in these cases any kind of report can be dismissed as ‘not expert 
evidence’, so that courts may ignore the findings of these reports without having 
the obligation to base their dismissal on alternative expert evidence.56 Not 
surprisingly, this worries aliens law advocate Frans-Willem Verbaas, who 
rightly asks: ‘Does the ABRvS really think that IND employees are better 
equipped to judge whether someone has honestly converted than a professor in 
the psychology of religion or an expert on the religion the refugee says he has 
converted to?’ With this criticism he finds himself in the company of several 
courts.57 The UNHCR has criticised the demand for positive persuasiveness of 
refugee statements, citing cases in which ‘one mistake in response to a question 
                                                      
51  ABRvS [Dutch Council of State] 5 June 2015, 201410596/1/V2, ECLI:NL:RVS:2015:1911. 
See also: ABRvS [Dutch Council of State] 24 May 2013, 201109839/1/V2, ECLI:NL:RVS 
:2013CA:0955, point 1.4. 
52  IND 2015. 
53  Verbaas 2016, p.25-26. 
54  Meeting of the Permanent Parliamentary Justice Commission, 4 June 2015, Kamerstukken II 
2014/15, 19637, 2025, p. 30. 
55  ABRvS 3 July 2015, ECLI:NL:RVS:2015:2187, point 1.4. 
56  For example: Rechtbank [Dutch District Court] Den Haag zp Rotterdam, Augustus 19, 2015, 
AWB 15/5011, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2015:6008, JV 2015/303, point 7.9, referring to ABRvS 
[Dutch Council of State]  3 July 2015, ECLI:NL:RVS:2015:2187. 
57  Verbaas 2016, p.27-28. 
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assessing general knowledge in relation to a material fact [suffices] to determine 
that the claim is not credible. For example, if an applicant is asked to name three 
villages in a particular area, and only one named village is correct, according to 
the Council of State, the determining authority can reasonably conclude that the 
claim is not positively persuasive.58 Certificates of baptism may be judged as 
unimportant as expert evidence or church statements.59 
 More recently, the ABRvS has, in addition to the foregoing, explicitly stated 
that professor Van Saane’s reports are also not decisive because, first, the IND 
applies the same method as Van Saane, who gives workshops for IND 
employees, and secondly, her reports only deal with the conversion and do not 
assess all the refugee’s statements in the procedure as a whole.60 The latter 
argument is probably meant to render the duty to use alternative expert evidence 
non-applicable on the grounds of incompleteness.61 But that would be ironic, or 
even cynical, because, as mentioned above, the ABRvS agreed with the Minister 
that he does not have to consider the other elements mentioned in the IND work 
instruction besides the conversion itself. Frustrating every possible guarantee of 
expert evidence being taken seriously is in stark contrast to the great importance 
attached to equality of arms by the ECtHR in administrative cases in Korošec.62 
I will discuss some of the rejections these criteria allow for in the next section. 
12.6.2  Rejected conversions 
Asylum lawyer Verbaas feels that sometimes the real reason behind rejecting a 
conversion as non-credible is that the IND finds it not legitimate because it 
wasn’t necessary: the convert could just as well have chosen a more liberal 
variant of his own religion (usually Islam). He gives two examples: A woman 
who said she converted to Christianity because of the more favourable status of 
women, was told she should have done more research into the other varieties of 
Christianity besides the Pentecostal church she joined. A ‘low point’ was the 
rejection, motivated with bible quotes, of a woman who had had an abortion and 
stated that she found more forgiveness in the Christian faith than in Islam. The 
IND pointed out that in both religions abortion was a sin, which rendered the 
conversion non-credible.63 In another case the IND specifically asked the 
refugee: ‘Why was it necessary for you to choose a different religion instead of 
                                                      
58  UNHCR 2013 citing: ABRvS [Dutch Council of State] 30 May 2011, 201011349/1/V1, 
ECLI:NL:RVS :2011:BQ7859, point 2.2.3; ABRvS [Dutch Council of State] 4 April 2011, 
201008219/1/V1, ECLI:NL:RVS: 2011:BQ0748, JV 2011/245; ABRvS [Dutch Council of 
State] 24 December 2009, 200906274, ECLI:NL:RVS:2009:154. 
59  Haar & Douma 2016, p. 23. 
60  ABRvS [Dutch Council of State] 30 December 2016, 201505920/1/V2, ECLI:NL:RVS:2016 
:3502, point 7-7.5. 
61  Battjes 2016, p. 80. 
62  De Groot 2017. ECtHR 8 October 2015, 77212/12, Korosec v. Slovenia, ECLI:CE:ECHR 
:2015:1008JUD007721212. 
63  Verbaas 2016, p. 33. 
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practising Islam the way you see it and the way you wish?’64 It seems as though 
a refugee cannot legally change faith without an officially approved reason.  
 Sometimes decisions by the IND on the credibility of statements can be quite 
incredible themselves. In one Kafkaesque example, the alien applicant had made 
statements about discussing with his girlfriend their own conversion and the 
possible consequences, and also statements about his doubts about Islam, his 
initial disinterest in religion and the gradual process of his conversion. The IND 
however, following its policy of attaching crucial importance to the statements 
by the aliens themselves, decided that the applicant ‘did not think about the 
consequences [of his conversion]’ and ‘did not adequately explain his road to 
Christianity’. In its decision, the IND stated without explanation that the alien 
could not explain how he went from being uninterested in religion to becoming 
a Christian, and that it was incomprehensible that ‘someone who is not really 
involved in religion or looking for one, rather suddenly surrenders to a new 
religion’. The court understandably quashed the IND’s decision as incom-
prehensible.65 It almost seems as if it doesn’t matter what the alien says for the 
IND to decide that he hasn’t made adequate statements about the relevant issues. 
Does the IND use a secret blueprint of a ‘credible’ conversion? Or are the 
decisions rather random? 
 Other decisions seem to use a tacit criterion akin to ‘Westernisation level’ 
which is used in the ‘pardon’ of refugee minors: it seems as if a certain level of 
Christian religiosity is required to acquire an asylum permit. In both cases, 
persons can be said to be integrated to a degree that will cause enormous trouble 
(re)adapting to life in, say, Afghanistan or Iran. The more a refugee adopts an 
identity with which civil servants can identify, the more willing they seem to be 
to take him in. But the bar is set high. An example is the case of an Afghan 
refugee who in his seventh (!) application for asylum finally succeeded in 
getting his conversion confirmed, not by the IND, but by the district court. The 
court decided that the applicant had shown that he had made progress in his 
knowledge and practice of the Christian faith and was more and more integrated 
in the Christian community in which he lived, while the IND in their defence 
merely stated that ‘the plaintiff states that he goes to church, reads the bible and 
prays. But he stated this in earlier procedures already.’ When that is not enough, 
which is more than most self-declared present-day Christians do, what does it 
take to be a credible Christian? The IND continued with barely concealed 
irritation: it is ‘not surprising that the plaintiff has gained more knowledge, now 
that he submits his conversion as motive for asylum for the fourth time.’66  
 The IND also expects applicants to think and act rationally and to be fully 
aware of their interests and rights and duties at every stage of the procedure. 
The questions in the interviews ‘often assume a high level of education’ on the 
                                                      
64  IND, Rapport aanvullend gehoor (additional hearing), 28 August 2014 (anonymized).  
65  Rechtbank [Dutch District Court] Den Haag, 2 March 2017, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2017:2808. 
66  Rechtbank [Dutch District Court] Den Haag, 2 March 2017, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2017:2106, 
point 5.2. 
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part of the asylum seeker.67 In one case, the Muslim applicant had not mentioned 
his interest in Christianity in the first hearings, because he was not yet sure about 
converting: ‘my faith was not yet complete’. Failing to mention something so 
important harmed the credibility of the applicant’s story. But the fact that he 
mentioned it at a later stage, when others had told him that his considering to 
convert would be relevant in the procedure, was taken as a sign of insincerity as 
well. Apparently, if you do not act perfectly rationally from the start (even if 
you are traumatized, homeless, illiterate, culturally different etc.), you run the 
risk that your statements are labelled as ‘insincere’.68 This is aptly expressed by 
Dutch author of Afghan origin Rodaan Al Galidi, who in 2011 won the EU Prize 
for Literature, and subsequently failed his Dutch ‘integration test’: ‘a tidy lie is 
better than a messy truth.’69 
 I will end this contribution with, first, a brief discussion of the role of 
rationality in the procedures in both cases and the historical context of con-
versions and new religions, and, finally, speculate on the real motives 
underlying institutional reluctance concerning conversions and new religions. 
12.7 Character and context of institutional reluctance: 
rationality and history 
It seems as though refugee converts as well as Pastafarian colander wearers have 
been accused of acting too rationally: using religion as a mere instrument to 
acquire rights or privileges. Of course, that image does not square with the 
picture of religion as consisting of deeply personal and very profound convic-
tions about aspects of life that elude rational explanation and choice. But the 
law, as well as people processing organisations such as the IND, municipal civil 
service and courts, presuppose the fiction of the rational person: people are 
rational thinkers and actors with free will who are aware of their objective 
interests. This leads to contradictory demands, for which I will give some 
examples. 
 On the one hand, an asylum seeker must explain his conversion to 
Christianity as a well thought through and rational decision out of free will. On 
the other hand, the whole flight history and asylum procedure may not form a 
part of those rational deliberations, on the penalty of being regarded as not 
credible. On the one hand, objective evidence is demanded concerning the 
conversion, while on the other hand, the IND can ignore any scientific reports 
or other official (church) documents and use only its own judgement based on 
the refugee’s statements in the interviews. The same happens with Pastafarians: 
on the one hand, the mayor of Nijmegen demands ‘objective sources’ that show 
                                                      
67  Werkman 2017. 
68  IND, Voornemen tot afwijzen asielaanvraag (intention of rejecting asylum application), 13 
May 2014 (anonymized). 
69  Al Galidi 2016, back flap. 
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Pastafarianism to be a religion. But when those sources are provided – multiple 
scientific publications, opinions of other Dutch mayors and a Dutch court ruling 
– the mayor uses the same tactic as the IND and demands credible proof from 
the Pastafarian herself, of which only the mayor himself is to be the judge.  
 Rational investigation by courts does not stop at the content of faith, where 
it should stop in order to respect freedom of religion. The principle of 
interpretative restraint is clearly violated in both cases: refugees are forced to be 
completely open about their religious opinions, doubts and changes and to 
justify their adherence to a certain religion. Pastafarianism is judged on the 
credibility of its content, and on the existence of explicit written commandments 
concerning certain rituals (holy headgear).  
 In history, conversions are abundant. Romans and Germanic tribes were, 
sometimes by force, converted to Christianity; Portuguese Jews converted to 
Christianity after the Alhambra Decree; slaves in the colonies converted to 
Christianity. Does it make any difference when we label these conversions ‘not 
credible’? Maybe motives were pragmatic: humane treatment, escape from 
poverty and exclusion, respect for human rights and dignity. But if, after 
conversion, one lives as a Christian, why not recognise the convert as a 
Christian?  
 The history of the emergence of new religions is full of examples of more 
and less success. Let’s take a brief look at the Church of Jesus Christ of the 
Latter Day Saints, or Mormonism. This church is now generally recognised as 
one of the varieties of Christianity and has millions of followers. However, the 
circumstances of its foundation were not very dissimilar in terms of credibility 
to those of the FSM Church: the founder, Joseph Smith, claimed he had received 
golden plates from an angelic figure called Moroni on which ‘reformed 
Egyptian’ characters were written which he translated using a ‘seer stone’. The 
text contained the Book of Mormon. Amongst many other things, it reports that 
Jesus visited America shortly after his resurrection and that there have been 
several waves of migration from the Middle East to America starting as early as 
2500 BC.70 Pastafarians have holy headgear, Mormons have religious under-
garments. Joseph Smith met with considerable suspicion and resistance, but in 
the end his church succeeded in attaining official recognition.  
12.8 Possible motives for institutional reluctance:  
policy and authority 
Two motives seem to be the most likely candidates for explaining the less than 
accommodating attitude of government institutions. The first is government 
policy and the protection of vested interests. In the case of refugees, public 
opinion as well as government policy is not pro-immigration. The IND is a 
                                                      
70  See, for example, Brodie 1995 and Wagoner & Walker 1982. 
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government agency, executing government policy, which is based on the idea 
that the people of the Netherlands have to be protected from large numbers of 
immigrants, especially from non-Western countries. In the Pastafarian case, the 
Ministry for the Interior sent a letter to all municipal authorities, warning them 
about applications with colander photos and strongly advising them to reject all 
such applications.71 The association for the municipal civil service cheerfully 
forwarded this message to its members.72 Although both instructions are not 
binding for the mayors who formally make the decisions, they are authoritative. 
 In May 2017, a Pastafarian filed a request under the Government Information 
(Public Access) Act regarding communication about applications for travel 
documents by Pastafarians. Quite soon after the first questions in 2014 by 
municipal civil servants, the Home Office’s Identity Data Authority came up 
with a standard rejection text which it has repeated to civil servants ever since, 
without reconsidering.73 
 The mayors also argued that religious people might be offended by the 
Pastafarians’ colander photo applications, because they might feel mocked. 
Also, Muslims might be afraid that the Pastafarians were actually campaigning 
for the abolishment of the religious exception clause for ID photos, and maybe 
even for religious privileges altogether. Whether or not this is true, it is not a 
valid reason for government institutions to restrict the religious freedom of 
Pastafarians more than the freedom of other believers. It seems that the interests 
of traditional and traditionally organised religions are still protected very well, 
although their social relevance is small and rapidly diminishing.  
 The second possible motive is fear of being tricked into awarding rights and 
privileges to people who do not really deserve them. Authorities do not like 
being taken for a ride, which is understandable, because that diminishes their 
authority in the public eye. The fear of being made a fool of, whether or not 
justified, was tangible in the procedures I witnessed.  
12.9 Conclusion: symbolism or consequences? 
To sum up, the suspicious attitude of civil service and courts towards the FSM 
Church and converted asylum seekers is understandable. But that does not make 
it justified. In both cases, the consequences of being more lenient and accom-
modating are not very serious: how many people will want to appear in their 
photo ID documents with ridiculous headgear just for fun? How many refugees 
                                                      
71  Nieuwsbrief reisdocumenten, Nummer 2, 26 juli 2016. 
 <abonneren.rijksoverheid.nl/nieuwsbrieven/archief/rijksdienst-voor-identiteitsgegevens---
nieuwsbrief-reisdocumenten-caribisch-deel-koninkrijk/716>.  
72 <nvvb.nl/nl/communicatie/nieuwsberichten/pastafarians-mogen-niet-met-vergiet-op-id-
kaart>.  
73 <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/wob-verzoeken/2017/09/05/besluit-wob-
verzoek-over-aanvragen-reisdocumenten-door-leden-van-de-kerk-van-het-vliegend-
spaghettimonster> 
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will go through the trouble of separating themselves from their religious 
community and integrating into a new one only for the sake of appearances, to 
acquire a residence permit? Keeping up appearances seems to be more 
important in these cases than really addressing the issues and taking a level-
headed perspective. 
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 Chapter 13 Concluding Remarks  
Elspeth Guild 
13.1 Introduction 
Romans 13:  
(1) Let every person be subject to the governing authorities. 
For there is no authority except from God, and those that 
exist have been instituted by God.  
(2) Therefore whoever resists the authorities resists what 
God has appointed, and those who resist will incur 
judgment. 
or Matthew 25? 
(35) For I was hungry and you gave me food, I was thirsty 
and you gave me drink, I was a stranger and you welcomed 
me,  
(36) I was naked and you clothed me, I was sick and you 
visited me, I was in prison and you came to me. 
The reception of migrants in Europe has become a controversy which leaves no 
section of society untouched. The arrival in a European Union of over 500 
million inhabitants of a couple of million asylum seekers mainly from Syria, 
Iraq and Afghanistan in 2015 and 2016 has sparked controversies in as disparate 
areas as social affairs, housing and schooling, employment, integration policies 
and transport. The activities of charities and non-governmental organizations, 
mainly in assisting refugees and migrants as they seek protection from war and 
persecution or better opportunities for themselves and their families (or both) 
has come under scrutiny, primarily by state authorities (and extreme right 
groups), regarding whether assisting refugees and migrants is permissible, 
lawful or illegal. If illegal what sanctions should there be against those who help 
refugees and migrants?  
 These controversies about refugees, migrants or possibly simply foreigners 
are also rending religious communities apart. Even the Catholic church has been 
riven by differing views on what those who profess a belief in God and the Bible 
should do when confronted by the distress of the refugee or migrant in the face 
of state authorities’ policies to prevent the assistance of irregular entry and 
residence in the state. Among Christian religious groups, whether Catholic or 
Protestant, this controversy seems to express itself most frequently as the 
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Romans 13 versus Matthew 25 issue: in Romans 13 the faithful are called upon 
to obey the laws of the state, in Matthew 25 the faithful are called upon to 
welcome the stranger according to the famous phrase: I was a stranger and you 
invited me in.  
13.2 Scapegoating 
There are a number of ways of analyzing the issue and the arrival of religious 
doctrine into the arena. First, the hardening of law and policy in many European 
(and North American) countries against migrants and foreigners has sparked 
substantial controversy about the scapegoating of migrants as the source of other 
problems such as unemployment et cetera. While state authorities in many 
countries rely on the argument that the citizens are tired of so many migrants 
and want them either to leave or to integrate (assimilate), civil society groups in 
those same states have become increasingly mobilized against the more 
draconian immigration measures to which authorities have resorted. These civil 
society actors reject the claims of state authorities that they are acting in 
accordance with the wishes of the majority; instead, the civil society actors 
claim both the support of the majority (against a minor extreme right) and an 
obligation to protect and defend the weak – refugees and migrants. As so often 
happens, as the arrivals of refugees and migrants in 2015 – 16 increased, there 
was an escalation in the conflict between state authorities and civil society actors 
which resulted in an increasing use of criminal law against civil society actors 
who defied state authorities and welcomed refugees and migrants into their 
communities.1 The result has been an increase of criminal sentences being 
handed down by criminal courts in Europe against people who have and insist 
on continuing to assist refugees and migrants. Primarily these criminal 
sentences have been accompanied by fines, but in 2016/17 there was an increase 
in the use of custodial sentences.2 Thus, an analysis on the basis of law, 
resistance, more law and escalation is one framework to understand the 
changing relationship of Europe and its migrants.  
13.3 Justifications 
Another analytical framework is through the justifications which European civil 
society actors give for their actions in defying their own state authorities. 
Numerous actors facing criminal charges have justified their actions on the basis 
of the humanitarian crisis which faces migrants and refugees as a result of state 
                                                      
1  <picum.org/de/nachrichten/bulletin/52284/#cat_40004> accessed 13 September 2017.  
2  <en.rfi.fr/france/20170727-french-press-review-27-july-2017> accessed 13 September 
2017.  
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actions.3 They claim that the state itself should be providing reception and 
succour to refugees and migrants who arrive at the borders of their territories. 
They claim that state authorities are hypocritical when they claim that they 
comply with their international obligations but leave people in desperate 
conditions just at the edges of their territory. Still others claim that their faith 
requires them to provide assistance to refugees and migrants irrespective of the 
state laws which might prohibit or criminalise these actions. A notable example 
of this faith based argument is found in the Sanctuary Movement among 
churches in the USA.4 However perhaps the most widely reported religious 
actor calling on the faithful to defy state authority has been the Pope of the 
Catholic Church.5 
 The Pope’s call in 2015 that Catholic religious institutions and the faithful 
should open their doors and shelter refugees and migrants (irrespective of the 
prohibition of state authorities)6 came as a surprise not only to some state 
authorities but also to many faithfully within the Catholic ranks. Not all bishops 
and other leaders of the church agreed with the Pope and the controversy spread 
within the Vatican. The Jesuit Refugee Service has been among the most vocal 
in support of refugees and migrants7 while other parts of the faithful are more 
reluctant.8 The controversy is frequently expressed in terms of Roman 13 versus 
Matthew 25 – the language of the Bible, which as is not infrequently the case, 
appears to point in two directions simultaneously. The fine theological 
arguments are played out among those who have the specialist training and 
knowledge for that exercise. It is not here that these will be repeated. Rather it 
is space which has been chosen by many of the faithful, not only among the 
Catholic church but also among the Protestant sects, for the debate to take place. 
Unlike the civil society actors who defy state authorities on the basis of 
humanitarian grounds, there is no effort in the Romans 13 versus Matthew 25 
debate for the state. The language of humanitarian reasons, human rights et 
cetera, is the language of the 20th century international institutions charged with 
maintaining peace. This is the field of international conventions, agreements, 
protocols and other products of international law and diplomacy which is 
mustered against the claims of state sovereign entitlements of some state 
authorities to protect their borders against those arriving (albeit on foot and in 
                                                      
3  <www.businessinsider.com/r-french-farmer-defiant-despite-suspended-jail-term-for-aiding-
illegal-migrants-2017-8?international=true&r=US&IR=T> accessed 13 September 2017.  
4 <www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/feb/08/sanctuary-movement-undocumented-
immigrants-america-trump-obama> accessed 13 September 20917.  
5 <www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ppeo-francis-refugees-migrants-more-help-
politicians-governments-europe-mediterranean-a7904341.html> accessed 13 September 
2017.  
6  <www.nbcnews.com/storyline/europes-border-crisis/pope-francis-calls-parishes-house-
refugee-families-says-vatican-will-n422561> accessed 13 September 2017.  
7  <en.jrs.net/> accessed 13 September 2017.  
8  <www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/05/catholic-populists-trump-pope-
francis-vatican/527766/> accessed 13 September 2017.  
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need of shelter) and to expel those who have managed to arrive. This is a battle 
of state sovereignty against the claim that states have ceded competence through 
international conventions to international organisations regarding how state 
authorities must behave in respect of refugees and migrants. It is a struggle 
which takes place before the courts with legal arguments about the meaning, 
reach and authority of international law in respect of state claims regarding 
border controls. This is the friction between state sovereignty and international 
law.  
13.4 Religious doctrine and the faithful 
But the Romans 13 versus Matthew 25 debate is quite different. It is not founded 
in law of any form which is still justiciable before the courts of Western states. 
Instead it takes the language of humanitarianism back to its pre 20th century 
roots in religious doctrine. Christian and Muslim religions have never ceded 
ground regarding religious duty to state authorities. Indeed, even the relin-
quishing of the entitlement to determine the composition of families (birth, 
marriage and death) has only slowly and some would say partially been 
relinquished by religious institutions to state authorities (and only for some 
purposes). That the faithful will find themselves in conflict between the 
prescriptions of state authorities and their religious obligations is not new. 
However, the field on which it is currently being carried out is more recent. The 
arrival of refugees and migrants in Europe and North America in perhaps 
somewhat larger numbers than state authorities anticipated (though not 
necessarily in such substantial numbers as to be destabilizing) in 2015 – 16 has 
opened the debate about the entitlement to obedience.  
 For those among the faithful for whom the practice of charity and welcome 
is an essential element of their doctrine, the Matthew 25 argument is the 
dominant one. In any discussion about the meaning of Romans 13 and the duty 
to obey state authorities is always read in a restrictive manner among this group, 
so as to limit to non-existent the ultimate duty to obey the state and refuse a 
welcome and shelter to refugees and migrants. For those who find the presence 
of refugees and migrants disturbing and unsettling, the argument of Romans 13 
that obedience to state authorities is a duty of the faithful takes precedence. As 
the balance of power between religious bodies and state authorities has 
vacillated towards state authorities in the 20th century, the certainty of the state 
of its entitlement to determine issue of policy such as border controls, and the 
refusal of shelter to refugees and migrants has been taken for granted. The 
arrival of Matthew 25 again in the public sphere as an argument for civil 
disobedience in support of refugees and migrants is something of a surprise for 
those authorities. The durability and sustainability of the Matthew 25 arguments 
in the face of state authorities’ power (and eventually violence) is a matter for 
all religious institutions to reflect upon at this time. 
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